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Recent years have seen increasing interest in economic analyses of religion. We carry out a 
critical review of Economics of Religion (EoR) in this review essay. We find that on the one 
hand  EoR  has  made  a  significant  contribution  to  enhance  our  understanding  of  secular 
trappings of religion and to break the stranglehold of non-rational approach to religion. On 
the other it has failed systematically to address the core of religion, namely, belief in its 
purportedly supernatural basis. Furthermore the methodological foundations of EoR are far 
from settled. We identify the shortcomings of the literature and suggest remedial measures, 
wherever possible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our 
learning, that  we through patience and comfort of  the scriptures 
might have hope. (Emphasis added) 
- Roman 15:4, Bible (King James Version) 
 
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
- George Santayana, The Life of Reason (Chermol 1985: 9) 
 
All submitted papers must also represent original work, and should 
fully reference and describe all prior work on the same subject and 
compare the submitted paper to that work. (Emphasis added) 
- Submission Policy, American Economic Review 
 
1.0 Agents of Mammon in the Temple of Gods? 
 
Recent years have seen increasing interest in economic analyses of religion. However, it is 
widely believed that the tendency to analyze social phenomena, including religion, within 
economic framework originated in the 18
th Century (Parsons 1979). That is when economics 
“sprang at least half grown from the head of Adam Smith” (Boulding 1952). Boulding traces 
back the origin of economic analysis of religion to Smith. But economists became interested 
in religion in a sustained manner only in the late 20
th Century
2 because of their inability to 
explain interpersonal (Tomes 1985) and international (DeLong 1988) income differences 
using material factors alone   (also  see Chiang 1961),  the rise of fundamentalism in both 
developed and underdeveloped countries (Schlicht 1997) , and also  as part of the general 
expansion of economics into contiguous fields (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975, Pautler 1977).
3 In 
any case the tendency to analyze largely secular phenomena within religious/supernatural 
                                                 
2 In the early 20
th Century the founders of modern economics like Alfred Marshall (1920) and F. Y. Edgeworth 
(2003) operated at a safe distance from the religious domain. Marshall (1920: 1), for instance, begins with the 
acknowledgement  that  religion  is  one  of  “the  two  great  forming  agencies  of  the  world‟s  history”.  But  his 
engagement with religion ends with this commonplace remark. 
3 Coase (1978: 207) and Stigler (1984: 312) suggest that the expansion of economics into contiguous fields had 
to wait till the discourse of economics attained a minimal level of “abstractness and generality”. Hirshleifer 
(1985: 59) seems to suggest that the expansion is inevitable. Coase (1978: 210), Hirshleifer (1985: 53), and 
Schlicht (1995: 113-114) suggest that these forays have an intrinsic motivation as well, namely, “to understand 
the working of the economic system itself”, “to become aware of how constraining has been their [economists‟] 
tunnel vision about the nature of man and social interactions”, and “testing the limits of economic analysis”, 
respectively. Such intrinsic interests have at times inspired economic analyses of religion. See, for instance, 
Kane (1966), Olds (1994), Hull and Bold (1998), and Olds and Liu (2000). In this regard also see papers 
inspired  by  Solomon‟s  Problem  (Section  4.7.3,  infra).  The  hype  around  imperialist  drive  of  economics 
notwithstanding the impact of economics on other social sciences has been modest. See, for instance, the general 
survey of influence of economics on sociology by Baron and Hannan (1994). Closer to our concern is the 
negligible influence of economics on sociology of religion as late as early 1990s (ibid).   5 
framework is as old as mankind itself. A complete list of examples would turn out to be the 
history of mankind. Still to give a feel of the range of issues involved it is sufficient to note 
that from wars to marriages, from fertility of females to fertility of farms, from earthquakes to 
lightening  anything  and  everything  that  comes  to  mind  has  been  explained  by  invoking 
supernatural  agencies  in  some  form  at  some  stage  of  history.  Material  setbacks  were 
attributed to divine punishment for transgressions and victories were treated as rewards for 
righteousness. So the “pre-moderns”, as Oakley (2006: 15) has argued convincingly, saw 
almost everything through the supernatural prism.
4 That this tendency is not confined to the 
pre-modern age should be evident from the massive influence of religion in the 20
th Century 
(see, for instance, Iannaccone 1998 for survey based evidence in this regard). Also a cursory 
glance at a list of contributions dealing with religion in a variety of academic disciplines 
suggests that the tendency to explain anything and everything using religion continues to be 
pervasive in our times. 
 
No  wonder  the  role  of  religion  in  society  has  been  debated  intensely  over  the  last  few 
centuries, especially after the Protestant Reformation. On the one hand Adam Smith and Max 
Weber maintained that the right kind of religion can do wonders, even if indirectly. On the 
other David Hume and Karl Marx were at best skeptical of religion. We will argue later that 
insofar as almost everything religious is explained by invoking material forces there is a 
strong tendency within  Economics  of Religion  (henceforth  EoR) to  look at  religion  à la 
Marx.  For  now  the  burden  of  the  argument  is  that  there  seems  to  be  a  near  universal 
consensus regarding some sort of link between religion and socio-economic outcomes. All 
parties to this debate invoke some measure of economic performance to support their claims. 
So economists cannot be accused to have invaded the scene with alien concepts. In any case 
the unresolved puzzles haunting other disciplines are not the primary concern of EoR, which 
has largely restricted itself to empirical analyses of the massive influence of religion in the 
20
th Century. While reviewing the literature we will see that it is also raising questions about 
hitherto ignored aspects of religion and economy. 
 
Given the teleological consensus referred to above an economist could surely ask, and in fact 
should ask, if this consensus is helpful to one engaged in analysis of religion. Perhaps it is not 
helpful because the sheer diversity of outcomes attributed to religion in different times and 
                                                 
4 See Loewe (1994) for an extensive discussion on the place of supernatural in Han China (202 BC - 6 AD and 
25 - 220 AD).   6 
places  is  bewildering.  Either  the  people  are  using  the  same  label  (religion)  for  entirely 
different things or religion is multi-faceted and can indeed produce such a diverse range of 
outcomes given suitable environment. In either case the consensus referred to above should 
serve as a warning that isolating the role of religion or even identifying its essential character 
is going to be quite difficult, if not impossible. The controversy around Weber‟s Protestant 
Ethic Hypothesis is a sobering reminder in this regard. 
 
Religion is indeed astonishingly polyvalent and for that reason amenable to any number of 
interpretations, which perhaps explains why economists have generally steered clear of things 
divine. But a priori there is no reason why religious phenomena should not be amenable to 
economic analysis. There has, in fact, been a consensus within economics on the applicability 
of  the  formal  methodology  developed  for  analysis  of  markets  to  heterodox  concerns.
5 
However,  skepticism  regarding  EoR  within  economics  surfaced  soon  after  Azzi  and 
Ehrenberg‟s (1975) pioneering contribution (see, for instance, Long and Settle 1977: 413, 
also Hutchison 1977: 96) and religion continued to be an ignored issue within economics as 
late as mid 1980s. For instance, Stigler (1984: 309) wondered if “economic analysis can 
contribute significantly” to the study of “religious piety” while Hirshleifer‟s (1985) forceful 
advocacy of “expanding domain of economics” has no reference to religion. EoR picked up 
momentum only towards the end of 1980s when a number of papers addressing a variety of 
issues  ranging  from  historical  roots  of  EoR  on  the  one  hand  to  nature  of  church-sect 
dynamics on the other appeared in economics and non-economics journals. Around the same 
time some non-economists, especially in USA, started engaging with EoR.
6 This, however, 
                                                 
5 See Buchanan (1964, 1990), Becker (1976), Coase (1978), Schelling (2006 [1978]), Stigler (1984), Hirshleifer 
(1985), Posner (1987), and Ekelund et al (2006). Also see Gale and Shapely (1962), who put forth a general 
argument in favour of non-denominational character of formal methodology. In their justification for applying 
economics to religious phenomena McConnell and Posner (1989) restrict themselves to secular organizational 
issues.  Olson  (1971),  Coase  (1978),  Chakravarty  (1989),  McConnell  and  Posner  (1989),  Frey  (1997),  and 
Gomez and Moore (2006) suggest limits to usefulness of purely economic models outside the market arena. 
6 See, for instance, contributions to American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, and Journal for Scientific Study of Religion. Rodney Stark is one of the 
most vocal proponents of rational choice approach within sociology of religion, where it is generally identified 
with economics (Stark 1997). Also see Warner (1993) and contributions by a number of protagonists of rational 
choice approach within sociology in Young (1997, Ed.). See Parsons (1979), Robertson (1992), Bruce (1993), 
Chaves (1995), Demerath (1995), and Ellison (1995) for a critique. The sociology literature is divided into 
institutionalist and rational choice camps. The former stresses the “cultural embeddeness of religious practice” 
(Miller 2002: 440). On critiques of rational choice within sociology in general see literature reviewed in Baron 
and Hannan (1994: 1115). See Iannaccone (1995b, c) and Ekelund et al (2006) for a defence of rationality 
assumptions  in  EoR.  It  is  not  that  economists  are  unfamiliar  with  the  institutionalist  perspective  (see,  for 
instance, Sen 1973) but in economics it is not divorced from rational choice (Bernheim 1994, Kuran 1997). But 
not  all  economists  are  comfortable  with  the  rationality  assumptions  made  in  EoR  (see,  for  instance, 
Montogomery 1996a).   7 
was  not  the  end  of  the  era  of  skeptism  referred  to  above.  The  question  whether  or  not 
economics can be applied to things divine, and, if yes, in what way, remains far from settled 
and continues to evoke interest both within and outside economics (for recent discussions see 
Ekelund et al 2006: Chapter 1, Dialogue in Journal of Management, Spirituality, & Religion, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, also Symposium on the Rational Choice Approach to Religion, Journal for 
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 34, No. 1). Amidst all this EoR emerged as a sub-discipline 
within economics in the late 1990s. This in short is how the agents of mammon (economists) 
became associated with religion. 
 
This review began with an attempt to carry out a quick aerial survey of EoR in response to an 
innocuous  question  but  ended  up  almost  as  a  door-to-door  census  of  the  literature.  The 
driving force for this circuitous journey can be traced to three disparate sources, namely, the 
ancient  reverence  for  all  things  written,  Santayana‟s  caution  against  forgetting  past,  and 
AER‟s  ambiguous  submission  policy.  The  present  essay  provides  snapshots  from  that 
rewarding journey. Any traveler back from a long journey faces the dilemma of what to 
share. Even though instinctively he wants to share everything in the end he has to make a 
selection. Hopefully the selections made for the present essay are of wider interest. As we 
will  see  in  our  discussion  below  the  field  is  still  in  a  state  of  flux  and  most  of  the 
methodological foundations are yet to be laid down. Therefore, in the present draft, which is 
also the first, we adopt liberal selection criteria to avoid Type I errors.  Rest of this review 
essay is organized as follows. Section 2.0 of Part I provides a summary of the review. The 
next two parts constitute the bulk of this essay. Part II provides a bird‟s eye view of the 
literature. Part III critically examines the treatment of select issues like the nature of data 
generating process in the religious domain, the treatment of afterlife, religious beliefs, etc and 
then provides an outline of the market for religion. Part IV very briefly recapitulates the 
discussion. In this essay we use the word church to refer to religious organizations in general 
as well as Christian churches in particular. Around 90 entries in References, which are not 
part of EoR literature, have been starmarked. The identification is not definitive since there is 
bound to be some overlap among the literatures of disciplines working in interdisciplinary 
domains. Actually another two dozen or so contributions that belong to the grey area between 
EoR and sociology and EoR and mainstream economics could have been marked out. We 
have not done that for a specific reason. A literature differs from a collection of writings in a 
crucial respect. It is marked by interconnectedness or cross-referencing. If this idea makes 
sense then we are not mistaken in treating the abovementioned contributions as part of EoR   8 
literature. Note one more thing. We are emphasizing not only the interlinkages between EoR 




The last major review of EoR was carried by Iannaccone (1998) who reviewed the literature 
starting from 1975, which is when the first well known contemporary contribution to EoR 
appeared (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975). Iannaccone (1995b, 1998) eloquently summed up the 
positive  contribution  of  EoR  without  subjecting  it  to  a  critical  examination.  In  addition 
Iannaccone‟s review did not examine a number of important, pre-1988 contributions. In this 
essay we will step further back and subject the progress in the field to a critical review. The 
first thing that strikes one is that almost all major ideas that dominated EoR in the 1990s have 
been overturned or severely challenged. Freeriding is no longer treated solely as a problem 
while providers  of religion  are not  necessarily  treated  as  rent  seekers.  Both  demand and 
supply  side  theories  of  religious  vitality  have  been  subjected  to  severe  methodological 
criticism and previous findings have been shown to be dubious in many cases. Sects are no 
longer treated as necessarily non-violent and free market for religion is no longer an article of 
faith. The causal relationships between education, crime, etc and religion are no longer taken 
for granted. Things are changing fast in EoR. While it took more than a decade for supply 
side approach to secularization to be challenged the newer theories that appeared after 1998, 
like  the  ones  proposing  a  link  between  religious  beliefs  and  economic  growth,  were 
challenged within less than five years. So EoR has indeed entered what Hirshleifer (1995: 54) 
calls the second phase of invasion of a new field “when doubts begin to emerge”. In a parallel 
development the structure of discourse of EoR seems to be moving closer to mainstream 
economics  and  the  field  is  becoming  clearly  distinct  from  its  elder  cousin  Sociology  of 
Religion.
7 In other words it is the right time to carry out a thorough review of the literature. 
 
The present review  has three distinctive features. First of all this review  tries to cover the 
entire literature (1776-2008). Secondly, it attempts a multi-level synthesis of the literature. 
The  inter-linkages  highlighted  would  hopefully  help  future  researchers.  To  be  precise 
                                                 
7 There is hardly any attempt in EoR to distinguish between Sociology of Religion and Economics of Religion. 
For limited attempts in this regard see Iannaccone (1995b), Ekelund et al (2006: 70-72) and Sherkat (2001). See 
Miller (2002) for a discussion on difference in management studies and SoR approaches to religion.   9 
synthesis is attempted at three different levels. Firstly within EoR the review brings together 
well-known as well as less well-known but methodologically important contributions to a 
particular issue. Wherever required it draws from contributions to other issues in EoR as well. 
To this set are added critiques within EoR. At another level it draws upon contributions from 
other related disciplines such as Sociology of Religion, Management Studies, etc. We also 
refer to useful developments elsewhere in economics. Last but not the least we subject EoR to 
a rigorous critique, identify the areas in which it is found lacking, and suggest remedies 
wherever  possible.  In  a  number  of  places  we  sketch  newer  alternatives.  Multiplicity  of 
explanations for almost every religious phenomenon seems to be the most striking empirical 
regularity in EoR. The collage of models that emerges in this review helps to illustrate the 
primitive stage of theorizing in  EoR  and  also  drives home the message that  if the same 
empirical regularity can be explained using different approaches none of them should be 
accorded primacy. In the rest of this section we will briefly discuss the key findings of this 
review essay. 
 
EoR has made a significant contribution to enhance our understanding of secular trappings of 
religion and to break the stranglehold of non-rational approach to human behaviour within 
the religious sphere. To be precise its primary achievement has been to expose the mundane 
character of most of the things that were otherwise granted immunity from critical scrutiny 
owing to allegedly supernatural connections. Consequently, the enigmatic core of religion has 
shrunk considerably over the years. However, EoR has failed systematically to address the 
core of religion, namely, belief in its purportedly supernatural basis. It is with regard to this in 
particular that the methodological foundations of EoR are found lacking. The success has a 
Marxist tinge insofar as almost every religious phenomenon, institution or choice has been 
shown to vary more or less continuously with material factors. The failure has resulted in a 
secondary failure, namely, inability to generate positive externalities for other domains of 
economics from which EoR has borrowed so heavily. One indeed wonders that if EoR is all 
about  demand  and  supply  of  goods  and  services,  which  for  some  reason  are  tagged  as 
religious, then one does not need a separate field. The microeconomics used to deal with 
market for potatoes is sufficient. But hopefully in this review we have been able to show that 
EoR indeed has a more challenging side, namely, trade in a peculiarly inscrutable market 
where  the  pivotal  good  (afterlife/salvation),  without  which  market  for  religion  becomes 
indistinguishable from usual markets, defies traditional conceptualizations of a good. 
   10 
All along in this review we draw attention to unresolved or untouched problems and their 
implications for our understanding of religious phenomena. In particular we draw attention to 
issues  like  the  persistent  dissonance  between  practice  and  doctrine,  the  inflexibility  of 
doctrine  and  the  ease  and  universality  of  evasion,  the  inertia  of  religious  beliefs,  the 
problematic  dichotomy  of  believing  masses  and  narrowly  self-interested  clergy,  etc.  We 
argue that further progress within EoR is possible only if we are prepared to address the 
above issues, which requires among other things opening up the hitherto untouched black box 
called religious preferences and beliefs as well as better coordination with other disciplines 
engaged in studying religion. Otherwise EoR is condemned to remain a net debtor to other 
fields  of  economics.  In  fact,  large  parts  of  post-1975  EoR  are  a  by-product  of  George 
Becker‟s work on time allocation, human capital, household production, etc (e.g., Becker 
1965, Becker 1976, Stigler and Becker 1977, Becker and Mulligan 1997, etc) and, to go even 
further back, Adam Smith‟s general insights. In other words Stigler‟s (1984: 312) concern 
about low returns from diversification remains valid at least in case of EoR. This calls into 
question the very sustainability of EoR because it has been argued that in the long run the 
stability of economists‟ foray into another domain depends to a large extent upon what it 
contributes to the core concerns of economics (Coase 1978: 211). We are, however, not the 
first to observe this with respect to EoR. More than half a century ago Boulding (1952) while 
reviewing  economic  analyses  of  religion  pointed  out  that  the  contribution  to  EoR  by 
“American economists in the generation before the First World War” failed to make a long 
term  impact  because  “[n]one  of  them…made  particularly  significant  contributions  to 
economic theory” (also see Coats 1985: 1704). For a related concern within management 
studies see Dialogue in Journal of Management, Spirituality, & Religion, Vol. 3, No. 3. 
 
Another major shortcoming of this literature is that nowhere does one find any attempt to 
defend the status of EoR as a science.
8 One does not even find a discussion of work in allied 
social sciences, which can support EoR‟s claim to be a science. If science of religion is not 
possible then EoR by implication cannot be a scientific discipline. It is not that the case of 
science of religion has not been defended (see, for instance, Balagangadhara 2005 [1994], 
etc) but the same has not been used in EoR as a starting point. Mere use of tools of economics 
                                                 
8 See Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]) for a critique of anthropology/sociology of religion. He argues that these 
disciplines are unscientific, a charge that easily sticks to EoR as well insofar as it accepts some of the prejudices 
of these disciplines without adequate scrutiny.   11 
does not guarantee scientific structuring of the discourse. For instance, subjecting survey data 
to econometric investigation does not suffice to make a science out of EoR. 
 
II. BIRD’S EYE VIEW 
 
Before commencing the review it makes sense to provide a ballpark estimate of the size of 
the domain referred to here as EoR. One of the earliest uses of the phrase economics of 
religion can be found in Boulding (1952). However, religion had not been assigned a JEL 
classification number as late as 1998 (Iannaccone 1998: 1465). So locating all prior economic 
analyses of religion though desirable is not straightforward. This review was carried out in 
two steps. It began with a database search (ECONLIT, etc) and then relied on ancestry search 
(screening  of  bibliography  of  already  identified  studies)  restricting  to  English  language 
sources in the process. In addition Iannaccone‟s (1998) review of EoR, Oslington‟s (2003) 
collection of papers on  economics  and religion, and meta-studies  like Baier and Bradley 
(2001) on crime and religion, Chaves and Gorski (2001) on religious competition and vitality 
of religion, and Durlauf et al (2008a, b) on theories of economic growth were referred to. In 
addition Arbaugh (2006) and Miller (2006) were referred to for contributions on religion in 
management studies. 
 
As mentioned above EoR like everything else in economics began with Adam Smith in the 
18
th  Century.
9  Anderson  (1988)  provides  a  succint  summary  of  Smithian  position  on 
economic analysis of religious behaviour  contained in  Wealth of Nations (also Theory of 
Moral Sentiments). On the one hand Smith treated churchgoers as self-interested individuals 
on the other he saw churches as yet another firm. In short, he “attempted to apply the same 
principles  of  economics  to  understanding  religious  institutions  that  he  applied  to  the 
understanding  of  ordinary  commercial  transactions”  (ibid:  1068,  emphasis  added).  Smith 
discussed the pros and cons of monopoly, high degree of polarization, and high degree of 
fractionalization in the market for religion and extended conditional support to a free market 
for religion (Rosenberg 1960, Anderson 1988, Ekeleund et al 2005, Leathers and Raines 
2008). He also pointed out that even though a symbiotic relationship emerges between the 
                                                 
9 Incidentally, Blaise Pascal, the 17
th Century French mathematician and theologian, was one of the earliest to 
formally apply rational choice approach to religious questions (see discussion on Pascal‟s Wager in Section 
10.1.2, infra). Possibly one can find a similar approach, even though implicit, in scriptures of all religions. See, 
for  instance,  Brams  (2003  [1980],  2007  [1983])  on  the  Old  Testament  and  Smith  (1999)  on  the  Book  of 
Revelation.   12 
established religion and the state it is not without risks. The state risks creating a parallel 
centre of power whereas the established religion risks being copted by a minority of the 
society, that is, the elite, to the detriment of its universal appeal. Roughly two centuries later 
Boulding (1952) noted that Smith‟s “observations represent everything that economists, qua 
economists, have said on this subject”. The exceptions being pre-War Americans like Richard 
T. Ely, who incidentally was one of founders of American Economic Association and was 
also  deeply  involved  in  the  Social  Gospel  movement,  John  B.  Clark,  Simon  N.  Patten 
(Boulding 1970, Coats 1985, and Bateman and Kapstein 1999), and Thorstein Veblen. Not 
much was written in the following decades. Interestingly, this gap in pre-War scholarship is 
despite the fact that during the intervening period a number of economists were “religious 
prelates” (Ekelund et al 2006: 21). For other early 20
th Century contributions see Oslington 
(1999, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, Part I) and Ekelund et al (ibid: 34). 
 
Iannaccone‟s  (1998)  review  of  EoR  covered  the  period  starting  from  1975.  Since  then 
religion  began  to  engage  economists  in  a  sustained  way  and  one  finds  at  least  one 
contribution per year by economists or in an economics journal dealing with religion as an 
explained or explanatory variable.
10 But we will push the cut off further back to include some 
insightful but widely ignored contributions like S. D. Clark‟s (1951) Religion and Economic 
Backward Areas (also see Clark 1947),  William Arthur Lewis‟s (1972 [1955]) The Theory of 
Economic Growth, and Kenneth E. Boulding‟s (1957) Some Contributions of Economics to 
Theology and Religion. Clark focused on Weber‟s Protestant Ethic Hypothesis in the context 
of  North  America.  Without  denying  the  impact  of  religion  on  material  development  he 
suggested  an  indirect,  and  only  incidentally  causal,  channel  of  influence.  While  Lewis 
recognized  the  bi-causal  relationship  between  religion  and  material  development,  and 
rejected both Marxist as well as Weberian orthodoxy, his treatment of religion is closer to 
Weber in spirit because religion, he argues, changes over a very long period. He suggested 
that  economic  (institutional,  e.g.,  religious)  change  is  at  best  sufficient  but  certainly  not 
necessary for institutional (economic) change. He also highlighted  the general disconnect 
between religious doctrine and practice and the difference between the impact of religious 
affiliation and demographic status - whether minority or majority, whether expatriate or not, 
of a community on its economic fortune. Next in line is Boulding (1957), who argued that 
                                                 
10 We are not denying the importance of contributions by non-economists in non-economics journals. In fact, we 
include a large number of such contributions in the present review. But relevant contributions began to appear in 
the 1980s and therefore cannot influence the choice of our cut-off date.   13 
economic  analysis  of  religion,  even  “questions  of  high  theology”,  makes  sense  and  that 
churches could be treated as multi-product firms.
11 The first major contribution in this sense 
was  Edward  J.  Kane‟s  (1963)  Justice  and  Welfare  Economics:  A  Slightly  Mathematical 
Approach.  Kane  showed  that  modern  Paretian  economics  and  Scholastic  thought  were 
unlikely to be compatible. We will return to Kane‟s methodological contributions later and 
presently  turn  to  a  justification  for  excluding  from  EoR  other  papers/notes  dealing  with 
similar issues. 
 
For  instance,  there  was  a  lively  debate  on  Medieval  Church‟s  economic  doctrine  in  The 
Economic Journal (1931-1932) involving Bhalchandra P. Adarkar, K. E. Boulding, Edwin 
Cannan, J. M. Keynes, B. K. Sandwell, and H. Somerville. Likewise in 1950s Raymond De 
Roover  wrote  a  series  of  articles  on  Scholastic  thought  in  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics and Kyklos. Elsewhere pre-First World War American economists like Richard T. 
Ely and others were interested in harnessing economics to fulfill their religion-inspired vision 
(Boulding 1970, Coats 1985, Bateman and Kapstein 1999). All these authors were concerned 
with either defending economics from, what Adarkar calls, “the ghost of Canonist doctrine” 
(attempts to provide modern economics with a Christian pedigree) or providing a sympathetic 
assessment of the Canonist doctrine. There was no attempt to subject religion per se to critical 
scrutiny (see, for instance, Veblen 1910 and Patten 1912). Knight‟s (1939) partly polemical 
piece seems to be an exception insofar as it asks if at all we can unambiguously attribute 
specific social outcomes to causal forces that can be traced back to the religious sphere. Kane 
differs  from  earlier  contributors  in  that  he  fruitfully  employs  formal  methodology  of 
economics  to  model  human  behaviour  in  the  religious  domain.  There  was  a  short  gap 
between publication of Kane‟s work (1963-1966) and nucleation of EoR as a sub-discipline 
of economics with the publication of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). Table 1 outlines the major 
phases in the history of EoR. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Some  of  the  post-1975  contributions  reviewed  here  are  not  EoR  in  the  true  sense.  For 
instance, just adding religion as a variable, with hardly any coherent theoretical justification, 
in an econometric model should not be counted as an exercise in EoR. Nevertheless in the 
run-up to this review any book/note/paper/working paper engaging with religion using some 
                                                 
11 Boulding (1970) collects a number of his writings on religion, not all of which qualify as EoR.   14 
sort  of  “economics”  approach  was  counted  in  to  avoid  excluding  any  consequential 
contribution. This made sense especially because the foundations of EoR are far from settled 
and therefore it is desirable to look  at all possible alternatives. Surprisingly even such a 
relaxed criterion could not admit more than a 1000 contributions, of which little more than 
half  employ  a  minimal  degree  of  rigor.  Within  this  latter  sub-set  around  a  tenth  of  the 
contributions can be attributed to a handful of authors and their co-authors, e.g., Iannaccone 
et al and Ekelund et al. With this crude estimate of the task at hand we can proceed to the 




The variety of taxonomies discussed in this section is an indicator of the richness of the issues 
with which we deal in EoR. Taxonomies suggested in Sub-Sections 3.1-3.4 relate to one or 
the other aspect of religion per se whereas those suggested in Sub-Sections 3.5-3.6 relate to 
purely methodological issues. 
 
3.1 Causal relationships 
 
We  will  begin  with  identifying  the  set  of  possible  relationships  between  religion  and 
economics in Figure 1, which is a modified version of Paldam (2001: Figure 1), that will 
serve as a roadmap for this review. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The links (1a) and (3a) in Figure 1, between economy and social outcomes, have been the 
mainstay of economics. The link 0a (0b) captures the impact of religion (other non-material 
elements of society) on other non-material elements of society (religion). EoR consists of two 
broad, not always exclusive, categories of studies that focus on the Weberian links, which 
capture the direct and indirect impact of religion on social outcomes (including economic), 
and the Marxist links, which capture the direct and indirect impact of material factors on 
religion.
12 To identify Weberian links (0a, 0b, 2b; 0a, 4, 3a; 1b, 3a; 2b) in Figure 1 start from 
                                                 
12 We use the labels Marxist and Weberian without implicating either Marx or Weber though referring to the 
general intuition behind their approach towards religion. Marx discussed the origin and the evolution of religion 
in  purely  material  terms  and  posited  a  unidirectional,  irreversible  historical  process  leading  from  origin  to   15 
the label religion and follow the arrows to reach material factors without retracing any line 
segment.  Likewise  we  can  identify  Marxist  links  (1a,  3b;  1a,  5,  0b;  2a).  One-part  links 
capture direct effects (e.g., 2a or 2b) whereas multi-part ones capture indirect effects (e.g., 1a, 
3b or 0a, 4, 3a). It is also possible to identify four-part links under both categories.
13 Note that 
within each category certain nodes are shared by more than one link. This should serve as a 
caution that isolating the causal mechanism can be quite difficult. In this essay we will try to 
restrict ourselves to one-part and two-part links.
14 
 
In the last major review of EoR  Iannaccone (1998: 1466)  calls attention to  “the  line  of 
research that interprets religious behavior from an economic perspective”, i.e., the Marxist 
links. However, we will explore both links because most of the religious outcomes of interest 
are  simultaneously  determined  along  with  other  socio-economic  outcomes  within  larger 
processes.  Figure  2  provides  a  layout  of  the  various  issues  discussed  under  Marxist  and 
Weberian categories in Sections 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0. 
Figure 2 about here 
                                                                                                                                                        
eventual demise of religion. To him religion was never more than a superstructure thrown up by deeper material 
forces that govern the organization of human societies. Lobkowicz (1964) provides an insightful survey of 
Marx‟s position on religion. Weber, while acknowledging the Marxist link, emphatically argued that there exist 
independent  channels  through  which  religion  influences  material  development  in  the  medium  to  long  run 
(Weber 1995 [1920]). But were they the first to argue the way they did? Far from that both acknowledged their 
predecesors. However, we use them as mascots here since the 20
th Century received the product of long lines of 
scholarship through their hands. Never before or after them have the ideas they championed – religion is a by-
product of material developments (Marx) and material development is deeply influenced by religion (Weber) – 
been put forth with so much force. 
13 This is not the only way of conceptualizing the inter-relationship between religion and economics. Welch and 
Mueller (2001) discuss a number of other schemes  - economics separate from religion, economics in service of 
religion, religion in service of economics, and religion in union with economics. See Parsons (1979) for a 
broader set of relations among things religious, erotic, economic, and intellectual. We, however, find the scheme 
outlined in Figure 1, which relates to Welch and Mueller‟s first category, to be best suited for our purpose. 
Boulding  (1952)  suggests  a  general  fourfold  classification  for  economics  per  se:  pure  theory,  study  of 
contemporary institutions,  historical studies, and policy studies. Within each of our  sub-categories one can 
approach the subject of interest in one or more of the four ways suggested by Boulding. For an attempt to map 
the relationship between business and religion see Miller (2006: Table 1). 
14 Without denying their importance we will skip papers dealing with inter -linkages between religion and a 
variety of issues like health,  happiness, satisfaction, delinquency, etc. Readers might want to refer Iannaccone 
(1998) and Dehejia et al (2005, 2007) for the first three. Regarding the last readers are referred to a meta-study 
by Baier and Bradley (2001) who review 60 studies and find evidence in support of a weak deterrent effect of 
religion on individual criminal behaviour (also see Iannaccone 1998). Lipford  et al (1993), Hull and Bold 
(1995), and Hull (2000), part of EoR tradition, were not included in the above study. Their findings reinforce the 
conclusion of the meta-study. Then comes Heaton (2006) who pointed out that most of this literature suffers 
from endogeneity bias. His analysis shows that religion has a negligible, if any, deterrent effect. Trawick and 
Howsen (2006) find an inverse relation between crime and religious homogeneity of a community. But they do 
not  address  the  problem  of  endogeneity  bias.  It  is  commonplace  in  this  literature  to  invoke  the  superior 
surveillance and punitive capacities of god to hypothesize lower  crime rates in religious communities. This 
hypothesis is suspect. Brams (2003 [1980]: 176) suggests that the threat of divine punishment might induce 
some to be deceitful so that “God‟s most punitive actions do not necessarily expunge evil from the world” 




Given the dominance of market metaphor in EoR it makes sense to classify studies according 
to the products of religious sector examined. Following Hull and Bold (1989: 8) products of a 
church can be classified as: a) temporal bliss (“set of products which bring happiness in this 
vale”) - e.g., Iannaccone (1988), b) public goods - e.g., Anderson and Tollison (1992), c) 
altered fate (“method to alter what otherwise might be considered uncontrollable events”, 
e.g., intercession, laying of on hand, etc), and d) deferred perpetuity (salvation) - e.g., Azzi 
and Ehrenberg (1975).
15 To this list one can add club goods - e.g., Iannaccone (1992a). EoR 
has so far attempted to model the market for the first two and the last product with some 
success. We are not aware of any attempt to model the market for the third
16 while attempts 
to model the market for salvation, which is the core of religion, have been uniformly 
frustrating as discussed in Section 9.2 (infra). What passes as salvation motive in EoR can be 
divided into two: afterlife and salvation. The latter refers to the need to live in a plausible 
world (Davies 1978: 90 and Schlicht 1995: 115). In most of the cases salvation in this latter 
sense  can  arguably  be  merged  with  public  goods.  It  is,  however,  desirable  to  retain  this 
distinction for two reasons. One, salvation can be individual specific (Davies 1978: 91). Two, 
salvation  generally involves an  element  of transcendence unlike public goods, which are 
necessarily driven by material forces. 
 
This attempt at classification notwithstanding one should not lose sight of two facts. One, 
religious goods are difficult to classify. For instance, “it is difficult to tell whether so-called 
mix-and-share groups constitute a "religious" good (e.g., fellowship and spiritual intimacy) or 
a "nonreligious"  good (e.g., friendship, interaction, and conviviality)” (Ellison  1995:  92). 
                                                 
15 Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 32; also Boulding 1957, Kane 1966, Ekelund et al 2006) list three motives for 
individual participation in religious activities: a) salvation, b) consumption, and c) social pressure. The last two 
can be interpreted as private and public good, respectively. 
16 One cannot be sure, however, because the talk about New Religious Movements is dangerously close to magic 
(e.g., Iannaccone 1995a). The work on religious rituals, however, is silent about magic. For instance, Miller 
(1993b: 488) acknowledges the possibility that rituals might be a “form of imitative magic” but proceeds to 
provide a legal-economic interpretation of textual references to sacrificial rituals. Ekelund et al (2006: Chp 3) 
provide a slightly detailed, but not very helpful, discussion on magic and religion (also see Iannaccone and 
Berman 2006). But they do not feel the need to differentiate the two for analytical purposes. Also note that 
insurance  products  of  religion  should  be  included  among  contributors  to  temporal  bliss.  Insurance  indeed 
involves attempts to avoid loss due to “uncontrollable events”. But the papers, dealing with religion as a source 
of insurance, discussed in this review do not invoke anything like magic as the instrument of avoidance.   17 
Two, “church”, as Boulding (1957) puts it, “is not a single-product firm” and “the purely 
“religious” product of the church is fairly small part of its total social product, even though 
this may be the ostensible excuse for its existence as an institution” (also see Ekelund et al 
2006). Without the “small part” a religious firm is not different from other types of firms in 
the society. So as long as the “small part” is left unaddressed we are far from an economic 
explanation of the divine realm. 
 
Ekelund  et  al  treat  the  output  of  religious  sector  as  Becker‟s  Z-good  because  “religious 
services are produced by combining capital goods (including money and time), labour, and 
market goods” (ibid: 55). They also observe that economic rationality can “derive from self-
interest  or  public  interest”,  which  in  turn  can  be  related  in  a  market  for  religion  with 
economic  or  spiritual  hypothesis.  To  elaborate  they  add  that  in  the  latter  “spiritual  ends 
become collective expression of common good, and religious organizations motivated by 
public interest would be expected to behave in conformity to this proposition” (ibid: 37). This 
confounding of spiritual and public goods is not helpful because of two reasons. Firstly, the 
two belong to different categories and are thus not directly comparable. The first relates to 
tangible/intangible  or  this-worldly/other-worldly  dimension  whereas  the  latter  relates  to 
nature of production technology. Secondly, even otherwise what is traditionally understood 
as spiritual good generally relates to individual experience even when enjoyed in a group or 
produced on a mass scale. 
 
Studies can also be classified depending on whether they treat products of a religious firm as 
search (quality can be determined before purchase), experience (quality can be determined 
costlessly  after  purchase),  or  credence  (quality  can  be  determined  after  purchase  at 
considerable expense of time and/or resources) goods. So far authors have largely ignored 
this distinction. But in most cases religious goods are implicitly modeled as search goods. 
Exceptions include Poutvaara and Wagener (2008), who could be interpreted as modelling 
religious goods as experience goods, and Iannaccone (1995a) and Ekelund et al (2006), who 
discuss the influence of credence goods in organization of the market for religion. We will 
argue  in  Section  10.3  (infra)  that  the  core  products  of  religion  defy  this  threefold 
classification scheme. 
 
Note two things before we close our discussion. The distinction between public, club, and 
private goods, as well as search, experience, and credence goods, produced by a religion is   18 
not  invariant to  the state of  technology, something that has  not  received attention in  the 
literature. We are not denying that some products are invariant to the general technological 
progress, e.g., auricular confession continues to be a private good (Arruñada 2004). Secondly, 
it is easy to see that the classification of studies depending on the motive of adherents of a 
religion follows the four-fold classification for products discussed above. 
 
3.3 Organizational forms 
 
Since organized religion dominates personalistic religion, at least in the public spaces, study 
of organizational forms in the market for religion is extremely important. Studies can be 
classified  depending  on  whether  they  deal  with  material  and  non-material  aspects  of 
organization. Under the latter category the most important distinction relates to whether a 
study treats theology/doctrine as endogenous (Kane 1966, Ekelund et al 1992, Smith 1999, 
Salmon 2008) or not (Allen 1995). The “material” category admits a number of distinctions 
among studies depending on whether religious organizations are treated as oligopolistic firm 
(Kane 1966), cartel-like (Ault et al 1987), rent-seeking organization (Ekelund et al 1989), 
monopolist firm (Ekelund et al 1989, Raskovich 1996), doctrine preserving organization, i.e., 
constrained by doctrine (Lipford 1992, Allen 1995), club (Iannaccone 1992a, Cassone and 
Marchese 1999), cooperative firm (Ferrero 2005, 2008b), social welfare maximizing entity 
(Anderson and Tollison 1992, Cassone and Marchese 1999), non-profit organization (Ben-
Ner 1997), membership maximizing (Cassone and Marchese 1999, McBride forthcoming), 
Stackelberg leader/follower firm (Barros and Garoupa 2002), normative organization (Miller 
2006a), longevity seeking (McBride 2007a), entrepreneurial firm (Poutvaara and Wagener 
2008), entity concerned about its share in god serving activities of society (Salmon 2008), 
etc. These modelling approaches are not essentially exclusive. In fact, many papers combine 
more than one assumption about nature of organization listed above. 
 
So  far  the  literature  has  largely  ignored  religious  organizations  concerned  with  universal 
dominance  (except  discussion  in  Bernholz  2006).  Fererro  (2006a)  deals  with  universal 
religions, “bound by a rule of free access”, which do not seek universal dominance. Based on 
their  club-theoretic  model  of  religious  groups  Carr  and  Landa  (1983)  argue  against  the 
possibility  of  universal  dominance,  in  demographic  terms,  of  any  particular  religion. 
Similarly  religious  organizations  which  inculcate  the  belief  that  at  least  some  of  their   19 
products are pure public goods and some of the products of other religious or secular groups 
are pure public bads are widely ignored (except Kumar 2008a). Kumar (2008a) differs from 
Chen (2004) in whose model religious participation of poor generates negative externality for 
the rich, where both rich and poor belong to the same religion, because the latter contribute 
more  to  common  pool  managed  by  religious  bodies  and  obtain  lesser  returns.  In  Kumar 
(2008a) a religious group can suffer due to the existence of other religions, which support 
different beliefs and preferences. 
 
3.4 Nature of god 
 
An overwhelming majority treats god as an intrusive wall hanging, better forgotten sooner 
than latter. Very few actually dare to invoke god and just one dares to play games with him. 
Salmon‟s (2008) god is endowed with preferences over division of power between state and 
church. He identifies five prototypical interpretations of divine preferences. State and church 
have preferences over interpretations of divine preferences. But once god‟s preferences are 
revealed he is out of picture and earthly players step in with all their material constraints. 
Viswanath and Szenberg‟s (2007) god designs rules, which address human externalities, to 
maximize inter-generational human welfare “subject to the constraint that they [rules] should 
be comprehensible to human beings… in the sense that they should be able to follow it, 
should make sense to the generation of human beings for whom the legislation is intended”. It 
is not clear whether their god is concerned about non-believers. Kumar‟s (2008a) god judges 
individuals  and  distributes  rewards  and  punishments  depending  on  their  religious  effort. 
Brams‟  (2003  [1980],  2007  [1983])  god  is  the  most  colorful  of  all  gods,  endowed  with 
varying degrees of immortality, incomprehensibility, omniscience, and  omnipotence, ever 
concerned  about  his  reputation  and  engaged  in  games  with  humans,  who  have  freewill. 
“[M]anipulative, vindictive on the one hand and magnanimous, open, and forgiving on the 
other”,  “always  suspicious  and  touchy”,  Brams‟  god  is  “other-directed  with  vengeance”. 
Surprisingly his god loses a number of games. No prizes for guessing why Brams chose to 
play a game with God! 
 
There is another way of looking at the nature of god, namely, identity. As discussed below 
(see Section 3.5, infra) majority of the contributions are concerned with monotheism. There 
are hardly any meaningful contributions on non-monotheistic beliefs in the EoR literature.   20 
Regressions with a dummy variable for a non-monotheistic religion cannot be counted in. 
Raskovich (1996), who deals with transition from polytheism to monotheism, is an exception. 
Kumar (2008a) introduces inclusive religions (all gods are equal, complete manfestations of 
the one true god/readiness to worship all gods) in addition to polytheism and monotheism in a 
model  exploring  propensity  to  secularism  while  Brams  (2007  [1983])  has  dealt  with 
agnosticism.  For  more  on  difference  between  treatment  of  polytheism  in  Kumar  and 
Raskovich see Section 10.1.2, (infra). 
 
All this is fine but one can surely ask if modelling god, or religion, presumes a positive belief 
in existence of god. Here Ekelund et al (2006: 48) come to our rescue. They argue: 
[W]hether God is some exogeneous force independent of human beings or whether God is a product of 
evolution  as  an  endogeneous  creation  of  the  human  brain  vital  to  survival  [or  whether  God  is  an 
innocuous, but persistent, by-product of evolution] is beside the point of economic inquiry. A demand 
curve for magic and/or religion may be generated in either case. 
 
It has been argued that existence of god could be treated as a state of nature (Brams 2007 
[1983]). Machina (2002) has suggested that whether the states of nature actually exist or are 
conjured up is irrelevant for the purpose of normative use. So at least as long as we stick to 
normative exercises we need not care about the truth status of the claim about existence of 
god. 
 
3.5 Objective of study 
 
Contributions to EoR can be classified according to their objective. Most of the studies aim 
(a) to add to the explanatory power of economic models (e.g., De Long 1988), (b) to enhance 
the understanding of religious phenomena per se (e.g., Iannaccone 1988), or (c) to enhance 
our understanding of economics (e.g., Miller 2002). Within the second category contributions 
can be classified according to whether they deal with peripheral aspects of religion (e.g., 
charity  -  Iannaccone  1997b)  or  core  of  religion  (e.g.,  basis  of  belief  in  god  -  Azzi  and 
Ehrenberg 1975, Brams 2007 [1983], Montgomery 1992). Regarding the last catergory note 
Schlicht (1995: 113-114) suggested that religion can serve as a testing ground for models of 
man. The idea is that a boomerang effect can result from use of economic tools in non-market 
settings. Very few contributors consciously examine the boomerang effects arising out of   21 
their engagement with religion (Miller 2002, 2006 and Gomez and Moore 2006, also see 
Montgomery 1996a, Hull and Bold 1998, and Olds and Liu 2000). Studies that fall under the 
first and second categories can also be classified depending on whether the objective is to 
build a theory of religion in general or a particular religion. Insofar as almost all the papers 
are silent in this regard it seems that the objective is to build a model of religion per se. But 
our discussion will reveal that most of the contributions are nowhere close to that implicit 
goal. Gomez and Moore (2006) have suggested that given the nature of market for religion it 
makes sense to restrict ourselves to “very close belief systems”. Another related scheme for 
classification relies on whether a study is normative (Iannaccone 1998, Clain and Zech 1999) 
or  not.  The  normative  studies  do  not  prescribe  how  religion,  etc  should  be.  Rather  they 
suggest  suitable  policy  measures.  For  instance,  Iannaccone  summarizes  the  research  that 
prescribes a hands-off religious policy for the state. Clain and Zech suggest that churches 
would be better off by working along with non-religious charities. 
 
There  is  another  category  of  studies,  ignored  in  this  review,  referred  to  as  Religious 
Economics  in  Kuran  (1994:  770),  which  broadly  refers  to  attempts  to  develop  economic 
models inspired by one‟s religious background or to justify “economic” models purportedly 
extracted from religious scriptures. Unlike Iannaccone (1998: 1466) we do not ignore this last 
category because “it is  far removed from  the research and professional interests of most 
economists” rather we find it impossible to engage in a dialogue with infallibilists.
17 The line 
between Religious Economics and EoR is indeed very thin. Level of formalism is neither a 
necessary  nor  a  sufficient  discriminatory  criterion.  We  ignored  anything  that  smelt 
infalliblism.  In particular note that  some  contributions  employing economic imagery, not 
necessarily rigor, which allegedly attack religion, have been included in this version of the 
review because they pass the infallibility test. Of the large number of authors reviewed here 
less  than  a  dozen  reveal  their  own  or  others‟,  whose  work  they  are  reviewing,  religious 
affiliation. In all the cases involving revelation of others‟s affiliation the aim of the author 
was to improve the clarity of the argument being made. This assures us that our screening 
device is efficient. Also ignored in this review are contributions dealing with economics as 
religion, which explore the theological foundations or nature of modern economics. 
                                                 
17 See Kuran (1994, also 1995), Margolis (1997), Hardin (1997), Albert (1997), Bernholz (2006), and Hillman 
(2007) for difficulties that one faces in such a dialogue. Hopefully in future we can find a means to break the 
gridlock. Till then readers interested in the subject might want to refer Kuran (1994, 1995), Wilson (1997), 
Oslington (1999, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, Part I), and Iannaccone (1998) and references cited therein. Since then no 
hell shaking development has visited Religious Economics.   22 
 
Studies  can also  be classified depending on the geographical  region  and/or religion  with 
which  they  engage.  An  overwhelming  majority  of  studies  seek  to  explain  developments 
within Judaeo-Christian religious traditions of West Europe, North America, and Israel. The 
focus is so restrictive that at times EoR becomes America and Monotheism centric, blissfully 
oblivious of rest of the world and other religious traditions. For instance, very few studies 
engage with animism (Ekelund et al 2006: 98-101, Hull and Bold 1994). It is only recently 
that other regions and religions have started receiving some attention (see Table 1). This 
neglect can be attributed to several factors: non-availability of data for non-western countries, 
more per capita academics in the West, more funding available for EoR in America, West‟s 
predominant position in the world, and the willingness of American economists to engage 
with  religion.  To  avoid  misunderstanding  it  bears  noting  that  one  is  not  attributing  the 
oversight  to  religious  bias  of  existing  scholarship.  Economists  from  other  regions  and 
religious traditions are indeed free to contribute to the literature and a few have already done 
so. But we very strongly disagree with Ekelund et al (1996: 3) who suggest that “[a] central 
goal in social science is to explain the course of Western Civilization” (emphasis added). One 
wonders if the central goal of cardiology is to count the heartbeats of reindeers of Finnish 
Lapland. 
 
3.6 Analytical framework and level of analysis 
 
Contributions to EoR can also be classified according to the type of analytical framework 
used. Exceptions aside an overwhelming majority of contributors work within rational (utility 
maximizing  individuals)/public  (rational  individuals  embedded  in  institutional  contexts) 
choice frameworks. For critiques of rational choice approach to religion see Schlicht (1995), 
Montgomery (1996a), Frey (1997), Zech (1998), and Sherkat (2001); also see Footnote 6 
(supra). Assumption of full rationality is the norm within EoR. For an exception see Ferrero 
(2008b: 84) who assumes bounded rationality (“the inability for ordinary people to appreciate 
doctrinal  subtleties  and  behavioural  differences  beyond  some  point”)  and  Montgoemry 
(1996a) who suggests a non-rational approach. Surprisingly so far social choice theory has 
not been harnessed within EoR. Kane (1966) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1986) contain a 
few clues though. Studies can also be classified depending on whether or not they use of 
spatial  models.  The  use  of  spatial  models  to  understand  religious  phenomena  became   23 
widespread only towards the end of 1990s before that it was used sparingly (e.g., Iannaccone 
1988; also see Barros and Garoupa 2002, Pepall et al 2006, and Ferrero 2008b for recent 
contributions). Further studies using game-theoretic models can be classified according to 
whether they use non-cooperative or cooperative game theory. Aumann and Maschler (1985) 
is perhaps the only instance of use of cooperative game theory in EoR. Regarding empirical 
studies note that time series (Mourao 2006, Beckworth 2008) and spatial (Land et al 1991) 
analyses are very rare. Further according to the level of analysis studies can be classified in 
the following ways: ecological (locality/province/state/region/world), institutional (religion, 
church,  sect,  cult),  individual  (Ellison  1995:  89,  Iannaccone  1995b:  78);  religious,  non-
religious; inter-religious, intra-religious community; and demand, supply. 
 
Finally we will discuss a hitherto overlooked distinction. The two kinds of problems a social 
scientist can engage with are Plato’s Problem - “the problem of explaining how we can know 
so much given that we have such limited evidence”, and Orwell’s Problem - “how it is that 
we know so little, given that we have so much evidence” (Patnaik 2007). Neither problem has 
received attention in EoR. Of the two the former is more important for physical sciences 
whereas the latter is more important for social sciences. Orwell‟s Problem is essentially about 
the failure of people to use available information in an efficient way. Interest in Orwell‟s 
Problem cannot be reduced to an interest in behaviour of boundedly rational people because 
the formulation of the problem does not preclude the possibility that even rational agents fail 
to use information properly. In the present essay we will highlight Orwell‟s Problems buried 
in the existing literature (Part I & II) and argue that further progress within EoR depends 
partly on the successful resolution of these problems. The present state of knowledge within 
EoR does not allow us to raise Plato‟s Problems. 
 
4.0 Marxist Analyses 
 
Contributions towards understanding the process of secularization dominate this category. 
Studies  in  this  category  can  be  classified  according  to  two  largely  congruent  criteria: 
individual vs. aggregate/institutional and demand vs. supply. At the outset it bears noting that 
though closely related secularism and secularization refer to  different  things.  The former 
refers to the norm that upholds the desirability of exclusion of religious considerations from 
non-religious relationships whereas the latter refers to the process of eliminating the control   24 
or influence of religion. There is hardly any work on secularism within EoR (see Section 6.2, 
infra). However, there is a large literature dealing with secularization, most of it empirical. It 
is a different matter that consensus on the essential nature of secularization has not been 
achieved  so  far  (Fox  2006:  540-541).
18  The  earliest  formulation  of  the  problem  of 
secularization is perhaps due to the English clergyman John Wesley  (Weber 1995 [1920]: 
175). Wesley, and later Weber, talked in terms of a self-limiting cyclical process in which 
each round of secularization triggers a  countervailing reaction. On the other hand scholars 
like Hume, and later Marx, went as far as predicting irreversible decay of religion contingent 
upon increasing influence of science. The empirical basis o f the latter prediction is highly 
questionable, though. Demerath (1995: 110) points out that such a  simplisitic, black-and-
white argument (irreversible decline of religion between “seamless sacral hegemony” and 
“mythical  end  point”)  makes  it  very  easy  to  reject  the  latter  version  of  secularization 
hypothesis. 
 
This  discourse  suffers  from  a  two-fold  problem.  First  of  all  it  suffers  from  definitional 
problems. On the one hand “secularization, secularity, or the secular is always relative to 
some definition of religion or the religious” (Swatos and Christiano 1999: 213). On the other 
there is a widespread tendency in literature not to spell out (define) what exactly religion 
stands for.
19 Secondly, no one stops to ask if in the first place it makes sense to think about 
secularization within the framework of EoR. If religion is an innate characteristic of human 
beings, encoded in their genes,  then the question of  secularization is beyond the scope of 
EoR.  However,  if  religion  is  an  acquired  trait  we  can  talk  about   the  possibility  of 
secularization as a historical process governed by among other things material forces. Insofar 
as the secularization literature skips the issue of origin of religion  it seems to presume that 
religion is an acquired trait. 
 
                                                 
18 For instance, Hegel (Lobkowicz 1964: 338) and Adam Smith (Anderson 1988: 1082) viewed deregulation of 
religion, i.e., separation of state and church, as liberation of state while Alexis de Tocqueville viewed the same 
as liberation of religion (Chaves and Cann 1992 a, b and Tong 1992; also see Kaufmann 1997: 85). Also see 
Martin (2005) for the latter view. 
19 Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]: 269), who avoids the definitional trap, argues that  “[r]eligion is both the 
“encounter with the sacred” and a “profane” variant of itself”. As a result right from day one of its existence 
religion organizes the world into the religious and secular spheres. It is therefore unreasonable to expect religion 
to disappear due to secularization of a part of social space or to talk about secularization as if it were a modern 
phenomenon. From another perspective he argues that “the universalizing drive of a religion involves a double 
movement: proselytization and secularization”. The first helps in gaining demographic preponderance while the 
second contributes towards social dominance (ibid: 391, 438). The latter observation becomes clear when one 
looks at how non-ecclesiastic Roman practices were first declared idolatrous and then re-admitted to the public 
space as secular social practices after some modification (ibid: 444).   25 
These controversies aside crudely speaking we know that in a limited sense there has been 
considerable insitutional secularization, i.e., reduction of role of religion in institutions of 
public interest. Martin (1969) has identified six broad patterns of secularization in the West - 
American, British, French, Russian, Calvinist, and Lutheran, to which we can add the Indian 
(massive religious beliefs in a multi-religious society confronting a state that is committed to 
secularism at the union level but not necessarily at the local level) and Islamic (occasional 
attempts to secularize evoking massive backlash) patterns. The institution of state religion is 
the  most  visible,  though  not  always  the  most  consequential,  manifestation  of  lack  of 
institutional secularization. Of the 188 states in Barro and McCleary‟s (2005) sample only 77 
had no state religion in 1900. The corresponding figures for 1970 and 2000 are 116 and 113, 
respectively despite reinstatement or introduction of state religion in 19 states. But the binary 
coding of Barro and McCleary (2005) masks a remarkable development, which becomes 
evident when one reorganizes results of Fox (2006) whose sample includes 152 states (> 1 
million population) rated on a 0-100 scale. Only 13 states, most of them Islamic, score equal 
to or more than 50 on Fox‟s scale. 
 
Similarly there is some evidence that influence of religion has also declined at individual 
level. In rest of this section we will discuss a variety of contributions examining the Marxist 
links between religion and society. The first three sub-sections are organized around demand 
and supply side issues related to secularism. Latter sub-sections deal with other related issues 
but without an explict demand/supply categorization. 
 
4.1 Demand side approach 
 
The supply side is treated as exogenously fixed and focus is on how demand varies with 
socio-economic  changes.  An  inverse  relation  is  posited  both  at  individual  and  aggregate 
levels between socio-economic (income, degree of urbanization, life expectancy, etc) and 
scientific (education) advances on the one hand and the importance of religion on the other 
(Swatos and Christiano 1999: 214, McCleary and Barro 2006a: 49-50). We will refer to this 
as the orthodox secularization hypothesis, which subsumes what is known as modernization 
hypothesis in literature (see Barro and McCleary 2006a for a discussion). This hypothesis is 
in turn embedded in a larger discourse which presupposes a linear, unidirectional history of 
religion starting from primitive societies, which suffer from an excess of religion, on the one   26 
hand to supposedly secularized, post-Enlightenment societies on the other through various 
shades of abstract religions in between (Swatos and Christiano: 219, Balagangadhara 2005 
[1994]).
20 Studies based on this approach fail to distinguish between changes in demand due 
to change in population, social pressure, supply side infrastructure, and preference. The stress 
is on the last though. Interestingly in the long run all these factors are interlinked. A  related 
hypothesis,  articulated  by  Talcott  Parsons,  argues  in  terms  of  “structural  and  functional 
differentiation of the realms of human action” over the ages (Kaufmann 1997: 87, also see 
Martin 2005) of which division of labour in markets is the most well-known example. A large 
number of empirical studies have failed to confirm these hypotheses unambiguously either at 
individual
21  or aggregate
22  levels.  We will now briefly examine  studies dealing with  the 
relation between  religion and  mortality, education, and insurance, all of   which relate to 
uncertainty
23, intrinsic or extrinsic to religion. 
                                                 
20 Fogel (1999) has drawn attention towards drastic reduction in time spent by people in rich countries to arrange 
not only necessities of life but also luxuries. The enormous amount of freed time is being invested in leisure 
activities and voluntary work. It is difficult to predict the impact of this development on religion. But one thing 
is clear, that is, religion is not necessarily on the way out. In fact, one suspects that it is going to take a relatively 
deeper hold even though its absolute share in population declines. 
21 A number of empirical studies assess changes in religiosity (church attendance and contribution of time and 
money to church, belief in afterlife, etc) controlling for income, wealth, urbanization, educat ion, etc. Demand 
side hypotheses posit an inverse relation between religiosity and the latter. For allocation/contribution of time 
see Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), Long and Settle (1977), Ulbrich and Wallace (1983, 1984), Neuman (1986), 
Grossbard-Schechtman and Neuman (1986); for allocation/contribution of money see Reece (1979), Lipford 
(1995, 1996a and b), Zaleski and Zech (1992, 1995b, 1996), Forbes and Zampelli (1999), Hrung (2004), Chang 
(2005), and Klick (2006); for both see Ehrenberg (1977), Redman (19 80), Sullivan (1985), Iannaccone (1990, 
1992a, 1994, 1997b, 1998), Clain and Zech (1999), Sanders (2002), Gruber (2004), and Tao and Yeh (2007). A 
few studies attempt to explore other kinds of Marxist links. The next two studies examine the impact of 
demography on religiosity. Relation between religious practice and religious concentration (share of a religion 
in population) is explored in Gruber (2005). Mourao (2006) studies the number of people who join Catholic 
priesthood in Portugal. The following studi es examine the impact of material setting/incentives on religious 
behaviour. Chaves and Montgomery‟s (1996) experimental study examines the impact of framing on religious 
choices. They find evidence in favour of status quo bias/loss aversion in case of religious choices. Eckel and 
Grossman  (2004)  study  the  difference  in  propensity  of  religious/non-religious  individuals  to  donate  to 
religious/secular charities in response to subsidies through an experiment based on dictator game. They fail to 
find significant difference between religious and non-religious individuals. Soetevent (2005) studies impact of 
anonymity on church giving in Netherlands. In his experiment the lack of anonymity positively affects giving 
for some time but only for external causes. 
22 Isaacs and Laband (1999) find that the number of suppliers in  a market for religion (U.S. counties) increases 
with income, educational, and racial heterogeneity.  They do not account for   interaction between various 
heterogeneities and do not disaggregate the  white group into Hispanics and non-Hispanics. For cross-country 
studies on state religion see Barro and McClearly (2005 - 188 states) and Fox (2006 - 152 states, population > 1 
million). The former find that incidence of state religion and per capita income are unrelated while the latter 
finds that more modernized states (economically advanced) are more likely to have government involvement in 
religion. The two studies use different measures of separation of religion and state. Also Fox‟s (2006: 562) 
results show a clear distinction between Islamic and other states with regard to separation of state and religion. 
Barro and McCleary (2005) code Central Asian states as state religion countries that partly biases their data 
against Islamic majority countries. Still they fail to find any significant difference between the two groups (ibid: 
1367). 
23 There are two views. According to  the first uncertainty increases demand for religion. Hechter (1997: 154 ; 
also see Ekelund et al 2006: 62) relates belief in religion to its capacity to manage global, i.e. inter-personal,   27 
 
4.1.1 Religion and ageing/mortality 
 
If there is one thing that has been held responsible more often than others as the main reason 
for continued existence of religion then it is the fear of death. The small body of contributions 
addressing  this  issue  adopts  three  distinct  approaches.  Starting  with  Azzi  and  Ehrenberg 
(1975) a number of papers deal with age and religiosity (attendance, church giving) positing 
salvation motive as the link (Ehrenberg 1977, Hrung 2004, Chang 2005, Klick 2006). The 
idea behind this approach is that rational individuals invest in salvation towards the end of 
their lives to minimize costs. In addition Klick (2006) finds that Catholic doctrine of faith 
plus  good  works  significantly  increases  the  age  effect  for  Catholics.  But  even  without 
salvation  a  systematic  link  between  age  and  earnings  should  lead  to  a  similar  result  for 
believers as long as religious activities provide in-process utility. A second approach suggests 
that as people grow older their religious capital grows, i.e., they develop a taste for religion, 
which explains growing participation with age (Neuman 1986, Iannaccone 1990).  Briefly 
religious  capital  refers  to  “familiarity  with  a  religion‟s  doctrines,  rituals,  traditions,  and 
members”  (Iannaccone  1990:  299),  which  not  only  facilitate  participation  in  religious 
activities but also enhance satisfaction derived from participating (for more see Section 9.1, 
infra). Even though the above models can claim some empirical support, based on analysis of 
cross-section  data,  a  longitudinal  analysis  is  highly  desirable  to  address  the  concern  of 
                                                                                                                                                        
uncertainty for individuals and groups while Khalil (1997: 154) stresses intra-personal uncertainty. In either case 
the demand for religion should be increasing in complexity of societies and it is unlikely that evidence from 20
th 
Century  will  support  the  orthodox  hypothesis.  Hull  and  Bold  (1989:  13-14)  on  the  other  hand  argue  that 
reduction  in  uncertainty  (they  give  the  example  of  efficient  credit  markets)  should  reduce  impatience  and 
thereby increase the demand for afterlife, the key product of religion. (But increase in uncertainty in this life 
could also render the prospect of a cosy afterlife  more attractive.) Though Hull and Bold talk in terms of 
development of markets and other public institutions others have argued that any sustained (not to be confused 
with sustainable) decrease in interest rates should increase demand for religion, as is supposed to have happened 
in response to usury prohibitions during medieval ages (Hull 1989: 20). As per the second view uncertainty 
should decrease demand for religion. Hull and Bold (1998) argue that uncertainty due to increased product 
differentiation can lower religious participation. There are two issues here. Firstly the two views do not posit 
mutually exclusive channels through which changes in uncertainty influence religiosity. Secondly, even if we 
admit that uncertainty/volatility leads to increased religiosity one still has to grapple with evidence that its 
impact varies across socio-economic groups. Beckworth (2008), for instance, finds that the religiosity (measured 
in terms of attendance) of evangelical Protestants has a strong counter-(business) cyclical element while that of 
mainline  Protestants  is  close  to  being  pro-cyclical  in  USA.  Note  an  important  point  before  we  end. 
Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]) argues that neither uncertainty nor capacity for abstract thinking/alleged innate 
longing for the divine can explain the origin of religion in human society. But we can say that appealing to 
uncertainty or capacity for abstract thinking to explain certain religious patterns or even trends subsequent to 
origin, say, in the 20
th Century, is quite different from invoking the same to explain the origin of religion in the 
first place. In short insofar as EoR is not dealing with the origin of religion it can avoid the functionalist trap, 
while invoking uncertainty.   28 
Wingrove and Alston (1974). They observe that the fact that elderly in a cross-section study 
are more regular church visitors cannot be used to infer that those presently young will also 
attend  church  more  regularly  when  they  grow  old.  They  report  attendance  rates  for  five 
different  American  White  cohorts  over  three  decades  each  of  which  exhibits  a  different 
attendance-age profile and in addition there are marked variations between sexes. The third 
approach focuses on the rate of mortality per se. Richardson and McBride (2008) explain the 
acceptance  of  the  institution  of  purgatory  in  medieval  England  by  invoking  changes  in 
mortality rates. Their evidence supports the orthodox secularization hypothesis to the extent 




4.1.2 Religion and insurance 
 
Since religion has often been linked with uncertainty it is not surprising that its persistence 
has been explained by drawing attention to its role as a source of insurance. There are two 
ways, it is argued, that religion can provide cushion in bad times. It can directly provide 
tangible support in terms of medical aid, economic support, etc (Burnett and Palmer 1984, 
Chen 2004, Dehejia et al 2005, Gruber and Hungerman 2005, Hungerman 2005, 2007a and b, 
Beckworth 2008). It can also provide psychological mechanisms to deal with socio-economic 
shocks (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Dehejia et al 2005). But there is a difference between 
potential and its realization. What enables religion to bridge this gap in the field of insurance? 
It  has  been  argued  that  religious  organizations  should  in  principle  be  able  to  provide 
individuals  with  “consumption  insurance  against  income  shocks”  because  they  can 
simultaneously limit both adverse selection as well as moral hazard (Dehejia et al 2005). The 
former is feasible as religions have certain entry barriers in the form of costs of religious 
participation, for instance, stigmas in Iannaccone (1992a), etc. The latter is feasible due to 
religion‟s  capacity  to  invoke  divine/social  support.
25  This  double  capability  of  religious 
organizations is also buttressed by the fact that in most of the cases religious organizations 
are manned by the local community, which also provides material inputs. The evidence so far 
                                                 
24 In his study of impact of economic shocks on religiosity Chen (2004) also presents evidence that death did not 
enhance participation in religious activities (Koran study) in Indonesia during the last financial crisis. 
25 In Chen (2004) individuals choose intensity of participation depending on income shocks and religious groups 
manage to provide ex -post insurance through social sanctions, which overcome  the constraints that would 
otherwise jeopardize the formation of ex-post insurance groups.   29 
suggests that religion indeed plays an important role in society as a provider of insurance and 
that it is an imperfect substitute for secular sources of insurance, especially the state. The 
insurance effect varies across ethnic communities in intensity as well as channel of influence. 
The literature discussed above works with 20
th Century data. The literature on usury deals 
with religion as a source of insurance in pre-modern times (See Section 4.7.2 and Section 
4.7.3, infra). 
 
Another way in which a religion can provide insurance, which is more important from the 
religious perspective, is through its purported capacity to insure one against uncertainty with 
respect to afterlife. But neither the gain from insurance (are returns, positive or negative, 
from afterlife infinite in magnitude?) nor the appropriate price of insurance is known to either 
party (cf. Ekelund et al 2006: 50-51; for a detailed discussion on afterlife see Section 9.2, 
infra).  There  is  yet  another  way  religion  can  provide  individuals  with  insurance.  Khalil 
(1997: 154-155) suggests that belief systems (religion included) can help mitigating intra-
personal uncertainty with regard to individual ability. So that resources invested in acquiring 
and nurturing a belief system can be seen as an investment in insurance. 
 
4.1.3 Religion and education 
 
So far we have discussed how religion purportedly helps humans in an uncertain secular 
space. But modern education, more generally reason, purportedly affects the plausibility of 
religious claims and increases uncertainty about the veracity of religion itself. Lewis (1972 
[1955]: 426-427), however, points out that “[r]eason erodes not religion but authority, and it 
is only in so far as religion is based upon authority that the reasoning mind is hostile to 
religion”. Therefore education should be expected to precipitate secularization only if religion 
continues to be authoritative. Hardin (1997: 263) draws attention to the fact that the level of 
exposure to scientific knowledge required for successful secularization is limited to a few in 
any  society.  Therefore  orthodox  hypothesis  is  unlikely  to  hold  at  the  aggregate  level. 
Arruñada  (2004)  suggests  that  education  redistributes  individual  commitment  across  the 
range of religious activities instead of causing inevitable attrition of religiosity across the 
board. 
   30 
A number of empirical studies control for education (see Footnote 21, supra). Sanders (2002) 
rejects the entire mass of empirical literature that posits a causal link between individual‟s 
education and religiosity because “education is not an exogenous determinant” rather it “is 
probably  just  a  correlate  of  an  unobserved  third  variable  that  affects  attendance  and 
contributions”.  There  are  a  few  models  on  education-religion  relationship.  For  instance, 
Sacerdote and Glaeser‟s (2001) model suggests a positive correlation between ones education 
and religious participation. But they model religious groups as yet another way to build social 
capital.  In  their  model  education  increases  returns  to  networking  and  at  the  same  time 
decreases  belief.  Fan‟s  (2008)  model  supports  a  positive  correlation  between  next 
generation‟s  human  capital  formation  and  ones  religious  participation.  Individual  human 
capital depends on parental human capital as well as social capital, the latter being governed 
by  aggregate  religious  participation.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  even  an  atheist,  who 
otherwise  reaps  disutility  from  participation,  would  participate  if  sufficiently  altruistic. 
Botticini  and  Eckstein‟s  (2007)  Jews  reap  positive  externalities  from  religious  education 
under certain economic circumstances. The same is true about Cozzi‟s (1998) agents who 
invest in religious learning to reap deferred benefits (see Section 4.6.1, infra). 
 
4.2 Supply side approach 
 
Irrespective of the failure to confirm demand side hypothesis it is undeniable that religion no 
longer enjoys primacy even in a majority of countries with state religions. But this does not 
automatically imply inevitability of total decimation of religion. Decline of existing churches 
and decline of religion per se are two different things (Stark and Bainbridge 1985 and Martin 
1991, 2005). In the supply side approach demand is treated as fixed and the focus is on how 
religious phenomena of interest vary with changes in supply side of market for religion. This 
approach has spawned two lines of research - religious economy model inspired by Adam 
Smith and church-sect model inspired by Max Weber (introduction of the dichotomy), Stark 
and Bainbridge (denominational cycling, also John Wesley), and Dean Kelley (strength of 
strict  churches).  While  church-sect  dichotomy  briefly  appears  in  Adam  Smith‟s  writings 
(Anderson 1988: 1072) the idea that that state church is not conducive to vitality of religion 
makes a brief appearance in Weber (1995 [1920]: 152). 
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4.2.1 Religious economy model 
 
This model posits an inverse relation between the degree of religious regulation/concentration 
and religiosity of people as measured by church attendance or membership, etc. Deregulation 
is  supposed  to  increase  participation  directly  (religious  firm  exerts  itself  in  absence  of 
guranteed state support and provides higher quality services) and indirectly by eliminating 
barriers to evolution of product differentiated market, which is reflected in religious pluralism 
and increased participation. The idea is that in a religiously plural setting higher levels of 
religiosity are sustained, which is contrary to Emile Durkheim and Peter Berger‟s idea of 
religion as a sacred canopy that loses legitimacy in a plural setting. This model came into 
limelight  with  Finke  and  Stark  (1988,  1989)  who  found  an  inverse  relationship  between 
religious pluralism (measured by one minus Herfindahl index) and religiosity in American 
cities (also see Iannaccone 1991 and Iannaccone et al 1997) and was immediately challenged 
by Breault (1989 a, b).
26 Breault pointed out that Finke and Stark‟s (1988) results depended 
on special controls for Catholic population. For quite some time the literature, dominated by 
empirical studies, remained plagued with a string of contradictory findings.
27 Here we will 
discuss a few  major issues of contention. First of all the treatment of  degree of religious 
pluralism in this literature, particularly its use as a proxy for competition/deregulation in 
market for religion, is problematic. Firstly, Chaves and Cann (1992a) argue that religious 
pluralism is not an appropriate proxy for religious regulation. Secondly, such studies suffer 
from omitted variable bias in absence of controls for level of regulation because the latter can 
affect religiosity directly and indirectly through its influence on pluralism. There is a two way 
causality between pluralism and regulation. Ceteris paribus higher degree of pluralism makes 
regulation less likely whereas greater regulatory controls can suppress pluralism. 
 
Chaves and Gorski (2001) reviewed 26 studies (193 analyses ) dealing with supply side 
hypothesis  and  concluded  that evidence does not support a positive association between 
degree of religious pluralism and religious vitality. They also addressed other concerns like 
                                                 
26 Pautler (1977) made one of the earliest attempts to test the impact of supply side changes (relative price of 
services offered by different religious groups) on distribution of consumers in market for religion. He found an 
inverse relation between relative price (captured by a surrogate variable constructed using average contribution 
per member for different churches) and market shares of different religious groups. Hutchison (1977) faults the 
study on two counts, namely, the presumptions that people necessarily participate and also contribute. 
27 Olds (1994) explores the impact of deregulation in Massachusetts and Connecticut on demand for preachers, 
growth in their  salaries, and level of religious participation. He provides limited support for the supply side 
hypothesis. Though his study avoids some of the shortcomings from which much of this literature suffers, it 
lacks adequate controls.   32 
the use of datasets which do not provide information for all religions, choice of level of 
aggregation, and differential treatment of Catholicism (also see Hull and Bold 1998). Voas et 
al  (2002)  went  a  step  ahead  and  showed  that  positive  evidence,  if  any,  is  inadmissible 
whenever  measures  for  both  pluralism  and  participation  (a  measure  of  religiosity)  are 
constructed using the same data, which mechanically generates a positive or negative relation 
unrelated with the mechanism posited by the supply side hypothesis (see Iannaccone 1991: 
175 for a related concern). They did not, however, deny the inherent appeal of the hypothesis, 
namely,  more  suppliers  can  cater  to  a  variety  of  tastes,  which  should  increase  market 
penetration. 
 
But the problems do not end with addressing Voas et al‟s concerns. Montgomery (2003: 787) 
draws attention to yet another problem with the index. It “does not simply reflect the "supply 
side" of a market (i.e., the locations and effort levels of denominations), but also depends 
mathematically on the "demand side" (i.e., the distribution of consumer preferences)” making 
it unsuitable to capture supply side of the market. To avoid the above pitfalls Montgomery 
(2003)  proposed  “a  partial  order  on  the  set  of  religious  markets”  to  measure  religious 
competitiveness. One market is more competitive than another if the set of denominations in 
the  latter  is  a  strict  subset  of  the  set  of  denominations  in  the  former.  He  fails  to  find 
conclusive  evidence  in  favour  of  the  supply  side  hypothesis.  Interestingly  amidst  this 
controversy one rarely comes across attempts to verify the claim that more competition leads 
to better quality services and hence improved participation. If we are prepared to accept the 
degree of involvement in social services as a proxy for quality of services provided by a 
religious organization then Pepall et al (2006) provide limited support from USA for the 
hypothesis  that  higher  degree  of  religious  pluralism/competition  leads  to  better  quality 
services. 
 
Two, another line of criticism questions the narrow definition of religion used in the supply 
side debate. Boudon (1992) argues that it makes sense to treat “secular religions”, e.g., social 
democracy,  communism,  civil  religion  (in  the  U.S.  sense),  etc,  at  par  with  traditional 
religions and develop a parsimonious theory of religion. There are three objections to this 
critique and one theoretical model partly in support. First of all this would lead to a very 
broad conception of religion so that anything that arouses popular passion would be counted 
in. Secondly, Chaves and Cann (1992b) point out that secular religions lack a identifiable 
supply side, which is an essential requirement to apply the supply side hypothesis. Thirdly,   33 
Chaves and Cann (1992b) argue that nature and strength of civil religions is not independent 
of traditional religion. But in Barros and Garoupa‟s (2002) spatial model, and the following 
literature, presence of a non-church (i.e., the possibility of not be affiliated to any formal 
church) affects the equilibrium in market for religion. But the last result is conditional upon 
choice of spatial framework, namely, individuals distributed along a line segment rather than 
a circle. 
 
Three, supply side approach does not control for policy-making setting. Roemer‟s (1998) 
model of interaction between tax and religious policies in an electoral setting suggests that 
the interaction could mitigate extreme policy stances like disestablishment and very high 
levels of redistribution. So we can say that the official regulatory regime could be divorced 
from ground reality because bundles of policies are subjected to bargaining by competing 
interest groups. 
 
Four, it is not clear why current market structure (e.g., degree of pluralism) and participation 
rates should be correlated. If at all pluralism‟s impact on participation should be lagged. The 
system needs finite time to adjust to new information about change in level of pluralism, etc, 
particularly because religious choices are pretty sticky. 
 
Five, supply side approach cannot explain a few empirical regularities noted in Poutvaara and 
Wagener (2008): a) differences in structure of markets for religion across USA, which are 
exposed to similar regulatory environment and b) different attitudes towards the regulation of 
market for religion in countries with similar levels of church-state separation, e.g., USA and 
France. 
 
Finally we will suggest a novel test for supply side hypothesis. Kumar (2007) has drawn 
attention to the very strong relationship between monarchy and state religion. Throughout 
human history monarchy  has  almost  always  been sacral  in  character so much so  that its 
survival  has  often  been  confounded  with  the  very  survival  of  religion.  The  most  recent 
example  of  this  is  Nepal  where  monarchy  was  defended  unsuccessfully  in  the  name  of 
religion. Monarchy-state religion bond responded to 20
th century socio-political pressures in 
four  different  ways  (both  survive,  both  abolished,  monarchy  survives,  and  state  religion 
survives). In many cases the institution of monarchy/state religion collapsed suddenly due to   34 
shocks which are exogenous to the religious domain in the short run. Such events provide a 
natural experiment to check if change in supply side affects religiosity. 
 
4.2.2 Church-sect model 
 
This  model  explores  the  distribution  of  individuals  among  religious  bodies,  which  are 
differentiated by the demands they place on members, and changes in this pattern due to 
income and regulatory shocks.
28 Churches “tend to adopt positions relatively close to societal 
(read  secular)  norms”  whereas  sects  are  marked  by  the  distance  they  maintain  vis-à-vis 
society (Iannaccone 1988: 256-257). Iannaccone (1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1997a and c) is the 
single most important reference for this line of research (also see Berman 2000, Mcbride 
2007b). Montgomery (1996b) and Barros and Garoupa (2002) model denominational cycling 
alluded to in Stark and Bainbridge (1985), etc. Secularization is posited as a part of a cyclic 
process that keeps repeating over time in all societies. As older religions get enmeshed in the 
material world they suffer from sectarian secession. The stricter splinters then grow at the 
expense of the parent religion and might succumb to sectarian secessions in future, where 
strictness is the degree to which a group “increases the cost of nongroup activities”. 
 
The church-sect model treats religious groups as clubs. Utility derived by the ith member of 
the club can be expressed by the following quasi-concave function (Iannaccone 1992a: 276-
277): 
                    (1) 
 
where  S
i  denotes  private  secular  consumption,  R
i  denotes  individual  participation  in  the 
religious club, and Q
i denotes the quality of the club. Q
i depends on the average participation 
of other members of the club and the number of members of the club. It is easy to see that the 
club  good  is  “anti-congestible”.  Insofar  as  individual  participation  generates  positive 
externalities it will be underprovided. The club should in principle subsidize participation to 
achieve Pareto-optimal outcome. But since quality of participation is not readily measurable 
the club turns to prohibitions and penalties, which effectively increase the cost of secular 
                                                 
28 Redman (1980) made one of the earliest attempts to test differences between strict and liberal churches. She 
found  that  the  former  have  higher  levels  of  participation.  For  an  early  usage  of  church-sect  dichotomy  in 
mainstream economics literature see Clark (1947, 1951).   35 
consumption  whenever  R
i  and  S
i  are  close  substitutes  (relative  to  expenditure  share  of 






The major insight of the  church-sect model is that stricter churches (more sect -like) screen 
out potential freeriders.
30 Those who continue derive more satisfaction from higher intensity 
of involvement of other participants  and in turn increase their own level of participation . 
Under the screening process  perfectly rational individuals  accept stigmas  and sacrifices, 
which are essentially “seemingly unproductive costs” born by members that constrain extra-
sect activities, especially close substitutes.
31 Though not ideal this is a “second best solution”. 
In any case owing to these stigmas sects are in a state of tension with the surrounding society, 
where  tension  is  the  “disagreement  with  the  dominant  surrounding  culture  and  social 
institution”. Strictness and tension are related but not co-extensive. Sects are associated with 
behavioural strictness resulting in tension. But churches are known to induce tension with the 
society by espousing divergent ideological values (Miller 2002: 438). The degree of tension 
with the social/secular norm is a measure of strictness of a sect. Sects have been found to 
grow faster than the liberal churches. But strictness is only a necessary and not a sufficient 
condition  for  growth  (Iannaccone  1994:  1205).  Beckworth  (2008;  USA),  and  also  Chen 
(2004;  Indonesia),  finds  that  stricter  religious  groups  grow  during  economic  downturns 




We will discuss some objections to the  church-sect model and then examine some issues 
related to spatial models of church-sect competition. One, focused on behavioural strictness 
the model fails to address the issue of doctrinal strictness (Ferrero 2006b). But we are not 
                                                 
29 Coşgel and Minkler (2004a) argue that consumption restrictions observed by believers might not be meant to 
address the problem of freeriding. Adopting consumption norms could as well serve the purpose of expressing 
ones identity to others in an uncertain world, where individuals have imperfect knowledge about others. It is not 
clear how one can disentangle consumption restrictions as communication devices and stigmas/sacrifices. 
30 Models following Iannaccone (1992a) are not always clear with regard to diffe rence between screening and 
sanctioning. Brennan and Hamlin (1995) have stressed that screening and sanctioning relate to different 
assumptions regarding motivations and therefore institutional arrangements. 
31 One of the earliest club theoretic models of r eligion can be attributed to Carr and Landa (1983) who model 
personalistic exchanges. They also suggest that religious clubs demand unproductive sacrifices to screen out free 
riders and maintain higher quality of output for subscribers. Their religious clubs do not proselytize. In fact, they 
argue that “economic advantages accruing to smaller religious groups… may explain why no single religious 
group has dominated the world scene” (ibid: 152). 
32 Discussions on Pascal‟s Wager also suggest that ceteris paribus a strict church, which posits a punitive god, is 
more likely to be successful than lenient ones (Landsberg 1971: 100, Montgomery 1992: 120; also see Section 
10.1.2, infra).   36 
sure if the behavioural strictness in church-sect models cannot be interpreted at least to some 
extent as doctrinal strictness. At one point Iannaccone (1994: 1190) indicates in passing that 
the two are highly correlated. Two, Sherkat (2001: 1485) has a related but more serious 
complaint.  He  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  decline  of  liberal  churches  in  USA  is 
coterminous with secularization of these churches in the sense that they no longer cater to the 
popular need for, what Stark and Bainbridge (1980) refer to as, supernatural compensators. 
Church-sect theorists would probably respond by drawing attention to the abovementioned 
correlation.  But  given  this  correlation  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  empirically  between 
weakness  of  supernatural  dimension  (which  is  part  of  doctrinal  strictness)  and  lack  of 
behavioural  strictness  as  the  cause  of  de-vitalization  of  liberal  churches.  Which  kind  of 
strictness is primary? Doctrinal strictness possibly supersedes behavioural strictness but it is 
also well-known that there can be serious disconnect between the two for long periods. This 
issue needs further research since religions employ both instruments to manage their flock. 
But Ferrero (2006a) has a valid concern insofar as universal religions, once past a threshold 
size,  cannot  use  behavioural  strictness  because  the  community  of  non-believers  becomes 
irrelevant, where universal can be interpreted as non-ethnic/non-territorial and committed to 
free entry. 
 
Three,  Iannaccone  (1994:  1184-85)  argues  that  freeriding  could  arise  both  due  to 
heterogeneity  (groups  with  differing  levels  of  intrinsic  commitment  or  even  religious 
preferences) as well as opportunism within homogeneous groups. Strict churches flourish due 
to their relative effectiveness in checking free riding. But to sustain itself across generations 
and attract new members a church needs to allow individuals to acquire some familiarity and 
comfort before they start contributing. Within a spatial setting McBride (2007a, also 2007b) 
shows that churches have to tolerate some amount of freeriding so as sustain themselves over 
time. Similarly heterogeneity is required for the group to reach out to newer communities. In 
any case evidence for freeriding is mixed (see Section 8.2, infra). 
 
Four, it is argued that sects are more likely to attract poor and less educated, i.e., people with 
“limited  secular  productivity”.  A  corollary  to  this  is  the  movement  towards  liberal 
denominations  in  response  to  material  success  (Iannaccone  1988:  261  and  1992a:  387, 
Sherkat and Wilson 1995: 995). But one would like to know why do only a fraction of poor 
people  join  sects  (Kuran  1994:  773)?  This  reminds  of  a  valid  but  completely  ignored 
observation of Hutchison (1977: 96), namely, at the end of the day one has to buy potatoes or   37 
some  suitable  substitute  to  survive  whereas  there  is  no  such  compulsion  at  least  in  free 
societies with regard to religion. The proposed income-based sorting rests on at least three 
presumptions. First, religious bodies are incapable of product differentiation, which does not 
hold  in  most  cases,  leaving  aside  some  extremist  sects.  Sect  leaders,  particularly  those 
heading extremist or minority sects with a majority of poor, would not want to lose rich 
clients/patrons who are a source of protection/donation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
wealthy routinely get exemptions or customized services. Second, the upwardly mobile in a 
society prefer liberal churches, which is not necessarily true. Third, religious identity is not 
linked to other identity markers. But it is well-known that many a times religious identity is 
deeply linked to, if not co-terminus with, other aspects of identity (Ellison 1995: 93). So that 
dissociating from the church might imply a general dissociation with one‟s ethnic group. 
 
Five,  Baron  and  Hannan  (1994:  1137)  argue  that  “[i]n  imputing  interests  to  collectives, 
[instrumentalist]  approach  takes  as  given  the  existence  of  social  boundaries  demarcating 
“groups””, which is questionable because “creating and sustaining a group identity is much of 
what collective action is all about”. In other words group identity could be an end in itself, a 
possibility widely ignored  in EoR, where groups serve as vehicles to fulfill some  shared 
religious purpose. Exploring sectarian identity as an end in itself could help understanding 
violent manifestations of competing religions. 
 
Six, Iannaccone (1992a: 285) argues that to avoid freeriding sects erect high entry barriers 
and  under  self-selection  the  production  of  religious  capital  and  products  increases.  Frey 
(1997: 283) points out that stricter controls crowd out the intrinsic incentive to belief, which 
if true would imply that religious capital that which accrues due to beliefs and experience 
does not necessarily increase in strict sects. One also wonders why religions do not use any 
positive measure in the models following Iannaccone (1992).
33 Seven, the transition from 
sects to churches in the product space  is not smooth since unlike sects, which produce club 
goods, churches  also  produce public goods (Ekelund  et  al  2006: 54). So the sect-centric 
nature  of  church-sect  models  limits  their  ability  to  deal  with  churches.  Ferrero  (2008b) 
presents  a  model  of  religious  organization  as  a  cooperative,  which  can  deal  with  both 
churches as well as sects. Eight, while costs due to accepting stigmas solve first-order free 
                                                 
33 In a different context Hull and Bold (1994) speculate about the rationale for introducing hell in addition to 
heaven in Christianity. They invoke endowment effect as part of their explanation. Also see Smith (1999) on the 
introduction of the idea of apocalypse in early Christianity.   38 
rider problems it is not clear if stigma based organizations are insulated from higher order 
free rider problems (cf. Oliver 1980). Nine, Ekelund et al (2006: 71) suggest that this model 
“seems to maintain that consumption cost (price in terms of sacrifice) is a measure of value 
and  that  the  higher  the  price,  the  greater  the  quantity  demanded  and  greater  the  utility 
provided”. Is the demand curve upward sloping in this case? 
 
Ten, desirability of strictness is one thing while feasibility is another. Iannaccone has focused 
on desirability. The interesting question, however, is why only some religious organizations 
succeed  in  imposing  strictness  (Miller  2002).  Miller  questions  the  very  desirability  of 
strictness  from  two  different  perspectives.  Firstly,  he  argues  that  “[d]ifferentiation  can 
increase per capita organizational resources by exploiting switching costs across sub-cultures. 
Hence,  a  strategy  of  focused  differentiation  may  result  in  more  loyal  participation,  with 
loyalty expressed in terms of longevity of involvement as well as resource commitments. 
This strategy prescription appears to contradict the contention that strictness results in strong 
religious  organizations  (Iannaccone  1994).  Strictness  requires  placing  demands  upon 
religious adherents, rather than accommodating their preferences. However, accommodating 
distinct preferences can foster high commitment” (ibid: 445). Strictness can thus be seen as 
an outcome rather than cause of membership (ibid: 451). Secondly, he points out that even 
though strictness makes sense in a static setting in a dynamic setting relaxing strictness for 
newcomers is desirable when growth has positive externalities for existing members while 
new members have higher price elasticity (ibid: 445). 
 
Finally, empirical relevance of club models is limited insofar as it presumes voluntary nature 
of religious sector, which is not true in many parts of the world, including rural south in USA 
where, according to Ellison (1995: 93), “black Church” is a “semi-involuntary institution”. 
For a recent examination of empirical evidence related to the church-sect model see Ekelund 
et  al  (2006)  who  observe  that  the  evidence  is  not  unambiguous  even  for  a  country  like 
U.S.A., which has been the subject of analysis for over three decades. A related concern is 
that the model has not been tested outside Judaeo-Christian milieu where sects seem to attract 
at least in some cases the upwardly mobile as happens in India, and also Africa and Latin 
America. In India legions of tech savvy sects are teaching yoga and art-of-living at a price to 
the middle class. These sects demand more time and money than the traditional religion, 
which is closer to a fish market. Most sects of Hinduism starting from 19
th century have 
focussed on the emerging middle class in towns and cities. It is only since 1990s that such   39 
sects have begun to reach villages due to telecommunication revolution. Ekelund et al (2006: 
61,  71)  raise  a  similar  concern  about  USA  when  they  observe  that  some  of  the  fastest 
growing sects not only have higher average levels of education and incomes but also place 
higher demands on followers.  
 
We now turn to the issue of identification of religions/churches, interpretation of normative 
distance from the perspective of suppliers and consumers, and the significance of terminal 
points  of  continuum  characterizing  religious  organizations  in  spatial  church-sect  models. 
Iannaccone (1988) identifies each point in a normative space as a potential religious body and 
differentiates religious bodies as per their normative distance from secular norm, with the 
distance being more for sect-like bodies. This definition cannot differentiate among different 
religions  or  sects  belonging  to  different  religions.  It  also  cannot  differentiate  in  a 
straightforward manner between sects of the same religion. Rodero and Branas (2000) define 
extremism as the degree of proximity to limits of normative space and radicalism as distance 
to close substitutes. Without getting into the propriety of using radicalism and extremism in 
this  context  it  is  worth  noting  the  alternative  perspective  they  provide  by  defining  the 
measures  with  respect  to  the  limits  of  normative  space  or  inter-organizational  normative 
distance. In particular note that groups closer to either end of the normative space qualify as 
extremist. Moving between Rodero-Branas and Iannaccone definitions is not feasible unless 
secular norm in Iannaccone corresponds to minimal strictness in the former. Even this is a 
necessary but not sufficient for moving between the two models. 
 
In Barros and Garoupa (2002) suppliers and consumers perceive distance differently. While 
distance in either direction is weighted equally for suppliers, which is the usual approach, it is 
weighted unequally for  consumers. More precisely consumers see  an asymmetric cost  of 
going to a church different from one‟s most-preferred church; going to a less strict church is 
less damaging than going to  a more strict church. Finally, a few words  on the limits of 
normative space would be in order. There are two issues here. One, non-church is at times 
modelled as “a dummy firm with strictness zero” (Barros and Garoupa 2002). Two, so far no 
model treats the other end of the scale, maximum strictness, as a firm location by default, 
which is surprising because prophets, purists, and pretenders, of whom there is no dearth in 
any society and age, prefer that location. But see a recent paper, Ferrero (2008b: 84), for an 
exception. Pepall et al (2006) provide yet another way of looking at the problem. Instead of 
modelling  a  society  with  people  uniformly  distributed  along  a  straight  line  they  assume   40 
people distributed along a circle, which bypasses the question of nature of firms at extreme 
locations. Before we end a minor point would be in order. These models do not take into 
account  capacity  constraints,  which  would  help  in  explaining  existence  of  multiple 
organizations, with more or less identical ideological position, operating in a given market 
segment.  
 
4.3 Demand/Supply side approach 
 
Given the inadequacy of demand and supply side approaches a few authors combine the two. 
The empirical studies under this category have failed to find unambiguous evidence in favour 
of  one  or  the  other  secularization  hypothesis.
34  Theoretical discussions/models, however, 
provide explanation for the mass of contradictory findings.  In this section we will first 
discuss contributions which provide an alternative to the demand and supply side orthodoxies 
and then raise a few questions. 
 
Hull and Bold (1998) argue that it is not unlikely that increased product differentiation 
(supply side effect) raises cost to people in the form of increased uncertainty, etc (demand 
side effect) and lowers participation in the process (also see Miller 2002: 449).
35 They also 
                                                 
34  Hull  and  Bold  (1998)  reject  supply  side  hypothesis  in  case  of  USA.  Gill  (1999)  rejects  demand  side 
explanations in favour of supply side ones to explain the growing religious pluralism in Latin America. Barro 
and McClearly (2003 - 59 states, 2006 - 68 states) and McCleary and Barro (2006a - 81 states) find weak 
evidence for positive relation between pluralism and church attendance while various measures of religiosity 
were found to decline with per capita income. They also find that state religion and attendance are positively 
related while state regulation (whether the government appoints or approves the domestic leaders of religions) 
and attendance are negatively related. North and Gwin (2004 - 59 states, 46 of which are common with Barro 
and  McCleary  2003)  find  strong  support  for  negative  relation  between  state  religion  and  religiosity  and 
insignificant impact of pluralism on religiosity. Smith and Sawkins (2003) adopt a fresh approach and nest 
supply side model within a larger model, accounting for effect of religious capital and social interaction, which 
is tested using cross-country data (16 states, including East Germany) aggregated at the level of regions (163 
regions).  They  find  support  for  both  demand  as  well  as  supply  side  factors.  Future  work  should  find  a 
compromise between historic-cultural and legal affiliations, e.g., Bavaria in Germany is religiously closer to 
neighbouring regions across the Austrian border. Another problem with their study is that they use religious 
participation at the age of 11-12 years to proxy for religious capital. In this case recall is likely to be faulty 
because present choices would interfere with individual response to questions about past choices. Arruñada‟s 
(2004)  analysis  of  auricular  confession  (a  kind  of  third  party  enforcement)  suggests  that  the  institution  is 
decaying due to two complementary effects. On the demand side rising education levels have increased the 
salience of first party enformcement. On the supply side falling productivity of personalistic priestly activities 
relative to other economic activities in society and increased efficacy of secular law have decreased both the 
supply and scope for supply of confession. 
35 The demand side counterpart of the supply side plausibility argument discussed above is as follows. Consider 
a society with multiple religious groups, incomplete information about individual religious preferences, and 
imperfect checks on freeriding. Increase in individual heterogeneity or increase in uncertainty about individual  
heterogeneity can reduce participation across groups.   41 
suggest that it is quite plausible that a nationally plural market indeed consists of locally 
concentrated  markets.  Similarly,  McBride‟s  (2008)  spatial  model  supports  a  variety  of 
equilibria depending on the level of aggregation, e.g., town, province, country, etc. In other 
words empirical studies need to fix aggregation problems otherwise all kinds of results are 
possible depending on the level of aggregation (also see Chaves and Gorski 2001, Voas et al 
2002, and Montgomery 2003). In a spatial setting  Barros and Garoupa (2002) show that 
pluralism and participation are not unambiguously related due to strategic nature of choices 
faced by religious organization whereas McBride (forthcoming) shows that fall in demand 
does not necessarily cause demise of religion as long as the supply side adjusts accordingly. 
 
Poutvaara and Wagener (2008) show that demand and/or supply side differences  are  not 
necessary to explain the differences across markets for religion because such differences can 
also arise as a result of pure chance. In their model leaders are rent-seeking while consumers 
are uncertain about leadership quality and learn the same ex post. Following Brams (2007 
[1983]: 121, 166), who models the interaction between gods aka superior beings and humans 
using two person non-cooperative games, the observed spatio-temporal differences could as 
well be explained to  be entirely unconnected to  supply side and/or demand side factors. 
Brams shows the possibility of cycling of strategy in a number of games, which can be 
interpeted as variations in level of religiosity, etc. Also following Brams (2003 [1980]: 192) 
we can bypass the EoR orthodoxy in yet another way. Assume that religiosity peaks due to 
some shock in two societies. Now if the average recall rates in the two socieities are different 
then after some time the two would have different levels of religiosity. Next consider Carlton 
and Weiss (2001: 275), who suggest that difference in birth rates among religious, agnostic, 
and  secular  in  different  communities  coupled  with  cognitive  dissonance
36  can  lead  to 
difference in degree of religiosity independent of any of the standard supply and demand side 
determinants of religiosity. Finally consider Cozzi‟s (1998) model of religion as a bubble 
phenomenon,  which  would  suggest  that  exogeneous  material  shocks  can  deeply  affect 
religiosity (represented in his  model by time devoted to  acquire religion) independent  of 
supply side changes. 
 
Before  closing  our  discussion  on  the  secularization  debate  a  number  of  issues  need 
mentioning. One, what constitutes secularization needs explicit definition. Is it decline in 
                                                 
36 Cognitive dissonance is a state of psychological tension arising from holding two inconsistent ideas, attitudes, 
beliefs, opinions, etc.   42 
religiosity? What measure (or how many measures) of religiosity should count and how to 
determine the relative importance of the measures? What extent of change should be treated 
as  positive  evidence?  How  long  should  the  decline  continue  to  be  counted  as  positive 
evidence or what are the symptoms of irreversibility of secularization? What if parallelly the 
hitherto secular elements of a society sacralize in the meantime (see, for instance, Demerath 
1995)?  Is  it  decline  in  public  role  of  religion?  Should  state  induced,  i.e.,  top-down, 
secularization count? (Such attempts have failed everywhere.) What is the appropriate level 
of  aggregation  to  study  secularization  and  how  to  translate  findings  from  one  level  to 
another? 
 
Two, so far few studies directly account for decline in plausibility of religion amidst the 
much celebrated competition, the key argument of demand siders. Product variety in market 
for religion enhances uncertainty because each supplier is making claims about the ultimate 
reality, which undercut the claims of his competitors (Hull and Bold 1998). Exceptions like 
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), etc are not interested in competition in market for religion. A 
number of empirical studies account for level of education, which is expected to adversely 
affect plausibility (see Section 4.1.3). Another indirect control for plausibility is income (see 
Footnote  21).  Higher  income  is  generally  associated  with  greater  exposure  to  modern 
economy and therefore technology as well as urbanization, both of which are expected to 
reduce plausibility and utility from religion. There is another way of looking at this issue. For 
instance, Hardin (1997) observes that religion takes a deeper hold on individuals when it is 
contested,  i.e.,  there  is  competition.  Two  related  explanations  could  account  for  this 
observation. Firstly, when a religion is challenged it is also construed as an attack on the 
identity of the believers. A defeat on the religious front might lead to reduction in social 
bargaining  power  in  general.  So  defending  religious  boundary  becomes  an  end  in  itself 
independent  of  cost-benefit  analysis  intrinsic  to  the  religion  concerned  (cf.  commitments 
associated with identity in Coşgel and Minkler 2004a, b). Secondly, status quo and home 
team biases work against accepting the implausibility of long held beliefs, when confronted 
by others. The possible link between religiosity and conflict brings us to an entirely new 
question, namely, between religious polarization and fractionalization which is more likely to 
enhance  religiosity?  For  more  on  these  two  measures  of  demographic  fragmetation  see 
Section 8.3.2 (infra). 
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Three, the presumption in most of the studies that each religion/sect can cater to only one 
type of need or taste is questionable. Iannaccone et al (1997) draw attention to the wide 
variety of tastes that Catholicism, and also Islam, can cater to. But so far none of the studies 
has proposed any measure for intra-religion diversity for allegedly monolithic religions. Four, 
regulation is not only about supply side manipulation it can also affect tastes (demand side) 
through  indoctrination  so  that  deregulation  might  not  lead  to  increase  in  pluralism.  It  is 
possible that in certain contexts tastes are homogeneous so much so that regulation or no 
regulation the market cannot support many firms. Incidentally Das and Datta Ray (2008) find 
that competition between Hindu temples in eastern India is monopolistic even in absence of 
institutional  entry  barriers.  Five,  the  demarcation  between  supply  and  demand  sides  in  a 
market for religion is not unproblematic. Olds (1994) suggests that a dichotomous model of 
market  for  religion,  divided  between  supplier  churches  and  consumer  individuals  is 
misleading. 
Whether one treats privatization as a supply or demand effect depends on how one “slices” the market. 
Privatization affects the churches that are intermediate organizations matching parishioner-consumers 
and preacher-suppliers. If one views the  market from a  parishioner‟s standpoint, the  church is the 
supplier of religious services and privatization is a supply-side effect… I am viewing the market from 
the preacher‟s standpoint. Preachers are offering services to meet churches‟ demands (ibid: 284). 
 
Six,  it  is  desirable  to  account  for  conversion  dynamics,  which  can  influence  religiosity 
through  channels  that  are  independent  of  the  causal  mechanism  proposed  by  either 
hypothesis. Neo-convert syndrome refers to higher level of observance among new converts. 
Converts are allegedly more Catholic than the Pope. If some religion is relatively successful 
in proselytizing that could bias results in its favour in a study on religiosity. However, one 
could as well argue that new converts would take time to learn and build religious capital a la 
Iannaccone  (1990).  But  that  too  will  bias  results.  In  either  case  the  change  in  average 
religiosity of the religious community under consideration would have nothing to do with that 
religion per se. This problem could be addressed partly by controlling for the number of years 
the religion has been in a given society, still better if average “religious” age of converts is 
available. But can we not link missionary success with intrinsic traits of religion? We can but 
it  bears  noting  that  many  a  times  the  success  is  unrelated  with  religion  itself,  e.g., 
organizational problems in rival camps, firstmover advantage, etc. 
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In the next two sub-sections we will deal with religious regulation and structure of church, 
both of which influence religious competition, in greater details. 
 
4.4 Religious competition and regulation 
 
Spatial (Rodero and Branas 2000, Barros and Garoupa 2002, Montgomery 2003, Pepall et al 
2006, McBride forthcoming and 2008, Ferrero 2008b) and contest (Ferrero 2002, Epstein and 
Gang 2007) models of competition address this issue in a very limited manner. These models 
can at best handle intra-religious competition. Hull and Bold (1998) argue that the standard 
model  of  product  differentiation  has  been  applied  in  EoR  disregarding  the  fine  print 
according to which product differentiation results in greater market penetration in absence of 
uncertainty,  search,  and  commitment  costs  and  network  externalities.  In  addition  it  is 
important  to  keep  in  mind  the  limits  to  product  differentiation  in  markets  for  religion 
dominated  by  a  handful  of  focal  points  -  individual,  family,  community,  society,  and 
mankind;  one  god  (monotheism),  many  gods  (polytheism),  infinite  gods  (pantheism); 
revealed or not revealed, etc.
37 Very few papers posit a hierarchy of competing organizations 
in the market for religion.  Barros and Garoupa (2002) treat churches as Stackelberg leaders 
with sects as followers (also see Ferrero 2008b). Discussions on organizational strategies to 
keep  afloat  in  market  are  few  and  far  between.  Miller  (2002)  discusses  issues  like 
organizational strategies for sustaining competitive advantage and manipulation of market 
structure. The former requires making credible commitments, main taining legitimacy and 
inimitability, and targeted marketing whereas the latter requires  building bridges with other 
competitors. Goff and Trawick (2008) provide an empirical test for inter - and intra-brand 
competition‟s impact on market for religion. Even though their econometric specification is 
problematic the discussion there could serve as a starting point for future studies. Ferrero 
(2008b) compares the organizational and doctrinal strategies available to sects and churches: 
a sect controls membership and quality through behavioural strictness whereas a church relies 
upon doctrinal strictness. Interesting topics awaiting research include lobbying in a regulated 
market for religion (cf. Iannaccone 1991: 161), emergence of “black” market for religion in a 
                                                 
37 This implies discontinuity in the set of products on offer (cf. Schlicht 1995: 129). In other words not every 
point  in  the  normative  space  can  serve  as  a  “firm”  location.  Convexifying  this  set  from  the  supply  side 
perspective is problematic because religious firms generally do not employ mixed strategies in matters related to 
core beliefs. In equilibrium cognitive dissonance drives believers to focal points sanctified by religion/tradition. 
Also see the last point in discussion on church-sect model where we discussed the use of spatial framework to 
model interaction between religious organizations (Section 4.2.2, supra).   45 
state  or  socially  regulated  market  for  religion,  etc.  The  issue  of  standardization  will  be 
discussed later (Section 6.1, infra). 
 
Demand side analyses are generally not followed by policy prescriptions whereas the very 
idea of religious regulation is made to look unfashionable in the supply side approach. 
Theory  and  data  thus  combine  to  suggest  that  government  regulation  of  religion  tends  to  reduce 
individual  welfare,  stifling  religious  innovation  by  restricting  choice,  and  narrowing  the  range  of 
religious commodities… Beyond the question of deviant sects and cults, one encounters a broader but 
related set of issues concerning the overall consequences of regulating religion. Here again we find 
Smith  claiming  that  competition  would  not  only  generate  more  religion  but  also  better  religion 
(Iannaccone 1998: 1489). 
 
As  we  have  seen  above  the  supply  side  approach  has  been  severely  challenged  in  the 
meantime. The supply side argument, not entirely objectionable, is two fold. State regulations 
hamper natural equilibrium in religious sphere. But then what about deviant cults/sects that 
make severe demands? Since people who join these cults are rational individuals and make 
decisions based on their preferences there is no room for state intervention. In rest of this 
section we will discuss a number of objections to this hands-off recommendation. 
 
One,  alternate  approaches  have  explained  decision  to  join  extreme  sects  by  invoking 
indoctrination (see Akerlof 1991). Two, the informational structure of market for religion is 
completely  ignored  in  supply  side  approach.  Starting  from  customer  side  uncertainty 
Poutvaara and Wagener (2008) show that  even a rational individual might land up in an 
abusive sect, which he would not have joined under perfect information. Three, the case for 
deregulation is advanced sans welfare analysis. The ease with which the recommendation 
was taken for granted for quite some time rested on a not quite unproblematic distinction 
between market for ideas and market for goods (cf. Coase 1974). Let us not forget that in 
economics proper it would be sacrilegious to forward a regulatory recommendation without a 
thorough welfare analysis. Four, neither the product range (religion provides a combination 
of private, club, and public goods generally bundled together) nor the nature of firms (studies 
mostly  assume  common  firm  type  for  different  religious  groups,  which  is  not  true  as 
discussed in Section 4.5, infra, also see Section 3.3, supra) in market for religion is taken into 
account while suggesting deregulation. 
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Five, unregulated competition in market for religion is assumed to be necessarily beneficial, 
which is not true. Using a contest theoretic model Epstein and Gang (2007) show that contest 
between sect leaders would induce a race to top, i.e., higher levels of strictness (cf. Ekelund et 
al 2006: 50, Levy and Razin 2008). In Section 5.3.1 (infra) we will discuss the possibility of 
radicalization of unregulated sects, which then indulge in violent activities. Following Rose-
Ackerman (1996) we can adopt a more reasonable approach to regulation in this field. She 
suggests  that  in  service  sectors  catering  to  widely  varying  tastes  and  beliefs  “regulation 
should not impose uniform quality standards but should focus on health and safety issues and 
on  preventing  obvious  abuses”  and  at  the  same  time  ensure  that  the  regulations  do  not 
“undermine  the  benefits  of  ideological  diversity  and  service  differentiation”  (ibid:  724). 
Incidentally,  Adam  Smith‟s  position  on  state  regulation  of  religion  is  closer  to  Rose-
Ackerman‟s prescription (cf. Leathers and Raines 2008, also Rosenberg 1960). 
 
Six, McConnell and Posner (1989) and Posner (1987) have argued that regulation does not 
necessarily retard religiosity, at least in USA. The same can be said about India. Seven, while 
state regulation can be a source of conflicts among religious groups and also between the 
state and an aggrieved group it is also possible that conflict leads to state regulation, e.g., the 
Bulgarian decision to recognize Orthodoxy as the state religion can be seen partly as evidence 
for the latter, an issue completely ignored in supply side analysis. In other words direct or 
indirect religious conflict can accentuate religious identity leading to adoption of supply side 
controls. So at least in some cases regulation might be an outcome rather than the cause. 
 
Eight, supply side view is based on a static conception of the market. A dynamic analysis 
would examine two distinct possibilities. Firstly, competition could lead to standardization in 
religious  sphere  due  to  convergence  among  religious  firms  (see  Section  6.1,  infra). 
Competing religions could learn from each other through a mechanism not so different from 
yardstick  competition  (see  Salmon  1987)  or  state  socialization  (see  Arreguin-Toft  2005). 
Secondly,  cost  of  competition  can  induce  self-interested  firm-owners/managers  to  form 
cartels and mergers (cf. Miller 2002). In the long run any of these possibilities can materialize 
and in each of these cases in the end people would be left with fewer choices due to lack of 
regulation. For a study on transformation of a competitive market for religion sans regulation 
into a monopolized one see Raskovich (1996). Miller (2002) discusses the variety of possible 
cooperative  arrangements  that  can  emerge  in  a  contested  market.  He  suggests  that 
undifferentiated religious organizations come together to harness economies of scale whereas   47 
related ones seek technology sharing and unrelated ones come together to face non-religious 
problems. Actually both inter-religious conflict as well as common threat like government 
intervention in market for religion can lead to alliance among unrelated religions. So far the 
impact internal specialization and supply side market fragmentation on firm strategies has not 
received attention. Presence of too many firms  might rule out collusion due to collective 
action problems whereas in case of too few firms the legacy of sustained competition with 
clearly identifiable opponents might obstruct collusion. 
 
Last but not the least it makes sense to check if a government would necessarily like to 
control religion. Given growing religious pluralism within societies over time and parallel 
increase in voice of sub-state players probably state finds it unprofitable to associate with any 
particular side and get discredited. This mirrors Tocqueville‟s rationale for liberating religion 
from incumbent partisans in a state and protecting its universal  appeal. Since  whosoever 
(state/individuals/community) tries to monitor and regulate deviant religious groups has to 
bear  disproportionate  cost,  in  the  form  of  conflict,  monitoring  and  regulation  would  be 
underprovided. Here state and other groups or individuals in a society are players in a public 
goods game setting, where monitoring and regulating deviant sects is a public good. In other 
words proliferation of sects that place severe demands on followers might be a consequence 
of state/citizen collective action problem rather than increased degree of toleration. Once in 
place  such  sects  might  contribute  to  increased  tolerance  via  belief  adaptation  due  the 
realization that curbing them is costly. 
 
4.5 Structure of religious organizations 
 
Though an important determinant of nature of competition in market for religion the structure 
of religious organizations is not controlled in empirical studies discussed above. In fact, it is 
common to assume identical firm structure for all religious groups. The structure of religious 
bodies is influenced both by material (market structure, labour supply, etc) and non-material 
(doctrine) factors. Lipford (1992) and Allen (1995) explain organization of religious bodies 
assuming doctrine as an exogeneous determinant, which in turn helps to secure the reputation 
of the organization in the market. Religious organizations with similar doctrines have similar 
structures and vice versa. Mao and Zech (2002) provide game-theoretic foundations for Allen 
(1995).  The  basic  intuition  is  that  where  leadership  has  more  powers  it  is  hobbled  with   48 
organizational restrictions to avoid agency problems. For example, nothwithstanding their 
differences  both  Mormons  and  Catholics  have  prophetic  doctrines  and  similar  corporate 
structures.  But  why  should  one  believe  in  doctrine  of  this  or  that  religion?  Iannaccone 
(1995a) is inspired by this uncertainty intrinsic to any religious enterprise, one is never sure if 
the desired outcome follows a prayer. He focuses on risky nature of religious activities and 
suggests two strategies adopted in market for religion to reduce the risk of fraud. Religious 
organizations  either  adopt  collective  structure  with  large  inputs  of  voluntary  labour  and 
donations or provide for a private fee-for-service arrangement. In the former freeriding is 
kept in check by “exclusivity and costly prohibitions” whereas in the latter individuals insure 
themselves against fraud by holding a diversified portfolio. Iannaccone, however, does not 
explain which one of the two strategies would be adopted in a particular environment and 
why.  Berman  (2000)  models  changes  in  the  structure  of  collective-type  religious 
organizations in response to environmental changes, e.g., changes in subsidies for religious 
participation, etc. 
 
A number of contributions look at agency problems affecting religious organizations. The 
issue of agency problems came to forefront after a series of contributions by Ekelund et al 
based on the assumption that the Medieval Chruch was a profit-maximizing enterprise (see 
Section 4.7.2, infra). Earlier Fama and Jensen (1983) explored means of addressing agency 
problems  within  non-profit  organizations  in  general,  namely,  separation  of  control  and 
ownership.  While  Protestant  and  Jewish  congregations  seem  to  follow  this  strategy  the 
Roman Catholic church does not, in which case the specificity of human capital investments 
made by church officials is supposed to allay the concerns of Catholic consumer-donors. 
Raskovich (1996) discusses franchise monopoly as a solution to agency problems in ancient 
Judaism.  Ben-Ner  (1997)  argues  that  durable  religious  organizations  are  like  non-profit 
organizations  with  substantial  involvement of adherents.  Ferrero (2002) suggests that the 
Catholic Church induces a multi-prize, open contest in the form of competition for sainthood 
to solve agency problems and counter the inertial character of its large bureacracy. Ferrero 
(2005) argues that to solve agency problems religious groups turn into producer cooperative 
but face a free entry constraint because religion is not proof to imitation (which amounts to 
presuming absence of sunk/fixed costs). The organization controls freeriding by manipulating 
the level of its extremism. There are two objections to the last modelling approach. Miller 
(2002) has stressed that successful religious organizations maintain inimitability. Also one is 
not sure if the level of extremism can be altered in the short run. If anyting the level of   49 
extremism should be quite inertial because it depends on a number of socio-economic factors, 
which are beyond any organziation‟s control. For instance, Huntington (1997) has argued that 
the  youthfulness  of  a  society  is  an  important  determinant  of  its  propensity  to  religious 
extremism. 
 
There is not much work on leadership of religious organizations and how these organizations 
arrange salaried manpower (for contribution of time and money by laity see Footnote 21, 
supra).  We  will  discuss  these  issues  very  briefly  and  focus  on  two  specific  problems. 
Regarding the first issue note that charismatic figures serve as sites for nucleation of cults, 
sects, etc. Just think of Calvin, Khomeini, and Luther, if any example is needed. The idea of 
superstar effect (“In certain kinds of economic activity there is concentration of output among 
a few individuals, marked skewness in the associated distributions of income and very large 
rewards at the top”) due to Rosen (1981, 1983) is of some relevance in this regard. Further 
even  though  organized  religions  dominate  the  religious  sphere  entrepreneurs  play  a  very 
important role in shaping its contours, especially, in countries like India and U.S.A. But there 
is not much work on entrepreneurial firms in the market for religion. See Poutvaara and 
Wagener‟s  (2008)  model  for  an  exception.  There  are  a  few  contributions  on  salaried 
manpower in market for religion. Condon‟s (2002) empirical study of U.S. market for clergy 
suggests that Catholic Church is a monopsonist for Catholic clergy, which is consistent with 
its inability to attract sufficient candidates. Mourao (2006), however, finds that in Portugal 
the reason for decline in number of Catholic priests can be attributed to changing fertility 
patterns  rather  than  economic  factors.  Arruñada  (2004)  suggests  that  supply  of  priests 
declined  due  to  decline  in  productivity  of  personalsitic  priestly  activities  via-a-vis  other 
economics  activities.  Olds  (1994)  studies  the  fortunes  of  preachers  in  the  wake  of 
deregulation in two U.S. states. He finds that deregulation increased the demand for preachers 
(also see Footnote 27). 
 
Note that while discussing religious organizations we did not bother to ask why religious 
organizations in the first place. Levy and Razin (2008) try to answer this question. Unlike 
Iannaccone (1995a) or Ekelund et al (2006), who advance a safety in numbers argument, they 
begin with two observations, namely, belief is always individual whereas manifestation is 
often collective. In their model economically valuable actions are tagged with uncertainty, 
which individuals trace to divine justice. There are two objections to their model. First of all 
one is not told why they assume that “those individuals who choose to be religious must   50 
participate in some observable activity” which they “interpret as religious rituals”. In fact, 
most of the religions support both highly personalistic as well as collective expressions of 
faith and also attach value to inwardness. Further one is not sure if sharing similar beliefs and 
being  more  cooperative  towards  those  with  whom  one  shares  beliefs  makes  a  religious 
organization. Individuals can share beliefs without being part of an organization. How do we 
distinguish between a close network of bullish stockbrokers and a Christian congregation? 
Without claiming to provide solutions to these answers we can try to search for some clues. 
To begin with we need to make clear two distinctions. If religion is built into genes then it 
can survive sans social support. However, if it is an acquired trait then it is essentially a 
collective phenomenon. In the latter case we can look at social network theory for answers. 
Following this approach if we are prepared to admit that not all information is available for 
purchase in market and that “availability, nature, and value of information as products” might 
depend on social relations then we can say that “it may not be possible to decouple the 
information from its social structural base; nor would the information be available to actors, 
regardless of their level of investment or search, absent the social connections that provide 
access to the information in the first place” (Baron and Hannan 1994: 1133, emphasis added). 
The other distinction to which we would like to draw attention relates to the root cause of 
need to organize. In case of religion we need to distinguish between religious beliefs per se 




Given the primacy of prosletyzation in Christianity it is surprising that the issue has not 
received the attention it deserves. We have already noted the near total lack of work on 
religions  with  ambition  of  universal  dominance  and  those  which  believe  that  religious 
practices  of  others  generate  negative  externalities  for  them  (see  Section  3.3,  supra). 
Discontinuous conversions across religious boundaries - Saulus/Paulus types like changing 
from left to right hand driving system, remain one of the biggest challenges for EoR. For 
methodological  and  empirical  issues  facing  a  credible  economic  explanation  of  religious 
conversion see Vanberg (1997) and also Frey (1997). Zech (1998) discusses applicability of 
different economic models of organization to the issue of congregational growth. Here we 
will first look at the issue of doctrinal conversions and then discuss the conversions driven by 
material considerations. Finally we will look at hitherto ignored issues related to conversions.   51 
 
4.6.1 Doctrinal conversions 
 
The existing models of religion in EoR are woefully inadequate for this task because majority 
of them differentiate between churches/denominations/sects by strictness (Iannaccone 1988: 
256-258, Iannaccone 1992a: 283, Montgomery 1996b: 84, Barros and Garoupa 2002: 563, 
Epstein and Gang 2007: 260; also see the last point in the discussion on church-sect model in 
Section 4.2.2, supra) and by relative importance of private and social motives (Iannaccone 
1988: 256-257, Redman 1980: 332, 336).
38 The limitation of these models become s clear 
very easily. Consider two religions equally strict about frequency o f prayers. In the above 
models these religions are identical! Models dealing with conversion per se  are also not of 
much help. Shy (2007) models conversions between secular and religious groups assuming a 
mechanically programmed fraction of population, which converts necessarily subject to some 
costs. Botticini and Eckstein‟s (2007) Jews are driven by utility considerations. Bisin and 
Verdier  (2000)  and  Bisin  et  al  (2004)  model  religious  conversion  completely  driven  by 
parental  investment  in  socialization  of  children  (paternalistic  altruism)  and  demographic 
parameters,  ignoring  that  parents  not  only  want  to  socialize  their  children  to  their  own 
religion but also want to see them successful in the secular world. These two objectives might 
not be compatible for a minority parent, an issue discussed by Lazear (1997) with regard to 
language transmission. In Levy and Razin (2008) conversion is limited to accentuation of 
belief within a religion, including the possibility of going secular, in response to material 
shocks. But we know that religions insure themselves against disbelief triggered by material 
shocks by instilling the belief that bad times are but a passing phase during which god tests 
believers (see Carlton and Weiss 2001: 260 and Nutzinger 1997: 239). Otherwise the entire 
world would have gone Protestant by now. 
 
By an abuse of language we can interpret raising children to become religious as an act of 
proselytization. Some of the models discussed above deal with this issue. Here we will focus 
on a particular model (Cozzi 1998) and summarize others briefly. In Cozzi‟s overlapping-
generations model culture, which can be interpreted as religion, is treated as a “public input” 
                                                 
38 Empirical tests in line with these models include Sherkat and Wilson (1995) and Sherkat (2001), who examine 
religious mobility in USA, and Barro and Hwang (2007), who examine the same for 40 countries. Also see 
Beckworth (2008) for a time series analysis of strength of US Protestant groups, which throws some light on the 
issue of conversion.   52 
in the production process of future generations. Individuals invest in learning culture, which 
is “completely unproductive at the individual level”, when young in anticipation of its resale 
value when they are old and themselves serve as teachers. As youngsters they incur two costs 
in learning culture: direct cost paid to teacher and opportunity cost. Now it is easy to see that 
price of culture is strictly increasing over time. “[L]earning would therefore be a way of 
saving and investing in an asset carrying no positive market fundamental, that is, in a bubble” 
and the intergenerational link depends on the bubble. If the economy does not grow then the 
bubble will not be sustainable so that the survival of culture itself depends on its positive 
impact on output at the aggregate level (ibid: 377). Carlton and Weiss (2001) examine the 
issue of competition in Torah and suggest that the free competition in the field of Torah 
teaching ensured the inter-generational survival of Judaism (also see Liebermann 1981: 297 
and 1985: 388-389 on the importance attached to religious education within Judaism). In 
McBride‟s (2007a) overlapping-generations model adults tolerate freeriding by children till 
the latter acquire religious human capital, which binds them to religion (cf. Miller 2002). 
Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2007) have discussed the mutually reinforcing links between 
Jewish religious education and their economic fortunes. 
 
We will now move to the issue of discontinuous conversions. Following Iannaccone‟s (1990) 
Religious capital model one can say that “the likelihood of conversion between particular 
religious groups should be greater the more similar the groups”. But it is possible to model 
the process of conversion in a different way so as to show that conversion, if at all it takes 
place,  matches  an  individual  to  a  significantly  different  religion  (Kumar  2008b).  This 
discrepancy  arises  because of the following reason.  Iannaccone  and others  do not  model 
conversion explicitly so one is really not sure what exactly they mean by conversion in their 
model. A closer reading suggests that they are at best talking about behavioural aspects, 
without being explicit about the doctrinal issues. Contrary to Iannaccone‟s prediction it can 
be shown that in a world with sufficient uncertainty doctrinal conversions will involve two 
sufficiently dissimilar religions. 
 
Conversions involving mutually exclusive core beliefs are indeed qualitatively different from 
conversions involving peripheral aspects. It should be evident by now that none of the above 
contributions addresses the question of how people switch from one belief system to another, 
Saulus/Paulus type conversions, which involve drastic change in worldview. We will start by 
noting that one of the distinctive features of religions is their capacity to render the cosmos   53 
“explanatorily  intelligible”  to  the  faithful  (Balagangadhara  2005  [1994]:  324-325).  An 
individual can compare another religion with his religion only after the new religion has 
made the cosmos explanatorily intelligible for him. But simultaneous testing is impossible 
since  religions  provide  exhaustive  and  mutually  exclusive  accounts  of  cosmos.  There  is 
another reason why comparison between two religions is not feasible. Each religion supplies 
both its own hypotheses as well as test procedures. But for comparison to make sense test 
procedures need to be standardized and independent of the hypotheses being tested. We know 
that one belongs to this religion or that but never to both. Hence, any conversion between 
religions cannot be rational in the sense that when a follower of a religion makes a decision to 
switch to another religion he has no idea where he is headed towards (cf. Gomez and Moore 
2006: 206, Coşgel and Minkler 2004b: 331). 
 
There is another way of looking at the problem. Chaves (1995) draws attention to the strong 
evidence in sociology literature that actual conversion at the level of beliefs comes much later 
after initial, outward conversion (also see Ellison 1995: 91). Frey (1997) also notes the lack 
of concern for doctrinal issues at the time of conversion. These authors suggest that to begin 
with people change tags due to material factors, including network effects. Modelling such 
conversions is not difficult. See, for instance, some of the models discussed above. But we 
are still left with the problem of essentially religious conversion. Next with the help of two 
short  examples  we  will  highlight  the  problems  one  faces  while  trying  to  explain  such 
conversions. 
 
Example 1: Consider an extreme example first. Let Religion A  (B) prescribe  eternal hell 
(eternal  heaven)  for fox eaters. Under what  temptation would a believer  in  one of these 
traditions turn apostate, especially when the reward/punishment will be revealed only after 
one dies, i.e.,  at  a stage  when one cannot  take any corrective action? Unless we have a 
mechanism  explaining  how  the  threat  of  infinite  punishments  is  scaled  down  we  cannot 
explain conversion between these two religions.
39 Without such scaling down the religion 
that is receiving the convert  has to offer infinite rewards to offs et the penalty imposed by 
                                                 
39 Actually the above problem belongs to a broader class of problems referred to as Eve‟s Problem (Section 
9.2.2, infra). For example, it shares the basic structure with the following. Think of a person who believes that a 
certain place is haunted by ghosts. Under what conditions will this person agree to change his belief? It seems 
that imperfect recall, natural or induced, plays a big role in all such situations. This issue needs to be explored 
further. Within EoR Schlicht (1995) is the closest we come to a psychological perspective of problems at hand 
including recall. For a model involving memory see Benabou and Tirole (2006). See Rabin (1998) for a survey 
of interface between psychology and economics.   54 
parent religion. But how does one compare two infinities? But once scaling down takes place 
then the recipient religion can offer a very large or even infinite reward for conversion. 
 
Example 2: Now consider a variant of the above example where the reward/punishment is not 
infinite. Let us assume that the followers of the two religions truly believe in the uniquely 
truthful character of their respective religion‟s prescription and by implication of the false 
character of the other religion. No matter what the other religion promises a person will not 
convert  simply  because,  howsoever  attractive,  the  other  religion  by  construction  is  an 
illusion. It is like a choice between a real currency note worth a dollar and a picture of 100 
dollar note downloaded from the internet. Our examples seem to suggest that if only there 
were a worldly dimension to religion conversions between antithetical religions would not be 
difficult to explain. But this is not true because we will have to explain how people forget the 
other-worldly dimension and trade places based on this-worldly calculus. Hopefully we have 
been able to show that explaining religious conversions is an entirely different ballgame. For 
more on belief transformation see Section 10.1.2 (infra). 
 
4.6.2 Geographical dispersion of religions 
 
Why and how did monotheistic religions manage to grow at the expense of others? Military 
superiority of Islamic and Christian empires over the last two millenia alone cannot explain 
much. The Mongols who defeated all major powers of Asia eventually converted to the faith 
of the conquered peoples. Much later Islam expanded in Africa (Ensminger 1997) and South 
East  Asia  (Jomo  1997)  right  under  the  nose  of  Christian  colonists.  EoR‟s  focus  on  one 
religion, namely, Western Christianity, and its sects might be behind the lack of any work in 
this regard. Ensminger (1997), an anthropologist, is an exception in this regard, who invokes 
arguments  from  transaction  cost  economics  without  much  success  to  explain  pro-Islamic 
swing in colonial Africa. 
 
We have suggested above that religious conversion at the level of belief is an extremely 
complicated matter. But we have also noted that in most of the cases religious conversions 
involve little, if any, doctrinal delibration. In other words material factors must have a role to 
play. Given the very little work done in EoR in this regard as a first step it makes sense to 
check the empirical validity of hypotheses advanced in other disciplines. In fact, there is a   55 
rich literature in other disciplines that links the spread of religion with all kinds of material 
factors - diseases, transport and communication technology, printing, etc - leading to a variety 
of hypotheses about path dependence of religion (Park 1994, Johnson 1967).
 Consider, for 
example, Johnson (1967: 171-176) who points out that favorable climate, easy access, and 
dense settlements attracted Christian mission activities in Africa. As an example he cites the 
case of South Africa, with a promising climate, relatively hospitable terrain, and easy port 
access, which was over-supplied with missionaries. Note that he suggests a very strong test 
for importance of material factors in missionary activity, namely, oversupply missionaries in 
a hospitable target. Also population density, colonial status, etc of a target region governed 
the choice of missionary targets. 
 
In  economics  Acemoglu  et  al  (2001)  discuss  how  settler  mortality  influenced  European 
settlement patterns (and institutions and therefore economic development) in the Third World 
(also  see  Freyer  and  Sacerdote  2006).  Within  EoR  Richardson  and  McBride  (2007)  link 
acceptance of particular religious doctrines to mortality rates and Ekelund et al (2006: 80-84) 
discuss the role of technology in success of Protestant Reformation. Before we close our 
discussion one additional point bears mentioning. Cross-country studies of conversion need 
to grapple with another issue. It has been argued that among non-Semitic “religions” the 
notion of conversion has no meaning (cf. Balagangadhara 2005 [1994], A.D. Nock cited in 
Ferrero 2008b: 75). This criticism does not apply to Barro and Hwang (2007) the major 
cross-country  study  in  EoR  because  their  sample  is  completely  dominated  by  Semitic 
religions. But future studies covering eastern “religion” dominated countries need to account 




Conversion as a means to reduce cognitive dissonance is an unexplored subject. Goldin and 
Metz  (1991)  draw  attention  to  an  instance  of  conversion  in  Guatemala  where  a  certain 
group‟s  lifestyle  was  changing  over  a  period  in  way  that  contradicted  time  intensive 
traditional  religious  practices.  The  group  ultimately  started  converting  to  Protestantism, 
which is less time intensive and relatively better suited to modern lifestyle. Religious change 
in this case can therefore be seen as “rationalization of a broader, more profound cultural 
change”, which validated the emerging behavioural patterns and consequently contributed to   56 
reduction of cognitive dissoance. Further if we accept that religion involves commitment then 
we are only a step away from seeing conversion as a signaling and screening device. Both 
these lines of argument need further research. 
 
4.7 Interpretation of theology and mythology 
 
This is an area whose importance warrants more attention than it has received hitherto. We 
will discuss  the  feasibility  and nature of economic analysis followed by  a discussion on 
efforts  to  understand  Christian  and  Jewish  religious  traditions.  By  the  way  contributions 
related to the former are primarily focused on the historical Catholic Church whereas in the 
latter  case  the  focus  is  on  scriptures  and  legal  precedents  (also  see  Section  6.1,  infra, 
especially for the latter). 
 
4.7.1 Is economic analysis possible? 
 
We will begin with a discussion on hurdles facing rational analysis of religion, polyvalency 
and presumed inscrutability of religious discourse, and then provide outlines of what one 
should expect from economic analysis and implications of the same. 
 
Rational  analysis  The  problem  with  rational  analysis  of  religion  is  that  religious  claims 
cannot be disproved (Landsberg 1971). A stylized summary of religious discourse should 
make things clear. Religions present a tripartite dogma: a) belief that there is a true god with 
certain characteristsics, b) with verifiable manifestations reserved for true believers, and c) 
contrary  manifestations,  if  any,  are  either  temptations  (by  a  testing  god)  or  a  satan. 
Mythology and theology of all religions are replete with graphic details of (c) simply because 
contrary manisfestations dominate the experience of believers.
40 Given this dogma there is no 
possibility of disproving religious beliefs (also see Balagangadhara 2005 [1994] and Leiter 
2008 for insulation of religion from reason and evidence ). Religion ultimately reduces to a 
technology to feel good in a world contrary to ones beliefs (Nutzinger 1997, also see Carlton 
and Weiss 2001: 260 and Ekelund  et al 2006: 65). No wonder the stress within religious 
traditions is always on belief rather than knowledge (Hardin 1997: 272). 
                                                 
40 See Hull and Bold (1994) and Smith (1999) who attempt to explain why religions stress negatives.   57 
 
But this should not foreclose the possibility of rational analysis of religion. The tendency to 
rule out rational analysis of religion by identifying it with irrationality/non-rationality (e.g., 
Demerath  1995:  108)  does  not  make  sense.  Just  because  something  is  “itself  beyond 
rationality”  does  not  imply  that  it  cannot  be  rationally  pursued.  Following  Brams  (2007 
[1983]: 14-15), who suggests that “[r]ationality of theistic belief is independent from its truth 
- a belief need not be true or even verifibale to be rational”, we can say that while subjecting 
religion to rational analysis we can ignore its epistemic or ontological status. Closely related 
to  religion-is-not-rational  is  the  tendency  to  identify  it  with  categorical  demands,  which 
require  suspension  of  rationality.  Consider  once  again  Demerath  (1995:  108,  also  Bruce 
1993)  who  finds  the  following  claims  contradictory:  (a)  “secularization  has  been  proven 
wrong”  and  (b)  “religion  has  increasingly  become  a  matter  of  individual  rational  choice 
within a religious market”. This is not a valid criticism because one cannot, as Demerath, 
does argue that religion is multi-faceted, comprising of both transcendental and mundane 
elements,  and  then  reduce  this  multiplicity,  without  any  explicit  reasoning,  to  a  single 
attribute, namely, absolute categoricity. 
 
We are not denying that rational analysis of religion is problematic. To the contrary we are 
going  to  engage  with  the  debate  in  management  studies  on  the  applicability  of  strategic 
calculus in the religious domain, something we never had within EoR (for partial exceptions 
see Frey 1997, Ben-Ner 1997). We will draw from Gomez and Moore (2006), who draw 
attention  to  boomerang  (learning  about  tools  by  applying  them  to  newer  problems)  and 
surrogate validation (validating solution to a new problem by using tools validated elsewhere) 
effects. They begin  with the observation that while religion is  a “total phenomenon” the 
social sciences are reductionist, an incompatibility that should alert us towards the possible 
limitations  of  using  our  tools  to  understand  religion  (ibid:  201).  They  ask  two  related 
questions: a) is there a market for religion and b) is rational choice possible in religious 
matters. Regarding the first note that to apply tools developed for firms operating in a market 
we  need  to  ascertain  (a)  if  there  indeed  is  a  distinction  between  market  and  firms,  i.e., 
between  suppliers  and  customers  and  employees  and  clients  and  (b)  the  nature  of  value 
creation,  which  is  what  is  subjected  to  economic  calculus.
41  We  can  separate  market 
                                                 
41 Ekelund et al (2006: 39) identify three prerequisites in addition to “rationality axioms” for applicability of 
economic approach: (a) “clearly defined product”, (b) “operational notion of demand”, and (c) “operational 
notion of demand”. But they leave the issue after noting that most of the studies fail to meet these requirements.   58 
exchanges from non-market ones using these conditions. The first requirement can perhaps 
be met by dividing religious bodies into a collection of employee-like “deep” believers and 
client-like “fuzzy” believers (ibid: 204-205). This then is the first constraint that they would 
like to impose on analysis of religion. 
 
The second issue is trickier. What is the value of an indulgence to a Protestant? Value of 
products of a religion is a function of beliefs of buyers. Thus, they observe, “[i]n joining a 
religious  organization,  the  belief  that  is  manifested  is  not  the  price  attributed  to  the 
supernatural compensator; on the contrary the belief determines the value to be attributed” 
(ibid: 205-206). They conclude, “[g]iven that belief is profoundly subjective, a believer is 
therefore unable to objectively compare religious „products‟…There is  understandably no 
possibility for pricing and logically there is no market…the real value created by the religious 
organization is not “supernatural compensators” but just the ability of certain believers to 
enthusiastically transmit convictions to the old and new believers, whatever the convictions 
might be. In effect, rationality is totally replaced by mimetism” (ibid: 206). Thus they rule out 
the possibility of a market for religion, for the core products of religion, in the sense it is 
understood  in  the  literature  at  present.  It  is  to  address  such  concerns  that  we  introduce 
Gambettas‟s  inscrutable  markets  to  characterize  the  market  for  religion  (Section  10.3.3, 
infra). The next issue they take up relates to the possibility of rational choice in the religious 
domain. 
 
Rational strategy making in a market “supposes that economic products are objective and 
objectivable independently of the beliefs of the evaluator… [and] that decision makers do not 
simultaneously  question  both  their  own  preferences  and  the  quality  of  product  they  are 
buying  or  producing…The  simultaneous  questioning…leads  to  indetermination  and 
uncertainty”.  If  we  agree  that  beliefs  are  exchanged  in  a  market  for  religion  then,  “the 
principle  of  non-simultaneousness  would  affect  and  distort  the  consideration  because  the 
calculations of “economic decision makers” simultaneously concern “the belonging to the 
church or sect” and “the belief into the values of the church or sect”. It would mean that the 
consumer  uses  her/his  preferences  to  buy  her/his  preference”  (ibid:  208).  Now  a  second 
constraint  emerges:  rational  choice  based  analysis  has  to  restrict  itself  within  religious 
boundaries (ibid: 209). At this stage we can pause and note that Gomez and Moore offer 
constructive criticism. Instead of ruling out rational analysis completely they restrict its scope 
so that the conclusions derived are more reliable. Very few studies engaging with the market   59 
for  religion  observe  such  restrictions,  including  Miller  (2002)  critiqued  by  Gomez  and 
Moore. Now following Gomez and Moore (2006: 210) we can argue that large parts of the 
existing  literature  are  essentially  metaphorical.
42  Relying  on  metaphors  has  interesting 
implications. 
One feature of associating a well-known framework with an unknown object is that this leads the 
reader  to  concentrate  her/his  attention  on  the  application  of  the  framework  without  necessarily 
validating the appropriability of the application. As such a surrogate validation effect is achieved when 
propositions made in the unknown field acquire their legitimacy and their respectability from the proxy 
use of a very well known concept…The metaphor finally disciplines the imagination of both the reader 
and researcher
43, creates an impression of realism, and ultimately makes even a “simplified view” of 
religious organizations “that excludes essential aspects of religion” acceptable (ibid: 210, emphasis 
added). 
 
Polyvalency and inscrutability There are, however, other reasons why economists have been 
suspicious  of  theology,  etc.  The dangerously polyvalent language with  which one has  to 
negotiate is  one  such  hurdle, which  reminds  of Stigler (1984:  309) who was  not  sure if 
economics had anything to say about language. But the tradition of economic analysis of 
linguistic problems stretches back to Marschak (1965), if not earlier. Recent contributions 
include  Lazear  (1997)  and  Rubinstein  (2000).  Then  there  is  the  widespread  belief  that 
scriptures  are inherently inscrutable. A few economists have spanned the divide between 
religion and economics and justified economic analysis of theology using arguments from the 
arsenal of theologians. Boulding (1957) made a general case in favour of economic analysis 
of  theology.  His  argument  in  short  is  that  even  though  (Christian)  religion  essentially 
transcends the material world it is experienced within the bounds of human body that is 
subject to material constraints and its teachings are meant to be followed by humans with 
finite resources, which makes theology amenable to economic analysis (cf. Ekelund et al‟s 
2006: 1-3 argument for rational analysis of “organized” religion and Ekelund et al‟s 2002: 
Footnote  6  argument  for  rational  analysis  of  salvation  or  redemption).  Viswanath  and 
Szenberg (2007) come to a similar conclusion starting from Judaic sources. They add that 
                                                 
42 “[A] metaphor as a peculiar feature of speech, is a blending of words used figuratively while others are used 
literally…the rhetorical efficiency of a metaphor comes from the subtle combination of literal and figurative use 
of the words in the same discourse, the former creating a context that makes that makes sense of the latter” 
(Gomez and Moore 2006: 209-210). 
43 This is not inevitable. See, for instance,  Brennan and Hamlin‟s (1995) use of the metaphor economizing on 
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revelation  in  the  first  place  presumes  comprehensibility,  even  though  imperfect.
44  The 
arguments in sources cited here do  not depend on characterization of religion as a market 
phenomenon. 
 
Nature  of  economic  analysis  Three  things  need  to  be  taken  into  account  while  forming 
expectations  about  the  output  of  economic  analyses  of  religion.  Firstly  economic 
interpretations  will  further  our  understanding  of  scriptures  but  it  is  possible  that  actual 
practices  vary  dramatically  from  scriptures  and  the  degree  of  doctrine-practice  gap  itself 
varies across believers. Secondly, more than anything else economic explanations of religious 
doctrines need to account for the inertia of these doctrines, which have resisted pressures due 
to material changes over extended periods.
45 A high degree of inertia implies inevitability of 
doctrine-practice disconnect, which has serious consequences for both Marxist and Weberian 
studies, but more so for the latter.  To add to the conundrum religious doctrines are, in fact, 
marked by  a peculiar inflexibility coupled with a mazing flexibility.  One the one hand 
religions  intend to punish  small deviations with heavy penalties and on the other even 
outrageous criminals are promised heaven if only they agree to surrender to Lord, in most o f 
                                                 
44 Also see Deuteronomy 30: 11-14, Brams (2002 [1980], 2007 [1983]), Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]: 298-
301),  and  Leiter  (2008:  Footnote  34).  The  Calvinist  discourse,  however,  poses  a  truly  inscrutable, 
unimpressionable god. 
45 On why religions have to frame their messages in inflexible, extreme forms see Miller (1994) for a legal -
economic efficiency point of view. In a society where transmission was costl y it was desirable to retain tough 
cases dealing with extreme situations in scriptures and ensure stability of expectations by making it difficult to 
easily tamper scriptures. Though not directly related,  Miller‟s (2006b) discussion on the apparent extremism of 
pre-modern legal systems is also helpful in understanding the inflexibility of pre-modern religious discourse. 
The idea there is that rigid  standards provide benchmarks, the limits of the  solution  space. Miller (2006a) 
provides a technological explanation focusing on the difference in substitutability of different types of religious 
products vis-à-vis religious products of other  firms as  well as secular products available in usual  markets. 
Salvation, for which there are hardly any susbstitutes, is a high strictness product line where a few changes are 
required over time whereas other products like schools, etc have secular substitutes. The low strictness product 
lines have to change along with technology driven secular substitutes. A non-material argument is put forth by 
Ensminger (1994: 752) who suggests that rigidity of a discourse might “provide its very legitimacy” and is 
therefore valued by religions. 
 
We will now look at the problem from a cognitive perspective discussed in Schlicht (1995), which reinforces the 
argument in Miller (1994). Human  memory or senses  work on the principle of approximation  so that any 
information is recorded in extreme forms to make it easy to store and recall later on. He argues that “[o]ur 
perception, memory, and recall tend to maximum clarity. This means that divergences between the schema and 
the item it refers to tend to be either accentuated or minimised. These effects of „levelling‟ and „sharpening‟ are 
quite systematic and may be seen as an attempt of our minds to achieve maximum clarity” (ibid: 129-130). In 
order that individuals follow its standards a religion has to promise higher returns from observance compared to 
non-observance. This means that true belief plus any, possibly infinitesimal, positive difference between returns 
from observance and non-observance of religious precepts would do. Without this positive difference in returns 
a religion would undercut itself because true belief is necessary but not sufficient for observance. So starting 
with a finite difference between returns it is possible to land up with infinite difference after some generations 
due to cognitive distortion or starting from a minimally rewarding/punishing god a society can slip towards 
elaborately imagined heaven and hell.   61 
the  cases  without  paying  any  substantial  fines!  It  has  been  argued  that  ex  ante  infinite 
punishment prevents people from straying whereas ex post religions rope the deviants back 
by  positing  an  occasionally  forgiving  god,  etc  (cf.  Harmgart  et  al  2006,  Cassone  and 
Marchese 1999). This theological rigidity coupled, intentionally or otherwise, with ambiguity 
(that provides for flexibility) helps religion to preserve and propagate itself across space and 
time. Closely related to inertia of doctrine is the obstinacy with which religious beliefs are 
held. Even if the doctrine is inertial there is no inherent reason why it should be tenaciously 
believed by the laity. Caplan (2001) attributes the obstinacy to the low cost one has to pay for 
holding such beliefs in most of the cases (see Section 10.1.2, infra). 
 
Lastly, providing material explanations of religious doctrines is as good as suggesting that 
material factors could have been the actual causes behind the origin of the doctrines in the 
first  place.  Since  majority  of  the  literature  explains  anything  and  everything  through 
“material”  arguments  one  wonders  why  they  stop  short  of  saying  that  the  non-material 
dimension of religion is at best inconsequential. We will briefly illustrate why even very 
convincing  studies  cannot  rule  out  the  non-material  dimension.  Consider,  for  instance, 
Ekelund  et  al  (2002)  who  provide  a  purely  material  explanation  of  the  incidence  of  the 
Reformation,  which  seems  to  be  an  alternative  to  the  widespread  belief  that  moral 
considerations were at the root of the event. A notable feature of religious beliefs is that place 
categorical demands on human actions: “demands that must be satisfied, no matter what an 
individual‟s  antecedent  desires  and  no  matter  what  incentives  or  disincentives  the  world 
offers up” (Leiter 2008). If this is true then moral indignation is required for breakdown of 
categoricity and only then believers begin to care for calculus, a possibility that is difficult to 
rule  out.  So  one  can  as  well  say  that  Ekelund  et  al  have  not  provided  an  alternative 
explanation  rather  they  have  provided  an  explanation  of  how  things  worked  out  after 
breakdown of categoricity. 
 
If we look at the literature from the perspective of as if (material factors alone mattered) 
analysis  we find three  distinct types of contributions.  One, Ekelund et al (1996) provide 
perhaps the most ruthless, though not always coherent, dissection of the historic, and to some 
extent  contemporary,  Church.  They  explain  a  number  of  developments  in  Christianity 
assuming rent-seeking church hierarchy. Even though their priests  are  as  corrupt as  they 
could be Ekelund et al do not question the scriptures. In fact, for them scriptures are as good 
as non-existent, which is indeed characteristic of most of the literature. Two, Smith (1999)   62 
explains  the genesis of the idea of apocalypse  by invoking the need to hold  the nascent 
church together in a hostile environment. What is new about his treatment of doctrine is the 
idea that doctrinal messages work on imagination capital of followers and alter, in his case, 
their time preferences a la Becker and Mulligan (1997). This change reduces “their discount 
on afterlife outcomes and removes the incentive to participate in pagan idolatry”. Although 
self-avowedly deferential, Miller‟s (1993 a, b and 1996) interpretation of Old Testament, like 
Smith (1999) discussed above, debunks the superhuman inspiration of scriptures. Biblical 
characters  are  shown  to  be  mere  convenient  foils  against  which  society  economically 
constructs socially useful narratives aka scriptures. Ferrero (2008b) explains the doctrinal 
changes in early Church simply by taking into account the nature of competition and religious 
policy of the state. The above explanations are self-contained and leave no room for divine 
intervention or inspiration. Three, in contrast Brams (2003 [1980]) who has analyzed Biblical 
stories using game theory ends on an explicitly skeptical note because of the undecidability 
faced by his human players in a large number of potential games against superior beings. So 
humans cannot be sure whether their experiences can be attributed to a superior being. The 
divergent conclusions emerging from Brams and Miller are despite the fact that both examine 
Old Testament.  In  any  case  we find that  at  least  some contributors  are prepared to  take 
theological positions. We will return to Brams in Section 10.1.2 (infra) and presently engage 
further with Miller‟s argument. To be precise we will see what he has to say about structure 
of texts. 
 
Structure of scriptures Miller (1993 a and b, 1994, 1996) argues that high cost of recording 
and transmission in pre-modern age is bound to influence the format of religious scriptures 
and suggests a legal-economic approach towards interpreting theology/mythology. Following 
his  discussion  we  can  say  that  alternative  texts  containing  socially  beneficial  rules  are 
subjected to a process akin to natural selection. The texts that eventually survive contain rules 
embedded in stories/case studies, which maximize expected social welfare (by minimizing 
expected  transaction  costs  for  an  average  follower),  and  are  easy  to  transmit  across 
generations.  These  texts  originally  served  as  devices  for  establishing,  promulgating,  and 
enforcing  norms  in  primitive,  often  stateless,  societies.  Carlton  and  Weiss  (2001:  258) 
suggest that rules chosen by a religion have to satisfy a few conditions: (a) should enhance 
belief,  (b)  should  lead  to  complementarity  of  actions  of  believers  and  non-believers,  (c) 
assure relatively higher gains to believers who observe rules compared to observant non-  63 
believers, and (d) should be amenable to intergenerational transmission. In addition religions 
have to specify mechanism of choosing both rules and the mechanism itself. 
 
Historical  analysis  of  scriptures  Interestingly but  for possibly one exception none of the 
contributors has claimed to provide answers to issues like dating Biblical texts. But shouldn‟t 
this  be  the  target  if  we  agree  that  framing  of  doctrines  is  constrained  by  the  material 
environment?  Raskovich  (1996)  models  the  Old  Testament  market  for  religion  and  then 
shows the conditions under which it would undergo monopolization, which leads to higher 
prices at shrines. Combining the last with price of services given in different Biblical books 
Raskovich argues that Deuteronomy predates Leviticus. 
 
 
4.7.2 Christian tradition 
 
Economic  analysis  of  Chritian  tradition  begins  with  Kane  (1963,  1964,  and  1966),  who 
showed the theoretical incompatibility between Scholastic and Paretian welfare principles. 
He also argued that given a church doctrine it is not impossible to accommodate secular 
pressures for change. “Periodic modernization” of doctrine, he argued, could be treated as “an 
optimality problem”. The engagement with Scholastic literature ended with Melitz (1971), 
who examined the Scholastic position on usury at length. Since then two issues have attracted 
most of the attention in recent  years: usury and afterlife.
46 Most notable feature of these 
contributions is the diversity of objective functions assumed for the Church. But first we will 
briefly discuss contributions on evolution of ancient Church. 
 
Early Church We have already seen that Smith (1999) explained the evolution of the doctrine 
of  Apocalypse  by  invoking  the  need  to  hold  the  nascent  church  together  in  a  hostile 
environment that offered lucrative outside options to neo-converts. He provides a preference 
based explanation for introduction of the doctrine of Apocalypse. The vivid descriptions of 
hereafter enhanced its value to the followers of church by changing time preferences. The 
                                                 
46 A number of other issues have received fewer contributions. See for crusades Anderson et al (1992); for 
cathedral building Bereca et al (2005); for sainthood Ferrero (2002); for reformation and counter-reformation 
Ekelund et al (2002, 2004), also Allen (1995: 114) and Kane (1966: 439); for marriage Davidson and Ekelund 
(1997), also Anderson and Tollison (1998); for sex trade Ortona (2007); for contraception Kane (1966); for 
medieval  monasteries  Davidson  (1995);  for  miracles  (Harmgart  et  al  2006);  and  for  medieval  state-church 
separation (Salmon 2008). Ekelund et al (1996 and 2006) collect a number of papers by Ekeleund et al.   64 
doctrine also promised early return of Christ thereby reducing the relative value of current 
consumption. Smith ignores a belief based explanation (ibid: 453), according to which the 
doctrine might have enhanced the subjective belief in existence of afterlife. While Smith 
looks at a very small development within early Church Ferrero (2008b) attempts to explain 
the  entire  trajectory  of  Church,  beginning  with  its  obscure  origins  as  a  Jewish  sect 
culminating with its establishment in the late Roman period. When it was a small, dispersed 
sect, oftentimes underground, it did not have the luxury to control the quality of doctrine. It 
relied  like  any  other  sect  upon  behavioural  strictness-based  control  mechanism.  When  it 
emerged as the established church, with monopoly rights, it opened its doors to all (free-
access condition) and switched to doctrinal strictness-based control mechanism to maintain 
the  quality  of  returns  for  its  members.  The  distinctive  features  of  his  model  include 
accomodating both church and sect within the same framework as cooperatives, which are 
constrained by fixed factors including leadership. Other novelties of the model include a 
spatial representation of competition in market for religion with both ends of the normative 
space, minimum and maximum strictness, being default locations of firms, Paganism and 
Judaism, respectively. Furthermore the firm locations are constrained by a minimum critical 
distance they need to maintain, which is governed by the inability of laity to distinguish 
between sufficiently close doctrinal positions. 
 
Medieval Church Let us begin with usury. Melitz (1971) argues that the doctrine of usury 
was  a  byproduct  of  misunderstanding  of  Roman  Law  (also  see  Marshall  1920:  485-86). 
Ekelund et al (1989) argue that the Medieval Church tampered the doctrine with rent seeking 
motives. Hull (1989) suggests that usury prohibitions in medieval times were tied to  the 
ecclesiastical position on afterlife, which was tending towards a more fine-grained distinction 
between  different  stages  of  afterlife.  Posner  (1995)  argues  that  Church  being  the  major 
welfare provider in medieval age had to induce credit rationing for the poor to check the 
possibility  of  moral  hazard.  Glaeser  and  Scheinkman  (1998)  justify  usury  prohibitions 
assuming a social welfare maximizing church that aims consumption smoothing. Assuming a 
self-interested membership maximizing Church, which changes doctrine of usury in line with 
degree of substitutability  between capital markets  and traditional  consumption  smoothing 
devices, Reed and Bekar (2003) are able to better explain the changes in doctrine over the 
entire history of the church. They assume lexicographic preferences for Church: “Its foremost 
goal is to keep all members of the population alive because this increases the value of Church   65 
lands and the number of souls that can be saved” (emphasis added; for a related assumption 
see Hull 1989 and Anderson and Tollison 1992). 
 
The  other  prominent  issue  in  this  literature  is  the  church  doctrine  on  afterlife.  Medieval 
Church  devised  a  very  complex  system  of  afterlife  management  consisting  of  auricular 
confession, distinction  between mortal  and venal  sins, purgatory,  and indulgences.  While 
Ekelund et al (1992) assume a hardnosed rent seeking church in the market for sins/salvation, 
to explain the evolution of church‟s position on afterlife, others tread more carefully. Hull 
(1989) and Cassone and Marchese (1999) assume a welfare maximizing Church to explain 
introduction of doctrine of purgatory, etc (also see Arruñada 2004, Harmgart et al 2006). 
While these authors suggest that the Church aimed something like optimal enforcement and 
deterrence Ekeleund et al (2002, 2006) argue that historical evidence supports a contrary 
inference, namely, the church position was driven by pecuniary motives of its hierarchy. 
Based on insights drawn from a spatial model of competition between churches Barros and 
Garoupa (2002) argue that changes in churches position can be seen as “a rational response to 
competition from the non-church and potential entrants”. Richardson and McBride (2007) 
explain the acceptance of the idea of purgatory by appealing to changes in mortality patterns 
without invoking active oversight/interference of Church hierarchy. Another factor behind 
the  introduction/acceptance  of  purgatory  could  be  as  follows.  One  need  not  necessarily 
conjure up rent-maximizing popes at least as long as the laity believes that all licit work is 
pious  and  shifting  to  a  more  productive  but  equally  pious  work  and  financing  other 
requirements is acceptable. Then shift to a less time intensive practice is not unthinkable 
particulalry because the West began to witness higher growth rates in that period. This brings 
us to Hull (1989) and Hull and Bold (1989, 1994) who argue that evolution of the position on 
afterlife is tied to socio-economic developments with peak obtained at an intermediate level 
of development just before the emergence of modern state. Afterlife was made complex to 
address the requirements of a society becoming more complex over time without matching 
evolution of secular contract enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Contemporary  church  We  will  now  look  at  contributions  to  a  contemporary  doctrinal 
development, namely, the papal decision to relax the requirement to abstain from meat on 
Fridays. Ault et al (1987) argue that the decision was a consequence of shift in balance of 
power in favour of meat producing countries within the College of Cardinals. They treat the 
College as a cartel. Their evidence is at best suggestive and can be used in absence of positive   66 
evidence regarding lobbying to arrive at a contrary conclusion. Since their explanation is 
contingent upon a certain distribution of seats in the College they also need to explain why 
similar distributions in past did not lead to a similar relaxation. Thornton (1992), who extends 
their work and suffers from the same problems, argues that the leather interests tipped some 
European cardinals in favour of the change. Actually the earliest contribution to this issue 
was Bell (1968), where the impact of Papal decision on fish industry in North East USA was 
examined. Bell found that the decision negatively influenced fish prices. 
 
Orwell’s Problem (Part I) Let us return to Ekelund et al‟s questionable assumptions and 
treatment of agency problems within Catholic hierarchy. A full discussion is ruled out due to 
space constraints
47 so we will restrict in particular to two assumptions or rather presumptions: 
a) popes‟ utility has no room for number of souls saved or reduction in level of sin in society, 
which is what his Lord is supposed to judge him for, i.e., popes are godless and b) people are 
god fearing. These assumptions together lead one to Marx: poor people aka believers in the 
trap  of  remorseless  opium  peddlars  aka  church  authorities.  The  problem  with  Marxist 
theology is that it presumes unchanging class demography (Horowitz 2000 [1985]). Before 
making these assumptions one needs to explain why, how, and when did the two classes 
diverge  with  respect  to  belief  in  god.  Why  did  the  lower  class  not  learn?  Information 
problems alone are not sufficient to explain this divergence because given the relatively low 
levels of mobility in pre-modern society on the one hand people could easily learn through 
observing the local church and on the other it is more likely that a symbiotic relation evolved 
between the laity and local church due to repeated interactions. In any case the charge of 
atheism is  least  likely to stick to  pre-industrials  when the opium in  religion  appealed to 
people cutting across class lines. Furthermore, even if we assume that the Church hierarchy 
was corrupt and godless that in itself does not imply that it must necessarily fail to provide 
quality services to its members. Modern theory of organizations suggests that organizations 
manned by purely self-interested individuals, prone to moral hazard, can devise mechanisms 
to protect their customers from fraud. 
 
If we choose to stick to Ekelund et al‟s assumptions then we need to define religion as 
whatever supernatural excuse comes handy in conning people and religious community as a 
collection of extortionists - carrying supernatural labels, and the extorted - people who have 
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preferences  over  labels  or  some  external  compulsion/internal  commitment  to  choose  a 
particular label. Apriori there is nothing wrong with such an assumption except that it leads to 
Orwell‟s Problem: how it is that we know so little, given that we have so much evidence?
48 In 
Section  3.6  (supra)  we  reformulated  Orwell‟s  Problem  as  one  of  inefficient  use  of 
information.  We  have  argued  that  lack  of  information  is  not  the  main  issue  in  case  of 
Medieval Christianity. The interesting question then is not how much profits popes managed 
to amass rather why do people consistently hold beliefs contrary to observed reality. We are 
not rejecting Ekelund et al‟s conclusions straightaway. We are only drawing attention to the 
hitherto  overlooked  realm  into  which  they  drop  us,  without  a  map.  We  will  return  to  a 
complementary Orwell‟s Problem in Section 8.2.4 (infra). 
 
4.7.3 Jewish tradition 
 
Contributions to interpretation of Jewish scriptures begin with Brams (2003 [1980], 2007 
[1983]), who provides a game-theoretic analysis of a number of Old Testament stories. Miller 
(1993 a, b and 1996) provides a law and economics interpretation of Old Testament stories. 
Raskovich  (1996)  models  the  market  for  religion  following  Pentateuch.  Carr  and  Landa 
(1983) provide a club-theoretic rationale for Talmudic sanction against lending at interest 
within the Jewish community, which ensured consumption smoothing via mutual insurance. 
To  give  a  glimpse  of  the  difference  between  Brams  and  Miller  we  consider  their 
interpretations  of  the  Biblical  story  in  which  Esau  sells  his  birthright  to  Jacob.  Miller 
concludes that the crisp story upheld the validity and enforceability of contracts in a stateless 
society,  “even  if  made  under  conditions  of  extreme  inequality  of  bargaining  power”.  He 
observes  that  this  story,  among  other  Biblical  stories  of  this  kind,  sanctified  contractual 
obligations by citing precedents set by revered figures. Brams on the other hand shows that 
tit-for-tat (give food if Esau sells birthright) was the dominant strategy for Jacob given that 
Esau made the first move in a two-person, complete information, non-cooperative game. In 
equilibrium famished Esau sold his birthright in exchange for food. Miller would argue that 
by  making  the  first  move  and  declaring  private  information  Esau  lost  bargaining  power. 
Brams would, however, suggest that the dominant strategy of Jacob left Esau without any 
option irrespective of the revelation of private information. 
                                                 
48 See Patnaik (2007) for discussion of the standard Orwellian puzzle in the context of Hindu  mythology. 
Horowitz (2000 [1985]) provides a detailed discussion closer to our concern in context of ethnic movements but 
without linking it to the Orwellian puzzle. Within EoR see Kuran (1997) for a related discussion.   68 
 
Solomon’s Problem One story of Old Testament that has inspired a number a very interesting 
mechanism design papers is that of Solomon, who had to identify the true mother between 
two claimants to a newborn. Brams (2003 [1980]: 118-123) shows that both the true mother 
and impostor had a dominant strategy, namely, protest king‟s order to cut the baby into two 
and don‟t protest, respectively. Brams also points out that the outcome is invariant to the 
sequence of moves. The outcome changes only if the impostor is also endowed with altruism 
or maternalistic preferences, a possibility ruled out by the Biblical text. This story provides 
one with an interesting problem: how to allocate an indivisible good to one of many agents 
subject to the constraint that the recipient values it most and receives it without making any 
payments.  The  standard  second-price  auction  provides  a  straightforward  solution  to  this 
problem sans no-payment constraint. A number of attempts have been made to provide a 
general  solution  to  this  problem  with  the  no-payment  constraint.  Glazer  and  Ma  (1989) 
provide an implementation mechanism for many agents and one prize, where agents know 
each others‟ valuations and the allocation agency knows the vector of valuations but cannot 
relate it to individuals (also see Moore 1992). Perry and Reny (1999) and Olszewski (1999) 
relax the information requirement in a two agent setting by assuming that each agent knows 
which of them has a higher valuation without knowing the precise value. Bag and Sabourian 
(2005) provide a solution to the general version of the problem, which involves multiple 
agents and multiple indivisible goods in the Olszewski-type relaxed information setting. Bag 
(1996) provides solution to the problem involving a limited amount of divisible good and 
multiple agents. 
 
5.0 Weberian Analyses 
 
Under this  category one finds studies  on impact  of religion  on society and economy.  In 
principle within this category contributions can be classified according to whether they stress 
demand side or supply  side.  But  very few contributions  in  this  category  consciously  see 
themselves  in  this  manner  (e.g.,  Ekelund  et  al  2002,  2004,  and  2006).  The  original 
contribution is by Weber (1995 [1920]) who propounded the Protestant Ethic Hypothesis or 
PEH.
49 Weber suggested that the right kind of religion (in his case Protestantism) can foster 
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growth. Protestantism, in particular Calvinism, elevated secular work to the level of religious 
calling and made this-worldly saints out of commoners. This had two effects, emergence of a 
hardworking, industrious workforce and increased thrift, which in turn aided wealth creation. 
He then links these developments to origin of industrial capitalism. He was not unaware of 
the Marxist link. To the contrary he does discuss (and rule out) the possibility of reverse 
causality. Notably the economic impact of development of Protestant ethic was, according to 
Weber, an unintended side effect of the Reformation. Though Weber has been challenged on 
a number of fronts the idea behind his approach continues to inspire loads of studies. In his 
review of EoR Iannaccone (1998: 1474) observed that lack of empirical evidence is the most 
noteworthy feature of PEH. Since then a number of theoretical and empirical studies have 
appeared. We will look at papers dealing directly with nuts and bolts of PEH followed by 
work  on  growth  theory,  conflict,  and  experimental  studies.  Before  engaging  with  these 
studies we will quickly refer to a few broad brush treatments of PEH and the problematic 
nature of most of the studies inspired by the basic intutition behind PEH. 
 
Giddens (1976) provides a succinct summary of Weberian position and its critiques (also see 
Anderson  and  Tollison  1992,  Iannaccone  1998,  Collins  1997).  Clark  (1951,  also  1947) 
questioned the empirical basis of PEH in the context of North America and suggested that 
pro-economic atmosphere developed partly as a reaction and partly as an after-effect of the 
advent of Protestantism. Even though Protestantism was more dismissive of material world 
compared  to  Catholicism,  its  negative  influence  was  limited  by  the  continual  process  of 
fission. For a devastating critique of Weber see Samuelsson (1961) who observed that there 
was no association at all between Protestantism and economic progress to warrant a study of 
the causal content of the same. Knight (1939), as noted above, discussed the difficulty in 
defending  a  causal  hypothesis  linking  social  outcomes  with  religion  because  of  the 
ambiguous nature of religious doctrine. Friedman (1972) discusses the problematic character 
of explanations linking religion (Judaism) and socio-economic outcomes. Carr and Landa 
(1983) suggest that small, tightly knit religious communities (they deal with ascriptive ones 
in  general)  succeed  in  markets  where  trust  is  essential,  irrespective  of  actual  religious 
affiliation.  This  amounts  to  distinguishing  between  religious  and  demographic  (minority) 
effects, a distinction also made in Weber and Lewis. But the latter do not address the group 
size problem modelled in Carr and Landa. Others have argued that religion is quite malleable 
and  certainly  not  difficult  to  bypass.  So  it  can  at  best  constrain  growth  by  increasing 
transaction costs. But in any case the costs are never prohibitive. Hence, in the medium to   70 
long run it should not prove to be a barrier to growth (Marshall 1920, Lewis 1972 [1955], 
Samuelsson 1961, Schlicht 1995, and Kuran 1997). A widely ignored, though very critical, 
aspect of Weber‟s argument is the great stress it laid on the superior moral values, even 
though instrumental, of this-worldly saints produced by Protestantism. But looking from a 
distance,  i.e.,  the  perspective  of  colonized,  one  cannot  be  faulted  for  concluding  that 
Weberian-saints were not significantly different from their Catholic counterparts. 
 
We will now turn to be issue of lack of care with which PEH has been used in literature. A 
number  of  cross-section  or  panel  studies  use  20
th  Century  data  to  check  if  religion  can 
influence economic outcomes directly through its impact on trade, returns to human capital, 
etc  or  indirectly  through  conflict,  corruption,  institutions,  entrepreneurship,  tax  policies, 
savings, etc.
50 The evidence as usual  in EoR  is mixed.  One finds that these contributions 
suffer from a common shortcoming. In most of the cases a relation between income, etc and 
religion is hypothesized just because adherents of some religion seem to be different.  Very 
few step back and ask what does it mean to belong to religion x, which of these attributes are 
necessarily part of religion x but not a part of other religions. Since there can be a sustained 
divergence between religious doctrine and practice once the set of necessary and independent 
attributes of religion x is identified one still needs to justify a priori why these attributes are 
expected to influence the outcome of interest. Without this exercise many studies end up 
treating religion as the sum total of a community‟s historical experience, which is clearly 
inappropriate.  We  are  not  denying  the  consequential  nature  of  religious  affiliations. 
Affiliations indeed matter but a more careful methodolgy is to be followed to establish that 
they do so in a given case. Further these studies need to observe the distinction between 
policy and statistical significance because most of us are any way convinced that religion is 
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individual rate of return on human capital; Borooah (1999) for religion based discrimination in labour market; 
Borooah (2003, 2004) and Borooah and Iyer (2005) for human development indicators; Helble (2007), Lewer 
and van den Berg (2007), and Guo (2007) for international trade; La Porta et al (1997), Paldam (2001), Alesina 
et al (2003), Guiso et al (2003, 2006), Paldam (2007), and Borooah and Paldam (2007) for institutions; and 
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5.1 Protestant Ethic Hypothesis 
 
5.1.1 Structure of hypothesis 
 
Ekelund et al (2006) discuss the structure of PEH in the language of EoR. They argue that 
Weber‟s argument is basically preference-based and, therefore, focused on the demand side. 
They  suggest  that  there  were  supply  side  factors  at  work  as  well,  which  contributed  to 
economic progress in the Protestant regions. The most important ones being the release of 
resources withheld from productive use due to rent-seeking investment in Catholic Church 
and release of labour force tied down by endless religious rituals before Reformation (cf. 
Clark 1951, also 1947, who discusses a broader range of issues). In other words both tastes 
and constraints changed in tandem. We do not disagree with the identification of Weber with 
the  demand  side.  But  reading  the  Weberian  argument  as  preference-based  is  debatable. 
According to Ekelund et al Reformation changed preferences from other-worldly concerns to 
this-worldly concerns. The advent of Protestantism changed tastes in favour of work versus 
leisure and saving versus consumption. We do not deny this possibility. But even a cursory 
reading of Weber suggests that he stressed the role of change in beliefs. We will illustrate this 
point with the help of a short example. Think of a person who prefers carpentry to chanting 
but who also believes that afterlife exists and also that afterlife pay-offs are substantially 
larger and depend on the effort put into chanting in this life. It is not difficult to see that 
change  of  preferences  in  favour  of  carpentry  does  not  amount  to  much.  For  a  general 




Assuming uncertainty over existence or nature of other world Benabou and Tirole (2006) 
provide micro-foundations for economic growth generated by PEH. Basically they model the 
implications  of  the  “need  to  believe  in  a  “just  world””  within  a  cognitive  dissonance 
framework, which is then extended to religion. They assume two kinds of beliefs. According 
to the first “there is a hereafter in which rewards and punishments are tied to effort and 
industriousness (or lack thereof) during one‟s lifetime” and its counterpart according to which 
“there is no afterlife, or that if there is one, its rewards are determined according to criteria   72 
unrelated to industriousness, or even antithetical to material success” (ibid: 730). Individuals 
with  former  beliefs  would  work  harder  and  demand  lesser  redistribution,  which  in  turn 
prompts others to work harder and so on so forth. Individual‟s expected utility in period t is 
given by the following expression (ibid: 731): 
            (2) 
 
where   reflects the strength of individual religious faith, 
i   is 
the posterior belief about the state of world, which can be good   or bad  , e
i is the 
level of effort,   is the tax rate,   is the individual‟s information set, and y
i is individual 
income that depends on state of world, inherited wealth, and level of effort. In this model 
“[i]f a person expects to work hard because of low redistribution, then believing that effort 
carries important rewards in the afterlife will generate high anticipatory utility” (ibid: 731). 
The model  yields  two equilibria:  PEH equilibrium  “accompanied by high effort  and low 
redistribution”  and  non-PEH  equilibrium  “characterized  by  a  greater  predominance  of 
agnosticism  or  religions  that  do  not  stress  industriousness  and  worldly  achievements, 
accompanied by the reverse pattern of labor supply and redistributive policy” (ibid: 732). The 
model doesnot explain transition from a religious society in which PEH was unheard of to 
one divided into PEH and non-PEH communities, both of them religious. Also the model 
does not suggest any time frame for the sorting. However, given both kinds of belief it can 
explain the sorting of societies into PEH and non-PEH types. For a society imbued with 
Protestant ethic Cozzi‟s (1998) model of culture as a bubble can explain the simultaneous 
growth in value of culture and economy (see Section 4.6, supra). 
 
Glaeser and Glendon (1998) model the Catholic doctrine of freewill versus the Protestant 
doctrine  of  predestination.  Although  both  doctrines  create  incentives  to  promote  good 
behaviour  they  show  that  the  Catholic  doctrine  “creates  incentives  for  individuals  who 
actually  believe  in  the  hereafter”  whereas  the  Protestant  doctrine  “creates  incentives  for 
everyone  because  of  individuals‟  desire  to  convince  others  that  they  are  members  of  a 
spiritual elect”. Predestination is shown to be socially efficient whenever observable actions 
are  relatively  socially  valuable,  beliefs  about  afterlife  are  highly  diverse,  signaling  is 
valuable, and homogeneity of actions is desirable. In effect they extend conditional support to 
PEH. There are two objections to their model. Their results are completely driven by the   73 
following assumptions: a) Protestantism induced observable moral actions and deemphasized 
the unobservable ones and b) Catholic societies/communities have an inferior social control 
mechanism. 
 
5.1.3 Historical evidence 
 
One of the earliest empirical studies in this field was De Long (1988), which covered 23 
countries.  De  Long  observed  that  “a  nation‟s  dominant  religious  establishment”  in  19
th 
Century had a significant, exogenous impact on growth of a country while noting that the 
correlation could as well be due to a coincidence between introduction of Protestantism and a 
number of standard growth enhancing factors. He also observed that the effect is likely to 
diminish  as  more  non-Protestant  states  join  the  developed  nations‟  club,  which  is  not  a 
serious endorsement of PEH‟s causal explanation (ibid: 1146-47). Others have also looked at 
historical  evidence  from  Europe.
51  The  evidence  is  far  from  conclusive,  which  is  not 
surprising for two reasons, namely, paucity of historical data and lack of agreement over how 
PEH operates - does it induce virtues like honesty, discipline, thrift, and hard work or does it 
reduce non-cooperative behaviour  and  enhance interpersonal trust; does it operate at the 
individual or aggregate level; does it operate in the short or long run. In any case contrary to 
PEH Delacroix and Nielsen (2001) find little evidence in favour of a positive relation 
between  incidence  of  Protestantism  and  a  number  of  economic  variables  of  interest. 
However, Blum and Dudley (2001) conclude from their study of differential development 
between North and South European cities that enhanced cooperation (rather than hard work 
and higher saving), or networking as they put it, due to Protestantism can indeed explain the 
divergence. There are two objections to Blum and Dudley (2001). First, it is not clear from 
Weber (1995 [1920]: 106, 108) if he had networking in mind when he propo sed PEH. 
Second, they treat London as the hub of international commercial activity . But during the 
period under consideration (1500-1750) one can treat Amsterdam as a competing hub. In fact, 
their Figure 1, which plots population growth against real wage g rowth rate for 1500-1750, 
says as much.  For additional concerns about their analysis see  Ekelund et al (2006: 220). 
Becker and Woessmann (2007), who explore the impact of introduction of Protestantism in 
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Eckstein (2005, 2007) on role of religion in economic history of Jews, Geertz (1980) for Bali, Greif (1994) for 
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Germany, fail to confirm PEH. They instead show that a human capital explanation, namely, 
Protestant stress on literacy (actually Bible reading), can explain the economic gap between 
Catholic and Protestant counties of late 19
th Century Prussia. Cavalcanti et al (2007) examine 
PEH using an overlapping-generations model of economy calibrated with historical data and 
explicitly account for differences in beliefs about afterlife. They show that PEH can at best 
explain a 70 year gap between onset of industrialization in Catholic and Protestant regions of 
Europe. 
 
Ekelund et al (2006) show that the regions that embraced Protestantism shared a vital pro-
growth feature, pre-dating Reformation, namely, adherence to partible inheritance laws rather 
than primogeniture and that ceteris paribus richer regions and classes were more prone to 
Protestant  entry.
52  The  empirical  basis  of  the  assertion  regarding  inheritance  has  been 
questioned (Arruñada 2004). Earlier Clark (1947, 1951) has argued that it was the lower class 
that was most attracted to Protestantism, at least in North America. Ekelund et al also argue 
that  higher  growth  rates  in  Catholic  regions  bordering  Protestant  regions  cannot  in  itself 
disprove PEH because such an outcome is not unlikely if we agree with the idea of voting-
with-feet proposed by Charles Tiebout. 
 
5.2 Growth theories 
 
Religion  has  been  invoked  in  three  different  ways  to  explain  international  growth 
differences
53: religious beliefs about afterlife, etc matter  for growth  (Barro and McCleary 
2003),  the  effect of religion on entrepreneurial spirit, sa ving behaviour,  and demand for 
redistribution affects economic outcomes (Guiso et al 2003, 2006), and the effect of religion 
on  institutions  mediated  through  the  aggregate  structure  of  society,  i.e., 
fractionalization/polarization, influences growth (Alesina et al 2003). The first two have a 
distinct Weberian flavour. It is not unusual to find completely contradictory results in this 
literature,  e.g.,  Noland  (2005)  and  Hillman  (2006),  respectively,  find  that  Islam  is 
inconsequential  and  consequential  for  growth.  Barro  and  McCleary  (2003)  conclude  that 
                                                 
52 Paldam (2001: 411-412) likewise turns the PEH on its head and suggests that possibly only the honest part of 
Europe converted rather than Protestantism reducing corruption among neo-converts and enhancing growth. A 
20
th Century case study by Goldin and Metz (1991) also turns PEH on its head by suggesting that Protestantism 
was adopted in parts of Guatemala precisely because the people concerned were (already) upwardly mobile. 
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religious production efficiency positively affects growth while Mangeloja (2005) fails to find 
significant support for the same. There are a few studies on determinants of growth within a 
country, which account for religious factors (Heath et al 1995, Crain and Lee 1999, Lipford 
and Tollison 2003). But even here religion has not been found to be a robust determinant of 
growth. 
 
Using religious capital models we can recast the production function used in neoclassical 
endogenous growth literature as follows to include the effect of religious sector on economy 
(Mangeloja 2005: 2352-2353)
54, where R is the influence of religious sector on productivity: 
   and              (3) 
 
S is the stock of religious capital,   is the level of religious beliefs, and   is the time spent in 
religious  activities.  Individuals  maximize  utility    derived  from  consumption  (c), 
leisure (l), and R subject to the standard time and budget constraints. Assuming zero stock of 
religious capital religious production efficiency can be represented as  . For a given level 
of belief as time spent increases religious production efficiency falls and vice versa (also see 
Section 8.2.2, infra). Durlauf et al (2008b, also 2008a) in their meta-study find that religion 
(in the Barro and McCleary sense) contributes hardly if anything to explain inter-country 
growth  differences.  They  also  find  that  fractionalization  has  little  explanatory  power  but 
unlike  Alesina  et  al  (2003)  they  do  not  check  for  religious  fractionalization.  Mangeloja 
(2005)  provides  a  good  discussion  on  a  wide  range  of  issues  like  choice  of  estimation 
techniques, lack of quality of data, lack of understanding of data generating process, etc. 
 
5.3 Religion and conflict 
 
In this section we will deal with communal violence and not crime for which we refer the 
reader to Footnote 14 (supra). There are two sets of contributions. One set deals with violent 
religious organizations whereas the other engages with conflict in general. None of the papers 
discussed invokes doctrinal differences to explain conflict. Religion is an identity marker that 
differentiates parties to a conflict. Any other marker would do as well! We will also discuss 
the much neglected possibility of conflict affecting religion. 
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5.3.1 Religious organizations and violence 
 
Berman (2000, 2003), Iannaccone and Berman (2006), and Berman and Laitin (2008) extend 
the church-sect model (see Section 4.2.2, supra) to religious extremism, at times associated 
with violence, of sects. Stigma-based sects are more cohesive and can extract better efforts 
from members than secular organizations, which gives them an edge over the latter in case 
they choose to perpetrate violence. Ferrero (2006b) points out that the church-sect based 
models can explain the relative success of religious sects turned to violence compared to their 
secular counterparts without being able to identify which sects turn towards violence and 
when  to  expect  such  a  turn.  Ferrero  (2005)  models  religious  organizations  as  producer 
cooperatives subject to free entry constraint and shows that in the event of material setback 
such organizations use radicalization to restrict membership and enhance per capita returns.  
This is contrary to the behaviour of comparable secular organizations that radicalize in the 
event  of  success.  Ferrero  (2006b)  argues  that  in  the  event  of  failure  religions  based  on 
behavioural  strictness,  like  Islam  and  Protestantism,  direct  their  aggressiveness  towards 
outsiders. In Catholicism, which is based on doctrinal strictness, aggressiveness is directed at 
insiders. There are two objections to this explanation. One, the strictness-based categorization 
of  religions  proposed  in  the  paper  is  not  clear.  The  notion  of  strictness  was  originally 
developed for sub-groups of a religion. Before applying it to religions one needs to build an 
adequate  conceptual  framework.  Two,  Berman  (2000)  has  shown  that  religious  sects 




A few models directly address the most violent manifestation of religious violence, namely, 
martyrdom/suicide. Ferrero (2006a) proposes a model in which organizations offer a two -
period incentive contract that “(a) provides members with certain benefits in the first period 
and probabilistic benefits in the second period, (b) includes a probability of death in the 
second period, and (c) provides for a sanction or stigma to  apply to renegades”.  Ferrero 
(2008a)  extends  the  same  to  incomplete  information  settings.  Berman  and  Laitin  (2008) 
                                                 
55 Ferrero (2008b) suggests that Ancient Catholic Church while undergoing sect-to-church transformation turned 
towards  radicalization  (doctrinal  strictness),  i.e.,  just  when  it  became  successful  in  receiving  imperial 
endorsement from Rome. On the other hand Ferrero (2006b) suggests that religious organizations turn towards 
radicalization  when  faced  with  failure.  Arguably  these  two  outcomes  are  not  contradictory.  The  former 
transformation  was  a  one  time  shift,  a  stand  alone  choice,  where  the  nascent  church  was  responding  to  a 
particular religious environment. In a different environment it would have adopted behavioural strictness. The 
latter transformation applies to an existing church constrained by the free access constraint.   77 
extend the club goods model with emphasis on the capacity of religious organizations to 
provide “local public goods” and solve the principal-agent problem by imposing stigmas. 
They provide evidence that suicide bombings are more likely to be used against religious 
adversaries.  The  strength  of  this  finding  seems  to  depend  on  coding  of  Tamil-Sinhalese 
conflict (Sri Lanka) as religious, which is far from correct. 
 
The common feature of these models is that they assume the organizations and their members 
are rational. These models cover organizations devoted to extremism in general and highlight 
why religious sects are more likely to be successful in such ventures. In any case starting 
from  different  points  both  Berman  and  Ferrero  come  to  the  conclusion  that  to  counter 
extremism  a  state  should  try  to  mitigate  the  sanctions  a  sect  deploys  against  potential 
apostates.  Chen  (2004)  explores  insurance  function  of  religious  groups  in  Indonesia.  He 
suggests that economic shocks enhance religiosity when religious groups enable consumption 
smoothing. So it is imperative that secular sources of insurance are accessible to those in need 
otherwise religious groups will fill the vacuum. 
 
5.3.2 General Conflict 
 
The role of religion in more diffused conflicts like civil wars, riots, etc has not receieved 
adequate attention. An indirect contribution is the cross-country study by Alesina et al (2003) 
who find that religious heterogeneity, measured by fractionalization index, is associated with 
better socio-economic and institutional outcomes and by implication lesser conflicts. Reynal-
Querol (2002) finds the contrary to be true but uses polarization based index. She argues that 
religious differences are more troublesome compared to linguistic ones. For a comparison 
between the two indexes see Section 8.3.2 (infra). Field et al (2008) carry out an empirical 
study  of  religious  rioting  in  an  Indian  city  using  individual  level  data  and  argue  that 
inadequate property rights are to be blamed for the intensity of violence. Future work should 
focus on two issues: a) linking the work on violent religious organzations with the work on 
conflict in general and b) exploring the role of boundary preservation motive in religious 
conflicts. With regard to the second issue note two things. Since religions posit exclusive 
worldviews it is not unlikely that there is always some degree of conflict between religious 
groups independent of any material consideration, which can serve as the starting point for 
larger conflicts. Secondly, as noted above, conflict related to any identifiable group attribute   78 
(religion included) is likely to trigger defence of the boundary based on that attribute because 
defeat, if any, could lead to lowering of social bargaining power of the group as a whole. 
 
5.3.3 Reverse causality 
 
So far we have discussed how religion influences social conflict. One shortcoming of this 
literature is paucity of contributions dealing with the reverse relationship, i.e., the impact of 
conflict on religion, which incidentally would relate to the Marxist link. We will make just 
two points. While state regulation can be a source of conflicts among religious groups and 
also between the state and an aggrieved group it is also possible that conflict leads to state 
regulation, e.g., the Bulgarian decision to recognize Orthodoxy as the state religion can be 
seen partly as evidence for the latter. Further Hardin (1997) has pointed out that the intensity 
of religious belief varies directly with the intensity of conflict (for more see Section 4.3, 
supra). In fact, since strict churches are found to be more successful in volatile environments 
(Beckworth  2008,  also  Chen  2004)  it  is  not  unrealistic  to  expect  that  post-conflict  the 
intensity of religious practice will not return to pre-conflict levels. This can be attributed to 
two  reasons:  higher  expectation  of  volatility  in  future  and  higher  returns  from  religious 
practice in  future due to higher rate of  accumulation  of religious  capital  during conflict, 
especially if extended. 
 
5.4 Experimental studies 
 
So  far  the  primary  concern  of  experimental  studies  has  been  the  impact  of  religion  on 
propensity to share/cooperate/donate. Unless otherwise stated the subjects were American. 
Orbell et al (1992) use n-person Prisoner‟s Dilemma setting to study the role of religion and 
human  environment  in  promoting  cooperative  behaviour  vis-à-vis  strangers.  Dahl  and 
Ransom (1999) study self-serving bias among Mormons with regard to tithing. Johansson-
Stenman et al (2006) use trust game to explore cooperative behaviour among subjects in 
Bangladesh. But their sample does not allow distinction between religious and non-religious 
individuals.  Tan  (2006)  examines  relation  between  religiosity  (stated  in  response  to 
questionnaire) and social preferences (revealed in dictator and ultimatum games). Anderson 
and Melor (2007) study cooperative behaviour of religious/non-religious individuals using   79 
trust and public goods games. Ruffle and Sosis (2007) explore trust in others within Israeli 
Kibbutzs using a variant of Nash demand game. 
 
The results so far are mixed. Dahl and Ransom (1999) fail to detect significant self-serving 
bias with regard to tithing. Dahl and Ransom (1999) and Ruffle and Sosis (2007) suggest that 
participation in religious activities positively affected sharing tendency whereas Anderson 
and Mellor (2007) do not find support for such a conclusion. Johansson-Stenman et al (2006) 
interpret their results as supportive of a positive link between belief in divine justice and 
propensity to share. Orbell et al (1992) fail to find significant differences between religious 
and non-religious individuals. Orbell et al (1992) and Johansson-Stenman et al (2006) do not 
find significant difference between subjects of different religious backgrounds. In fact, Orbell 
et al (1992) suggest that it is the human environment, in their case religious concentration, 
which  drives  behaviour  in  their  experiment.
56  Anderson  and  Mellor  ( 2007),  however, 
conclude that religious affiliation matters for cooperative behaviour. One of the reasons for 
the contradictory results might be that different aspects of religion are being captured in 
different studies. Tan (2006) finds that religiosity does not have a straightforward impact on 
social preferences because different dimensions of religiosity produce counteracting effects. 
A smaller set of experimental studies fall under the Marxist category (see Footnote 21). 
 
6.0 Marxist/Weberian Links 
 
In this section we will discuss contributions that span both Marxist and Weberian categories 
suggested in Section 3.1 (supra). The contributions to standardization span both categories 
because when religions make standards for themselves they are influenced by material setting 
whereas when they generate standards for secular sphere they influence the material world. 
Similarly political economy of religion includes both religion‟s impact on nature of state, tax 
policies, etc and impact of state regulation on religion. 
 
 
                                                 
56  In  a  related  context  Ferraro  and  Cummings  (2007)  find  significant  impact  of  ethnic  concentration  on 
cooperative behaviour towards strangers.   80 
6.1 Religion and standardization 
 
There is very little work on religious standards
57, which is surprising because religious texts, 
rituals, etc were not only the earliest human standards but have also proved to be more stable 
than standards in other fields.  Religions have been a source of both religious and secular 
standards (see also  Section  4.7,  supra,  in  particular  Miller  1993  a  and  b,  1994,  1996). 
Oftentimes  standards  developed  in  the  religious  domain  served  as  templates  for  secular 
standards. To have its standards accepted a religion, like any standardization organization, 
needs to preserve its reputation. Interestingly one of the purposes of standardization is to 
protect reputation/brand value of the entity that adopts those standards and lower transaction 
costs in future interactions between that entity and others. For instance, Adam Smith argued 
that by adopting strict rules specified by sects poor individuals enhance their creditworthiness 
in the market (Anderson 1988). Note the concern for reputation at both the stage of standard 
formation as well as usage. 
 
We  will  first  note  the  ways  in  which  a  religion  protects  its  own  reputation  by  adopting 
internal standards. We can adapt the threefold classification of standards due to David (1990: 
214)  for  categorizing  internal  standards  adopted  by  religions:  standards  for  minimum 
admissible attributes (govern, e.g., whom to admit into the church - symbols in Carr and 
Landa  1983  and  stigmas  in  Iannaccone  1992a),  reference  standards  (stabilize  religious 
concepts and practices across sub-units - e.g., price of religious services across shrines in 
Raskovich 1996; Coşgel and Minkler 2004a argue that religious consumption norms serve as 
standardized communication devices; Ghosh and Kumar 2005 a, b discuss the role of religion 
in evolution of linguistic standards, which demarcate the community of believers from non-
believers), and interface compatibility standards (constitutional establishment clauses are a 
compromise between religious groups over use of public space for religion while ecumenical 
policy  governs  the  mode  of  coexistence  among  various  groups  outside  the  institutional 
structure of state, sub-groups within a religion rely on a common meta-standard in the form 
of scriptures, e.g., Bible, etc). 
 
                                                 
57 Weber (1995 [1920]:169) briefly discusses the standardizing impact of Puritanism. However, his argument 
can apply to any religious group as long as it is prepared to impose some code of conduct on its member. But 
Weber  makes  a  bigger  claim.  He  argues  that  by  restricting  potential  for  ostentation  Puritanism  aided 
standardization in markets.   81 
Using these three kinds of standards religions stabilize themselves and then generate norms 
of  behaviour  that  guide  believers  in  a  variety  of  social  interactions.  Lipford‟s  (1992) 
constitutional review, covering seven major US churches ranging from Roman Catholics to 
Southern Baptists, addresses the issue of organizational reputation. He suggests that churches 
protect  their  reputation  by  “preserving  doctrinal  integrity”  and  constraining  opportunistic 
behaviour of laity as well as clergy. In his discussion on constitutions of different churches 
one finds a number of examples of the first two types of standards. Miller (2002) provides 
discussion on interface compatibility issues. 
 
Having thrown some light on internal standards we will turn to external standards generated 
by religion. Among other things religion has been a source as well as repository of law across 
much  of  human  history  and,  in  fact,  continues  to  serve  in  that  capacity  in  certain 
contemporary societies (cf. Pylee 2000). The role of Church in the evolution of Western 
Legal systems is quite well-known. Ekelund et al (1996) suggest that the Medieval Church 
misused  its  control  over  “portions”  of  legal  system  for  pecuniary  benefits.  Directly  or 
indirectly religion has also provided standards for trade (Greif 1994, Ensminger 1997). Hull 
(1989),  Hull  and  Bold  (1989,  1994),  and  Anderson  and  Tollison  (1992)  note  that  the 
normative role of religion decreases as civil authorities become more efficient in contract 
enforcement (cf. Arruñada 2004). Anderson and Tollison argue that only a monopoly can 
provide optimal norms in the long run. So the tendency of religions towards monopolization 
depends on the welfare maximizing potential of monopoly in market for morals. But Schlicht 
(1995: 139) attributes this tendency to standardized nature of products in market for religion. 
 
A small but very interesting group of papers provide ex-post economic rationalization for 
legal precedents developed under the aegis of religion.
58 Posner (1987) was one of the earliest 
to emphasize the need to study the bi-causal link between law and religion, in particular state 
regulation  of  religion.  McConnell  and  Posne r  (1989)  provide  an  extensive   analysis  of 
regulation  of  religion  (also  see  Coase  1974  for  a  more  general  discussion  on  First 
Amendment).
59 Interestingly, later contributions on impact of regulation on religion do not 
                                                 
58 See Liebermann (1981, 1985, 1986), Aumann and Maschler (1985), Aumann (2002, 2003), Carlton and Weiss 
(2000), Viswanath (2000, 2007), and Viswanath and Szenberg (2007) for Judaism; Ekelund et al (1996, 2002, 
2006), Cassone and Marchese (1999), Arruñada (2004), and Harmgart et al (2006) for Medieval Christianity. 
59 The few contributions dealing with legal issues or using law and economics approach include Carr and Landa 
(1983) on role of ascriptive organizations in a society lacking contract  enforcement mechanism, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) on separation of ownership and control in organizations (including religious) ;  Cassone and   82 
adopt what is known as the law and economics approach. The importance of which should be 
evident from the fact that none of the contributions to regulation of religion provides welfare 
analysis of changes in legal policy.
60 
 
6.2 Political economy of religion 
 
“Largely  theocratic  societies”,  where  main  purpose  of  government  is  religious  and  some 
coercion is used to serve it, used to be the norm in the pre-Modern age (Salmon 2008). It has 
also been suggested that “state monopoly over religion has probably been the single most 
important form of state monopoly” in human history (Barro and McCleary 2005: 1331-1332). 
So it is surprising that the political economy of religion has received very little attention in 
EoR. Unlike Adam Smith the models of religious economy (Section 4.2.1, supra) look at the 
problem only from the point of view of consumers and suppliers of religion, with very little 
attention to institutional structure of the public space. At present there are two approaches to 
political economy of religion. There is a growing body of papers on state religion, etc, which 
will  be  reviewed  first.  Another  set  of  papers  attempts  to  model  the  interaction  between 
religion and other dimensions of public policy in different contexts, e.g., electoral (Benabou 
and Tirole 2006, Glaeser et al 2005, Roemer 1998), legal (McConnell and Posner 1989, 
Iannaccone et al 1997), etc. 
 
Thanks to the Workshop on the Political Economy of Theocracy (2007) organized by the 
University Centre St-Ignatius (Antwerp) we now have a number of contributions exploring 
both  modern  and  pre-modern  theocracies.  Noteworthy  among  these  are  Salmon  (2008), 
Glazer (2008), and Allen (2008). According to the consensus theocracies in general would be 
unviable in modern societies. Otherwise there is very little work on role of state in religious 
sphere. Barro and McCleary (2005) carry out a cross-country study to identify determinants 
of state religion (also see Footnote 22 for related studies). Their study suffers from a number 
of problems related to coding of explained variable, use of data from colonial period when 
the  subject  countries  did  not  have  a  choice,  failure  to  account  for  role  of  factors  like 
                                                                                                                                                        
Marchese (1999) on parallels between indulgences (Medieval Church) and amnesties (modern tax and criminal 
law); Gruber and Hungerman (2006) on impact of changes in blue laws on religion. 
60 Kane (1966), Dixit and Grossman (1984), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1986), Glaeser and Glendon (1998), 
Benabou and Tirole (2006), Poutvaara and Wagener (2008), Glazer (2008), and Allen (2008) discuss the welfare 
implications of their analysis, all of them in non-legal contexts.   83 
monarchy,  regional  effects,  etc.  Kumar  (2007)  draws  attention  to  the  sacral  character  of 
monarchies.  Coşgel  and  Miceli  (2008)  model  the  legitimizing  function  of  religion  with 
respect to state. 
 
Salmon  (2008)  examines  church-state  separation  in  pre-modern  Europe.  A  competitive 
governance framework is used to explain division of power between state and church in 
largely theocratic societies. The Biblical exhortation to render unto Ceaser what belongs to 
him is taken as given and players, Church and King, are allowed to fight over the actual 
interpretation.  He proposes  five ideal  interpretations  based a survey of  European history. 
Church aims to maximize its share in god serving activities of society. Both Church and King 
look  at  their  resource  base,  which  includes  popular  support,  and  choose  a  favourable 
interpretation.  Glazer  (2008)  tries  to  explain  the  productivity  gap  between  secular  and 
theocratic states. His explanation rests critically on the assumption that while secular states 
are  willing  to  learn  from  theocracies  the  reverse  is  not  true.  Allen  (2008)  provides  a 
transaction  cost  rationale  for  theocracy  in  pre-modern  societies.  He  views  theocracies  as 
screening devices. By making religion the driving force of social organization a theocracy not 
only  taps  a  larger  pool  of  talent  compared  to  aristocracy  but  is  also  able  to  screen  the 
applicants.  
 
Given the significance of establishment for market for religion it is surprising that there is 
hardly any work on the determinants of secularism, the norm that upholds the desirability of 
exclusion of religious considerations from non-religious relationships. Leiter (2008) is a good 
starting point for those interested in studying the issue of religious tolerance and role of state 
in this regard. He differentiates among the following: a) indifference (not at all concerned 
about  others), b)  instrumental  tolerance (concerned about  perceived  negative  externalities 
generated by others but forced to practice tolerance due to constraints), and c) principled 
tolerance (concerned about perceived negative externalities generated by others but practice 
tolerance even in absence of constraints). He also discusses moral and epistemic origins of 
principled  tolerance.  We  can  add  that  indifference  can  arise  from  two  entirely  different 
sources: a) belief that religion is irrelevant or inconsequential and b) belief that all religions 
lead to the same truth. Interestingly in each of the three cases identified by Leiter the end 
result is same, namely, non-interference in religious life of others, but for entirely different 
reasons. We can interpret secularism as non-interference. A state policy based on principled 
tolerance or indifference is relatively stable because unlike a policy based on instrumental   84 
tolerance it is not susceptible to changes in the constraint set, i.e., material environment. We 
will now briefly discuss two ways of modelling secularism. 
 
Starting  with  a  collection  of  individuals/groups,  exogenously  assumed  to  have  taste  for 
different kinds of tolerance, and finding the consensus policy depending on balance of forces 
is an ad hoc solution. Kumar (2008a) models the impact of individual religious beliefs and 
preferences on acceptance of secularism at various levels of aggregation and shows that only 
an absolutely tolerant or pretty inefficient ruler adopts the norm of secularism even when 
faced  with  a  secular  populace.  Equilibria  in  Kumar  (2008a)  correspond  to  indifference, 
instrumental tolerance, and intolerance. Starting from other models in EoR one cannot come 
to this outcome because none of them entertains the possibility of religions that believe that 
others  are  generating  negative  externalities  for  them.  We  don‟t  yet  have  a  model  for 
principled  tolerance.  Assuming  exogenous  commitment  is  not  only  an  ad  hoc  but  also 
unsatisfactory solution. In a multi-period model one can think of fossilization of instrumental 
tolerance leading to principled tolerance due to cognitive dissonance. 
 
Next  we  will  very  briefly  discuss  two  models  of  interaction  between  religion  and  other 
political  issues.  Glaeser  et  al  (2005)  show  that  political  parties  resort  to  dogwhistle 
campaigning, restricting certain extremist (religious) messages to a smaller sub-set of voters, 
to mobilize their core constituency which is not swayed by the campaign targeting the median 
voter. In this way he is able to explain the growing salience of religion in U.S. elections. 
Roemer (1998) considers a polity divided between rich and poor. Electorate is assumed to 
have preferences over tax-religion policy space. Some poor voters have a taste for religion 
(pro-clerical) while some of the rich voters do not have a taste for religion (anti-clerical). He 
shows that electoral competition in this two policy setting tends to mitigate extreme party 
positions on either policy. To attract anti-clerical rich voters Left softens its tax policy. Right 
offers a pro-clerical policy but has to offer relatively higher tax rates to attract pro-clerical 
poor. 
 
7.0 Theoretical diversity within EoR 
 
Before we move to the next section for a detailed discussion on some of the grey areas of 
EoR we will take a quick look at the diversity of modelling approaches. This diversity, which   85 
has increased particularly since late 1990s, is a measure of depth of interest of economists in 
religion. The list begins with Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), Neuman (1986), and Iannaccone 
(1990) who use Becker‟s  model of  allocation of time,  household  production,  and human 
capital  to  explain  religious  participation.  Iannaccone  (1988),  Rodero  and  Branas  (2000), 
Barros and Garoupa (2002), Montgomery (2003), Barro and McCleary (2005), Pepall et al 
(2006), and Ferrero (2008b) use spatial models to study the market for religion, while Mao 
and Zech (2002) use the same to model the choice of organizational structure of church. 
Glaeser et al (2005) use spatial model to explain the growing salience of religion in  US 
elections. Hull and Bold (1989) and Allen (1995) follow transaction cost approach to explain 
the nature of religious organizations whereas Ensminger (1997) and Allen (2008) follow the 
same to explain conversions and viability of theocracies, respectively. Ekelund et al (1989) 
use franchise monopoly model and economics of innovation to explain the developments 
within  Medieval  Church. Raskovich (1996) models  the emergence of  monotheism as  the 
dominant faith in a polytheistic society assuming the network of Jewish shrines to be part of a 
franchise monopoly. Ekelund et al (2006) treat the post-Reformation European market for 
religion as a collection of spatial monopolies whereas earlier it was dominated by a single 
vertically integrated monopoly.  
 
Lipford (1992) relies on constitutional economics approach to understand the ways in which 
religious bodies preserve their reputation. Iannaccone (1992a) uses variable utilization rate 
club  (with  “anti-congestive”  club  good)  to  explain  behavioural  restrictions  in  a  religion. 
Montgomery (1992) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) adopt the cognitive dissonance approach 
to  understand  changes  in  individual  beliefs.  Following  Stigler‟s  survivorship  principle 
Stonebraker (1993) examines the trend in size of religious bodies (also see Hull 1989). Hull 
and Bold (1998) use product differentiation models to explain religious participation rates. 
Overlapping-generations model has been used to explain culture (religion) as a bubble (Cozzi 
1998), patterns/trends in conversions (Bisin and Verdier 2000, Shy 2007), impact of religion 
on transition to industrial economy (Cavalcanti et al 2007), and the desirability of freeriding 
in  religious  organizations  (McBride  2007a).  Isaacs  and  Laband  (1999)  invoke  Tiebout‟s 
voting  with  feet  to  explain  the  structure  of  supply  side  of  market  for  religion  (also  see 
Montgomery 1996b). Condon (2002) models Catholic Church as monopsonists for Catholic 
clergy  while  Ferrero  (2005)  models  religious  extremist  organizations  as  monopsonist 
cooperatives. Ferrero (2002) invokes theory of bureaucracy and contest theory to explain 
intra-church competition. Epstein and Gang (2007) use contest theory to model strictness of   86 
sects. Lewer and van den Berg (2007) use gravity model to study impact of religion on trade. 
Salmon  (2008)  uses  a  competitive  governance  framework  to  explain  division  of  power 
between state and church. Podovano and Wintrobe (2008) use Wintrobe‟s dictatorship model 
to study the longevity of papal reigns. Add to this list the experimental studies discussed 
above (Section 5.4, supra). 
 
We conclude this section by noting the near absence of principal-agent models in EoR, which 
is perhaps not accidental. The exceptions do not provide an agency theoretic model for the 
enterprise of salvation/afterlife, the raison d'être for market for religion.
61 Three factors can 
explain this trend. One, the nature of information in market for salvation is queer (see Section 
10.3, infra). Two, the identity of principal and agent is not clear. Is Pope the principal, who 
wants to organize this world after the other world, and people the agents, who get a ticket to 
heaven provided they lead a Christian life? Or is  it the other way  round with  people as 
principals  who  employ  the  Pope  for  arranging  a  ticket  to  heaven?  Intermediaries  in 
hierarchical religious organizations complicate the picture further (cf. Zech 1998). Three, a 
number  of  authors  have  suggested  that  people  have  full  information  contract  with  gods 




In the literature surveyed in Part II one rarely finds an explicit demarcation of religion or 
related concepts either preceding the analysis, and thereby guiding it, or after the analysis, 
arising  as  a  consequence  of  the  analysis.
62  Very few clearly state what exactly can be 
analyzed within their set -up.
63  It is a truism that concepts like religion are difficult to 
demarcate due to their polyvalency (Goody 1961, Geertz 2000 [1968],  Stark and Bainbridge 
1985; for a  different approach  to this issue  see Balagangadhara 2005 [1994]). Still the 
treatment of religion in EoR is problematic because at times the implicit definition is too 
                                                 
61 The exceptions include Fama and Jensen (1983) on separation of control and ownership, Schmidtchen and 
Mayer  (1997)  on  optimal  selling  arrangement  for  indulgences,  Dixit  (2005)  on  state-church  collaboration, 
Ferrero (2007) on clerical authority‟s choice between theocracy or a hired lay ruler, and Ferrero (2008a) on 
martyrdom  contracts.  Olds  and  Liu  (2000)  provide  empirical  evidence  for  agency  problems  in  religious 
organizations in pre-/early 20
th Century Taiwan. All these applications address secular organizational concerns 
of religious organizations. 
62 Similarly in the debate on secularization, till recently drive n by regressions, no one bothered  to tell when 
he/she will agree that secularization has indeed taken place. 
63 Kumar (2008a) highlights the inability of his framework to deal with agnosticism and distinguish between 
sects.   87 
vague, characterized by over-inclusiveness, so as to include all sorts of things like New Age 
Religions  in  Iannaccone  (1995a)  or  it  becomes  yet  another  club,  which  it  is  not  (see 
discussion on club-theoretic models in Section 4.2.2, supra; cf. Ekelund et al 2006). It bears 
noting that we are not saying that religion cannot or does not share features with other human 
organizations. But it is important to recognize that while it is interesting to examine these 
commonalities it is also important that we clearly demarcate the field of inquiry so as to be 
able to pay attention to what makes religion a distinct element of human societies. Otherwise 
one comes across a narrower conception of religion, characterized by under-inclusiveness, 
which practically excludes non-Abrahamic religions, for instance, in  Azzi  and Ehrenberg 
(1975).
64 At times comparative discussion on religions uses entirely different yardsticks for 
different religions (e.g., Helble 2007) or different religions are confounded as in La Porta  et 
al  (1997)  who  treat  Islam  as  a  hierarchical  religion  like  Roman  Catholicism.  Elsewhere 
religious and other ethnic labels are confounded (e.g., Borooah and Iyer 2005). 
 
The burden of this discussion is that we cannot after Posner (1987: 1), who suggests that 
words like religion “can be used but not defined”, ignore the need to isolate what exactly is 
religious in a social phenomenon. It has been observed that a phenomena becomes religious 
largely due to interpretation within a religious context (Balagangadhara 2005 [1994], Martin 
1995, Hardin 1997, Thomas Szasz (quoted in Caplan 2006)). If we are not prepared to define 
or  demarcate  religion  then  “[h]ow  do  we  know  that  [we  are]  studying  religion  and  not 
something else” (Balagangadhara 2005 [1994]: 11) or in other words how do we know that 
we are indeed using religion. In this section we will discuss the consequences of the inability 
to pin down religion for economic analyses of religion. Before that we will briefly discuss the 
exceptions to this general tendency to ignore definitions. 
 
In Iannaccone (1988) the definition of  sect of a religion, based on distance from secular 
norms,  emerges  from  within  the  model.  Sects  (churches)  are  religious  organizations  that 
generate convex (concave) production possibilities frontiers. We have already discussed the 
limitations of this definition (see discussion on church-sect models in Section 4.2.2 supra). 
Kumar (2008a) provides a multi-dimensional definition of religion. A religion can have a 
number of dimensions (existence of god, nature of divine justice, set of gods, afterlife, etc). 
                                                 
64 Following Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]) this is unproblematic because in any case Abrahamic religions are 
the only religions known to mankind! However, since EoR has never denied the existence of non-Abrahamic 
religions it has to accommodate the same while building a theory of religion otherwise it would reduce itself to 
Economics of Monotheism.   88 
Religions differ from each other depending on the beliefs and preferences related to different 
dimensions. But Kumar‟s definition cannot differentiate between sects of the same religion. 
The  above  definitions  are  either  a  consequence  of  micro-analysis  or  geared  towards 
facilitating micro-analysis. Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]) provides an empirically grounded 
definition  of  religion  whereas  Leiter  (2008)  isolates  religious  beliefs  in  a  similar  way. 
Religion for Balagangadhara is an explanatorily intelligible account of cosmos, worldview 
par excellence. His discussion suggests that only Semitic faiths qualify as religion. Leiter 
suggests  that  religious  beliefs  are  different  from  other  beliefs  because  of  categoricity  of 
demands on action flowing from such beliefs (and the ability of religion to give effect to this 
categoricity)  and  their  insulation  from  evidence.  In  addition  religious  beliefs  involve 
metaphysical claims about ultimate reality. The last three definitions are able to screen out 
communism, civil religion, etc without any additional contrivance. 
 
8.0 Empirical Analyses 
 
We  have  seen  above  that  there  is  hardly  any  religious  phenomenon  for  which  we  have 
unambiguous  theoretical  or  empirical  support.  Contradictory  conclusions  are  due  to  a) 
focussing on different aspects of the problem (recall supply vs. demand side discusion in 
Section  4.0,  supra),  b)  lack  of  understanding  about  data  generating  process,  and  c)  data 
scarcity. The last two issues will concern us in this section. 
 
Non-availability of reasonably large and reliable data sets has plagued the field right from the 
beginning  (Azzi  and  Ehrenberg  1975:  39;  also  see  Stark  and  Glock  1968:  Preface)  and 
continues to do so till this day (Iannaccone 1998: 1467, Barro and Hwang 2007: passim). In 
this review we will refrain from direct examination of the surveys and censuses from which 
data is sourced.
65 We will instead focus our attention on the lack of understanding of the data 
generating process, which as we will find shortly is the major problem. Instead of going into 
each study we will look at some broader problems associated with  analysis of religious data 
and  refer  to  particular  stu dies  if  required.  These  references  are  suggestive  rather  than 
                                                 
65 See Iannaccone (1998: 1467-1468) for a discussion on data sources. Here it suffices to note that Hull and Bold 
(1989,  1994)  are  perhaps  the  only  ones  using  data  from  Human  Resource  Area  Files  that  contain  social 
anthropological data for around 300 non-Western cultures. Is it a mere coincidence that they are also the only 
ones to account, howsoever imperfectly, for religions devoid of afterlife in their work? Also noteworthy is 
Fogel‟s (1999) insightful discussion on need to shift from “cross-sectional to lifecycle and intergenerational 
datasets”.   89 
exhaustive or prejudical. Readers are free to demand fuller discussion on specific studies 
cited or those left out. Our discussion is forwardlooking in the sense that it raises issues that 
are  becoming  increasingly  salient.  It  is  divided  into  three  parts  dealing  with  aggregate 
analyses,  individual  level  analyses,  and  indexes,  respectively.  Even  though  the  first  two 
categories can overlap they are quite distinct. In the latter the focus is on studies that relate to 
individual level marginal calculus whereas in the former we restrict to problems related to 
studies that examine mass phenomena. 
 
8.1 Aggregate level analyses 
 
To begin with it is worth asking if the problem is limited to paucity of religious census and 
survey? If yes all we need is more census, which essentially boils down to more research 
funds. In the following discussion we will argue that perhaps the problem lies elsewhere and 
discuss the various facets of this problem. This does not amount to denying the paucity of 
data. Indeed a number of countries exclude identity from census (Fearon 2003: 221) to avoid 
escalation of communal politics while others discourage fine grained surveys of identity even 
though there is enough historical evidence suggesting that this trick does not work. Our aim 
instead is to learn from the analyses of existing data and throw light on a number of empirical 
and theoretical issues that need to be understood up front. 
 
8.1.1 Instability of labels 
 
In the 16
th and much of the 17
th Century African slaves in North America were known as 
“heathens”. The label “black” gained currency only after the Church in North America started 
to accept Africans (Horowitz 2000 [1985]: 43). Likewise the centuries old Burmese-Shan, 
Chinese-Tibetan, etc conflicts have proved resilient to taxonomic upheavals. Depending on 
when  one  carries  out  the  study  a  conflict  can  be  called  religious,  ethnic,  or  economic.
66 
Without adding examples it suffices to say that an attempt to explain the link   between 
religion and ethnic conflict or for that matter other phenomena supported by an unambiguous 
                                                 
66 Very few studies use long term data for analysis. Among the exceptions are Mourao (2006), who uses time 
series data (1960-2002) in his study of determinants of decline in the number of Catholic priests in Portugal, and 
Beckworth  (2008),  who  examines  impact  of  business  cycles  (1960-2006)  on  religiosity  of  US  Protestant 
communities. Barro and McCleary (2005) use data from three different points in the 20
th Century (1900, 1970, 
and 2000) to study the determinants of state religion.   90 
census  is  not  necessarily  going to  take us  far  because individuals/groups  are free to  use 
convenient labels, religion being one of them. Cross-sectional studies (e.g., Borooah 2004, 
Borooah and Iyer 2005) using these labels are problematic since they contain lot of sediment 
from  a  number  of  disparate  sources.  The  problematic  character  of  ascriptive  labels,  in 
particular  their  transience  and  endless  possibilities  of  interaction  among  them,  has  been 
discussed  in  literature  (Anderson  2006  [1981], Horowitz  2000  [1985], Fearon  2003,  Sen 
2006, also see Section 8.3.2, infra).
67 
 
The problem does not arise simply due to the long time span in the above cases so that a more 
reliable time series analysis, taking account of changes in identity markers, and use of an 
array of interacting dummies might save the day. The problem is lot deeper. In many African 
countries a nocturnal census would reveal a higher fraction of animism while one carried out 
in daylight especially on Sunday  (Friday) would likewise inflate the ranks of Christianity 
(Islam). Elsewhere there are 9-to-5 believers who adhere to state or civil religions in public.
68 
Rather than belittle the people concerned these observations draw attention to complexity of 
human needs and equally if not more complex arrangements in place to meet those needs. 
Individuals have multiple identities and are free to select a combination of identity markers to 
represent  them  depending  on  the  cont ext  and  further  their  interests.  In  other  words 
                                                 
67 Recent years have seen growing interest in economic analyses of social identity and related issues. For an 
early contribution in this regard see Carr and Landa (1983). More recently Akerlof (1997) and  Akerlof and 
Kranton  (2000)  have  brought  the  issue  in  limelight.  For  sociological  approach  to  this  issue  see  literature 
reviewed in Baron and Hannan (1994). 
68 Barro and McCleary (2005: 1367) observe that “standard data on religion adherence for Sub-Saharan Africa 
understate  dual  adherence  to  indigenous  faiths  and,  therefore,  overstate  the  adherence  rate  for  the  main 
religion”. Guo (2007: 110) faces the same problem with regard to East Asia, especially Japan. No one, including 
the Japanese, really knows how many Buddhists there are in Japan. Counting Buddhists in South Korea is an 
equally, if not more, unenviable job. In a thought provoking essay Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]) argues that 
Buddhism and the so-called pagan religions are not religions in the first place if one were to simultaneously 
maintain that Christianity, Islam, etc are also religions. He argues that Buddhism was manufactured in the 19
th 
Century Europe. In other words the encounter between the West and East created hitherto locally unheard of 
religious communities in the East with retrospective effect. No wonder one fails to find empirical correlates for 
such  labels.  Cf.  Iannaccone  (1995a:  291),  who  suggests  that  usefulness  of  religious  statistics  from  Asia  is 
suspect because Asian religions generally support fee-for-service arrangement so that a portfolio diversifying 
individual can have multiple affiliations rendering the idea of identity superfluous. 
 
But the problem is not confined to non-Abrahamic faiths. Penetration of standard form religion as represented in 
scriptures  is  not  guaranteed  in  pre-literate,  low  population  density  societies.  There  is  large  literature  that 
questions the belief that pre-Reformation Europe was solidly Catholic (see, for instance, Oakley 2006). Goldin 
and  Metz  (1991),  Stark  (1992),  and  Gill  (1999)  raise  the  same  issue  regarding  Catholic  Church  in  Latin 
America. We still do not know if Mormons are Christians or if Ahmediyas are Muslims (Kumar 2004). The 
share of  Muslims  in Indonesia remains a puzzle so  far (Paldam 2001: 405). Even in case of USA church 
statistics pertaining to African-Americans have been contentious (Chaves and Gorski 2001). Barro and Hwang 
(2007) suggest that religious accounting is not straightforward in post-modern Christian societies. Nature of 
intra-Islamic heterogeneity is another grey area. Iannaccone et al (1997) suggests parallels between Islam and 
Catholicism in this regard.   91 
prioritization of identity markers is not space-time invariant. Observers are free to attach a 
label of their choice but actors are not constrained to behave accordingly even in the short 
run. We come across cases of incorrect attribution of observations (e.g., La Porta et al 1997, 
Berman and Laitin 2008) or inappropriate accounting of interaction between identity markers 
(e.g., Isaacs and Laband 1999, Chen 2004, Glaeser et al 2005, Noland 2005, and Helble 
2007).  In  each  of  these  cases  one  finds,  or  can  find,  a  “reasonable”  justification  for  the 
approach adopted, but one which does not capture the dynamics of the problem during the 
period of interest. 
 
8.1.2 Who drives observable religious practices/outcomes? 
 
Ignoring the above doubts or assuming that there is some way to resolve the underlying 
problems let us check if we are any closer to deliverance. Perhaps not, because observed 
religious  behaviour  is  disproportionately  driven  by  extremists,  especially  in  societies 
suffering from conflict, endowed with poor public institutions, or supporting a state religion. 
The influence of extremists varies across sectors of society. So when analyzing aggregate 
religious behaviour more important than aggregate shares of religion one needs to worry 
about the relative shares of fanatics. Can any census or survey provide data on extremists? 
Can we find proxies for share of extremists? Say fraction of school age children studying in 
religious seminaries. Though it is tempting to fall for this proxy one is not sure it would help 
because not every society, especially, the troublesome cases from the perspective of religion, 
has sufficient secular alternatives to religious seminaries. The link up between the literatures 
on conflict in general and violent sects could provide a way out (see Section 5.3.2, supra). 
 
To the extent they ignore the fine print efforts to study aggregate behaviour by invoking 
religion suffer from another drawback. Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, the Sri 
Lankan  prime  minister,  who  more  than  anyone  else,  was  responsible  for  cementing  the 
position of Buddhism in public space was an Anglican Christian by birth and converted to 
Buddhism after his foray into politics (De Silva 1999).
69 Recall our discussion on neo-convert 
syndrome (Section 4.3, supra). Where does one place new converts? Also in Section 4.6 
(supra)  we  drew  attention  to  mismatch  between  formal  act  of  conversion  and  actual 
                                                 
69 See Gooneratne (1986) for an insider‟s view on the treacherously fluid religious-racial-linguistic identity of 
the Bandaranaike family.   92 
conversion at the level of beliefs and preferences (also see Section 10.1.2, infra). Likewise 
Ghosh  (1994)  reminds  that  the  torchbearers  of  movements  for  Jewish  Israel  and  Islamic 
Pakistan were largely secular. In short one needs to be careful while using labels, especially, 
in cross-country analyses. Infact, it is possible that certain issues are not amenable to cross-
country statistical analysis due to local peculiarities (cf. Geertz 2000 [1968]). 
 
8.1.3 Selection bias 
 
It is well known that the more advanced a society is the more information it needs to process 
to keep going, which in turn implies that we have more data for analysis. It can be argued that 
the information processing capacity of a society is correlated with general institutional and 
theological complexity (cf. Hull and Bold 1989, 1994). The fact that most studies have to 
restrict analysis to countries where there is sufficient data implies possibility of selection bias. 
These studies might end up artificially selecting a subset that is economically better off and 
necessarily has a complex theology (belief in hell, etc). Another point to be noted in this 
regard is that societies which value transparency and accountability provide more data. Once 
again there is possibility of selection bias in cross-section studies. We also know that more 
exclusivist religions generate not only more but also precise data.  Further producing and 
maintaining databases is a costly affair, which is why poor societies are less likely to provide 
researchers with data. A similar point can be made with regard to societies with high levels of 
illiteracy.  In  modern  times  the  overlap  between  Judaeo-Christianity,  technological 
development, prosperity, literacy, and democracy (transparency) is substantial enough to bias 
results. For instance, Barro and McCleary (2006: 154) observe that in their sample “coverage 
is better for rich countries than poor ones and for countries that are primarily Christian” (also 
see Hull and Bold 1989: 13, Ekelund et al 2006: 98). Another source of selection bias is the 
choice  of  level  of  aggregation  (see  discussion  on  secularization  hypothesis,  Section  4.0, 
supra). 
 
8.1.4 Simultaneity bias 
 
A  “state”  (its  dominant  group,  majority  or  minority)  can  simultaneously  choose  both 
institutions (state religion) and demography. 20
th Century witnessed too many population   93 
transfers,  forced  ethnic/linguistic/religious  re-classifications/  conversions,  and  ethnic 
cleansings  making  it  difficult  to  ignore  the  possible  simultaneity  of  demographic  and 
institutional (religious) developments. In other words population share of religious groups 
cannot necessarily be treated as an independent variable in a study based on time series or 
panel data involving widely separated points along the time dimension. A related issue of 
concern, as pointed out by Kane (1966), is that population share of a group might not be 
independent of its religious beliefs, e.g., Catholic population dynamics is partly governed by 
the teachings on birth control and the degree to which individuals heed those teachings in 
turn affects the strength of Catholic church. 
 
8.1.5 Spatial auto-correlation 
 
Individual religious choices have been shown to be correlated across space at county level in 
USA (Land et al 1991) and regional level within Western countries (Smith and Sawkins 
2003). But not much attention has been paid to correlation between institutional choices at 
the level of state. Neighbourhood effects (at the level of states) need to be taken into account 
in cross-country studies because political institutions (monarchy, state religion, communism, 
etc) in a region change in tandem. Cross-country studies on incidence of state religion (e.g., 
Barro and McCleary 2005), impact  of religion  on democracy (e.g., Borooah and Paldam 
2007), etc should account for regional/neighbourhood lock-in effects. 
 
8.1.6 Temporal auto-correlation 
 
In his discussion on New Institutional Economics Williamson (2000: 596 - 597) suggests a 
fourfold scheme for institutional analysis. He places religion in a group of extremely inertial 
institutions that change over centuries or even millennia (also see Weber 1995 [1920], Lewis 
1972  [1955]).  These  institutions  belong  to  “the  social  embeddedness  level…  where  the 
norms,  customs,  mores,  traditions,  etc.  are  located”.  This  idea  inspires  a  number  of 
contributions.  For  instance,  Guiso  et  al  (2006:  23-25)  identify  religion  and  race  as  slow 
moving components of culture, which in turn are used in their study to examine the impact of 
culture on economy to avoid reverse causality (also see Glaeser and Glendon 1998: 431, 
Paldam 2001: 384, Barro and McCleary 2003: 772-774). But it is also possible that all of a   94 
sudden there is a big change in a religious variable of interest. For instance, colonial and post-
colonial  data  can  vary  markedly  because  at  times  colonial  powers  imposed  metropolitan 
religious choices in teeth of opposition of local population. Decolonization can lead to both 
institutional  transition  as  well  as  reversal  of  preference  falsification.  Religious  capital 
approach would suggest that the latter may take place long after the regime transition, which 
implies dissonance between ground level practices and institutional structure. In short using 
colonial  and  post-colonial  data  together  (e.g.,  Barro  and  McCleary  2005)  is  problematic. 
Other possibilities of sudden change in religious demography include rapid growth beyond a 





There are some problems that all cross-country studies have to face. There is only one Jewish 
majority country and there are only two Hindu majority countries. Paldam (2001: 392-393) 
points out that cross-country data for religious studies cannot meet even minimal information 
criteria in case of one billion strong Hinduism. Followers of Shintoism are concentrated in 
just one country but that country is an early (non-Western) member in the high income club. 
Buddhism has three distinct groups Theravada, Mahayana, and Tibetan Buddhism. However, 
only  the  label  Theravada  has  sufficient  information  content  for  others  there  are  too  few 
observations, much of them suspect due to a variety of reasons ranging from long communist 
suppression to historical ambiguity of religious identity in East Asia (also see Footnote 68, 
supra). The monolithic category animism is very diverse and each animist majority country is 
almost  a  unique  but  spatio-temporally  unstable  data  point  because  animist  faiths  are 
disappearing or blending with major religions, partly due to ecological changes, geographical 
dislocation, and disappearance of native languages.  Though widely ignored the language, 
script,  and  religion  nexus  needs  to  be  studied  to  isolate  the  independent  contribution  of 
religion to conflicts (see Ghosh and Kumar 2005 a, b for a limited attempt in this direction). 
Finally, Ekelund et al (2006) observe that survey based approach to understanding religion 
suffers from bias against certain forms of religion. For instance, they observe “mere head 
counts of attendance or membership must undercount religion if it is defined as a personal 
belief system” (ibid: 8). 
   95 
8.1.8 Uncensusability 
 
Identity, religion included, is not merely under-censused but at times uncensusable. There are 
two reasons for this, one psychological and the other conceptual. While lack of counting is 
problematic counting itself can lead to a bigger problem. Horowitz (2000 [1985]), Anderson 
(2006 [1983]), and Kumar and Ghosh (2006) discuss how modern censuses end up modifying 
the very object of analysis. In other words if one wants to evaluate the role of religion in 
some under-censused society the process of census might alter the religious identity being 
studied. The question are you religious triggers the following should I be religious. So it 
makes sense to check if the data generation and measurement processes are independent. 
 
While discussing the problematic nature of labels above we left out one very serious problem. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  very  enterprise  of  labelling  religious  communities  might  be 
misleading in certain parts of the world. Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]), for instance, argues 
that Semitic religions and Asian “religions” (Hinduism through Shintoism) cannot both be 
religions and that the latter do not have empirical correlates (also see Footnote 68). In effect 
this line of argument contests the claim that religion is a cultural universal.
70 Performing 
cross-country regressions without answ ering this critique is awkward. Fortunately so far 
much of EoR deals with Semitic religions. But as it expands to cover more countries, 
presuming of course the universality of religion, the above criticism would apply to EoR with 
equal force. Note that unless otherwise required in the present essay we do not strictly follow 
the practice of avoiding referring to Animism, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc as religions. 
 
8.2 Individual level analyses 
 
Determinants of church attendance and donations have been one of the key concerns of EoR. 
The  modelling  enterprise  needs  to  grapple  with  issues  like  whether  religious  goods  are 
private goods or club goods or public goods. At times it is easy to classify the goods using a 
black and white scheme, say, public/private as in case of consumption of religious literature 
or supporting the construction of the only public (church) clock of the town. But religious 
                                                 
70 Theorizing about religion in social sciences, it has been argued, suffers from pre-theoretical such biases like 
religion is a cultural universal, there is no religion without a church, etc, which are not empirically grounded. 
We find that most of the contributions in EoR unconsciously subscribe to these biases originally from related 
disciplines like sociology and anthropology. See Ekelund et al (2006) for a recent example.   96 
goods  can  defy  such  classification  as  in  case  of  participation  in  missionary  activity,  an 
important element of Abrahamic religions. Is it a private good (satisfaction from fulfilling the 
divine call to spread the message), a club good (growth of ones religious club), or a pure 
public good (spreading religion in the interest of all)? A church can simultaneously provide 
printed scriptures, public clock, and missionary tours. But individuals generally make lump 
sum payments. In this section we will discuss limits to role of marginal calculus in religious 
sphere. 
 
Churches  cannot  be  run  by  god‟s  grace  alone.  Churches  need  resources  like  any  other 
organization.  But  as  Iannaccone  (1995a)  argues  Churches  rely  more  on  voluntary 
contributions of time and money to overcome the agency problems, which otherwise hamper 
a market with inadequate information about products (see Fama and Jensen 1983 for a related 
but different line of argument). So freeriding should be one of the central concerns of a 
religion that provides for collective production of religious goods.
71 This issue informs the 
seminal  contribution  of  Iannaccone  (1992a),  where  sect s  use  sacrifices  to  screen  out 
freeriders. Wallis (1991) discusses five kinds of solutions to the problem: a) coercion, b) 
bundling private and non -private goods, c) social pressures and incentives, d) promoting 
meta-preferences, and e) provision of in -process  benefits  (“benefit  from  the  process  of 
participation in group action regardless of the outcome”). He points out that a successful 
church, at least in free societies, is more likely to rely on the second and last two solutions. 
Issues  like  coercion  and  social  pressures/incentives  are  partly  addressed  in  the  literature 
though indirectly at the aggregate level in the form of degree of regulation in the supply side 
literature (see Section 4.2.1, supra) and church-sect models suggest bundling as a strategy 
employed by churches (see Section 4.2.2, supra). Insofar as much of the literature treats 
preferences  as  given  there  is  hardly  anything  on  why  and  how  churches  promote  meta-
preferences. Though none of the contributions explicitly models in-process benefits, much of 
the literature, which excludes salvation motive, implicitly accounts for religious participation 
using in-process benefits. It is not entirely clear whether the latter set of papers or Wallis 
(1991) imply psychic or material benefits or both. What is ignored in the literature is the role 
of technological advances in mitigating freeriding. 
 
                                                 
71 Mancur Olson was reluctant to apply a strictly rational choice theory to religion. In any case he observed that 
a believer in religion/utopia is unlikely to freeride in face of “an incalculably large or probably infinite” gain 
(Olson 1971: 6, 160-162).   97 
8.2.1 Monetary contributions 
 
Studies focus mostly on monetary contributions due to lack of data about contribution of 
time. Since evidence, both empirical and experimental, regarding freeriding with respect to 
monetary contributions is not unambiguous (Stonebraker 1993, Lipford 1995, 1996b, Zech 
and Zaleski 1992, 1995a, 1996, Dahl and Ransom 1999) it pays to look at the issues involved 
more  carefully.  We  will  discuss  a  few  issues  here.  First  of  all  it  is  desirable  to  define 
freeriding clearly. Is it contributing less than scriptural exhortation? Is it contributing less 
than  the  average  contribution  in  ones  religious  group  or  less  than  last  year‟s  average 
contribution (because only the latter is common knowledge)? Is it contributing less than what 
is needed to sustain the group‟s activity? Is it contributing less, in absolute or proportional 
terms,  than  followers  of  other  religions  around?  Is  it  contributing  less  than  some 
denomination-independent average? At what level of aggregation do we need to answer these 
questions: county, province, state? These questions are particularly important because of the 
extremely high degree of skewness observed in religious donations. In fact, roughly “20% of 
a congregation‟s members provide more than 80% of the giving” (Iannaccone 1997b: 142). 
Consider a group with 10 individuals and an annual collection of 10 dollars. It is not difficult 
to see that following Iannaccone‟s thumbrule a large majority is freeriding if giving less than 
group average is the criterion to identify freeriding. 
 
Two, it has been suggested that tolerating freeriding might be necessary for the growth of a 
religious  organization  (Clain  and  Zech  1999:  925-926  and  McBride  2007a:  passim,  also 
2007b: 417; also see Hutchison 1977, Wallis 1991: passim, Lipford 1992, 1995, and Schlicht 
1995: 136, Miller 2002: 445, Leathers and Raines 2008: 353-354) and that social structures in 
which an organization is embedded might inhibit freeriding (Baron and Hannan 1994: 1136). 
Finally, Tullock (1996) suggests that since people have a full information contract with god 
there should be no incentive to freeride (also see Anderson and Tollison 1992, Klick 2006, 
Ekelund et al 2006, Richardson and McBride 2007, Ferrero 2008a for related arguments). 
Following Coşgel and Minkler (2004 a, b) we can suggest that religious individuals who 
identify themselves with a group might commit themselves not to freeride. Schlicht (1995) 
provides  an  extensive  discussion,  stressing  cognitive  factors,  on  the  role  of  theological 
contraints  on  churches/churchgoers.  In  other  words  there  are  constraints  on  optimization 
exercise that can render marginal calculus superfluous. But it has also been pointed out that   98 
that  extreme/unreasonable  demands  placed  by  religions  are  routinely  bypassed  (Marshall 
1920,  Lewis  1972  [1955],  Schlicht  1995,  Kuran  1997)  and  that  god  is  not  necessarily 
perfectly omniscient (Brams 2007 [1983], 2003 [1980]). One last point regarding monetary 
contributions.  It  is  desirable  to  take  into  acount  permanent  income  into  account  because 
people who engage in religion generally take a long term view of the involvement (Reece 
1979: 146). 
 
8.2.2 Allocation of time 
 
First of all there is the issue of internal and external prayers dichotomy (Azzi and Ehrenberg 
1975: 39). Religions weigh the two differently. The problem could be compounded in face of 
continuous background prayers, i.e., praying while involving in secular activities. Possibly, 
external prayers proxy for overall time devoted to prayers. Secondly, one wonders if religion 
really claims a big share of time. Barro and McCleary (2003: 772) begin with the maintained 
hypothesis that controlling for level of belief higher church attendance negatively affects 
economic performance due to inefficient use of time (also see Grossbard-Schechtman and 
Neuman  1986:  74-75,  Fan  2008:  307),  which  presumes  that  allocation  of  more  time  to 
religion comes at the expense of secular employment activities. This is intriguing because in 
most of the countries for which data is available people work for 8-12 hours on an average 
and there is no trade-off between employment and religious requirements due to inflexibility 
of the modern workplace. If at all there is a trade-off it is between leisure and religion (see, 
for instance, Scheve and Stasavage 2006: 267 who posit a trade-off between religion and 
leisure). Also people spend more time on religious activities on holidays, many of which 
indeed coincide with religious festivities/activities by design.
72 Further it is likely that more 
religious people self-select to part-time or less demanding jobs or even self -employment. 
That is what happens in highly demanding sects, where time devoted is a club-specific signal 
(see Berman 2000 on ultra-orthodox Jews). So once job market sorting is over work hours are 
exogenously fixed, which enter the optimization framework as another constraint, and one 
should control for distribution of sports clubs, cinemas, reading rooms, NGOs, etc, which 
compete with religion for leisure time. In any case empirical evidence does not support Barro 
                                                 
72 Ulbrich and Wallace (1984)  who examine  working  women‟s church attendance conclude that difference 
between working and non-working women “is not due to coefficient differences but due to the differences in 
mean values of some key explanatory variables, particularly age, religious intensity, and having a spouse of the 
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and McCleary‟s formulation unambiguously (cf. discussion on growth theories in Section 5.2, 
supra). 
 
8.2.3 Allocation of time and money 
 
Contribution  of  money  (time)  has  been  found  to  increase  (decrease)  with  income.  But 
contributions of time and money have not been found to be substitutes. There is empirical 
evidence suggesting that the two are complements (Clain and Zech 1999). One of the reasons 
driving  this  finding  could  be  that  given  the  serious  principal  agent  problem  in  religious 
enterprises those who donate more are also more likely to devote more time to ensure right 
usage. However, Tao and Yeh (2007: 783) suggest that the two are found to be substitutes if 
time  includes  only  non-mandatory  contributions,  i.e.,  excluding  time  spent  in  Sunday 
services, etc, which are stipulated by scriptures or church authorities. Gruber (2004) finds that 
increase in subsidy to charity increases giving while decreasing attendance. Three points bear 
noting here. One,  Ekelund et al (2006: 5) argue that the full price, “the total cost to an 
individual in terms of money outlay and resources foregone”, including search, delivery, etc 
costs, should be taken into account for analysis. One is not sure if suitable data is available 
for this purpose. It is possible that different members have same full price but the distribution 
among sub-components of full price vary across members. If true this has implications for 
what  should  be  counted  as  freeriding.  Two,  the  issue  of  real  power  enjoyed  by  big 
contributors of time and/or money in religious organizations noted in passing in Iannaccone 
(1997b: 142) has not been analyzed so far. Recall the point about exemptions, customized 
services, etc obtained by wealthy members in Section 4.2.2 (supra). Asymmetric distribution 
of power would imply that the small donors might not be freeriding because the big donors 
who are increasing the average are basically paying more to buy power. May be the small 
donors are ready to worship in a hut and unwilling to sponsor missionary activity. So why 
should they pay for construction of a Neo-Gothic fortress or missionary activity in Tuvalu? 
Three, for yet another way of looking at the issue see Ekelund et al (2006: 58) who argue that 
given sufficiently segmented customers a seller in market for religion can price discriminate 
since services  are non-tradeable.  This  leads  us  to  ask  if  freeriding  merely  captures price 
discrimination. One more point that has not received much attention so far is doctrinal or 
behavioural freeriding. Consider someone who contributes average time and money but does   100 
not stick to behavioural and doctrinal demands of the group. Is this person freeriding? At 
least Iannaccone‟s (1992a) sects would regard behavioural deviation as freeriding. 
 
8.2.4 Belief-practice dissonance 
 
Having discussed a few issues related to time and money contributions we will now take up a 
more  fundamental  issue,  namely,  whether  church-goers  themselves  believe  that  religious 
effort, particularly contribution of time and money, influences their afterlife destination. Does 
a successful explanation of church attendance as if it were governed by cost-benefit analysis 
imply that  it is indeed  the true determinant  of  behaviour  (cf. Section 4.7.1,  supra)?  The 
following observation about Christianity illustrates our concern further: 
[T]he central message of Jesus, e.g., in the Sermon of the Mount, is that salvation will not be obtained 
or even guaranteed by the observation of law but by God‟s grace “without any merit and dignity,” as 
Martin Luther‟s famous short catechism states in its explanation of the first article of faith (Nutzinger 
1997: 239, also 237-8; also see Gleaser and Glendon 1998 and Ulbrich and Wallace 1983: 44-45 for 
Christian tradition; see Hull and Bold 1994: 456-457 for non-Western societies with uniform afterlife 
treatment for all). 
 
But Ulbrich and Wallace (1983: 50) are able to reject the hypothesis that individuals with 
greater exposure to  church (i.e.,  individuals  more well-versed with  the doctrine) are less 
likely to be influenced by afterlife incentives to attend. Others have found similar evidence. 
Ulbrich and Wallace (1983:  45) raise another point: 
If additional attendance is not expected to generate additional salvation, then there is no reason for 
belief  in  an  afterlife  to  be  positively  and  causally  related  to  attendance.  Of  course,  if  individual 
parishioners perceive a salvation payoff to attendance, regardless of official theological opinion, then 
belief in an afterlife and attendance could be related.  However, their view is not likely to receive 
positive reinforcement from the pulpit. (Emphasis added) 
 
If the above were true one cannot simultaneously claim that an individual is Christian as well 
as believes that prospect of afterlife varies continuously with individual offerings, church 
visits, etc. So the level of participation is to be seen as a token of gratefulness or whatever 
rather  than  as  an  outcome  of  marginal  calculus.  Consider,  for  instance,  Anderson  and 
Tollison‟s (1992) observation about Catholicism that good works are neither necessary not 
sufficient for salvation:   101 
The official doctrine of the Catholic Church has long held that salvation was strictly a function of faith 
on the part of the individual, and good works only play a role of insofar as they represent an expression 
of that faith (emphasis added; also see Margolis 1997: 246-247 for Luther‟s simultaneous linking and 
de-linking of salvation and good works; cf. Nutzinger 1997: 239. For detailed discussions on role of 
good works in Christianity see Weber 1995 [1920] and Samuelsson 1961). 
 
To retain marginal calculus in models of individual religious behaviour notwithstanding the 
above  concerns  requires  that  we  address  the  following  questions:  a)  from  where  do  the 
churchgoers  get  the  alternative  beliefs,  b)  why  do  they  go  to  a  church  whose  pulpit 
contradicts their beliefs
73, c) does the church know that its laity disagrees with it in this 
regard, d) if yes, why does it tolerate the dissonance, e) are we to define Christian church as 
one that consists of people who do not believe in its doctrines , f) should we treat the people 
who permanently disagree with the pulpit as Christians (unlike citizensh ip membership in a 
church is not mandatory) and g) why does no supplier move in to provide a theology closer to 
de facto beliefs? These questions lead to yet another question: a) is it possible that  there is 
disconnect between our variables some of which are stated (“Do you believe in the Sermon of 
the Mount”) while others are revealed (church attendance, donations)? and b) by how much 
should a given practice deviate from a given belief for us to conclude that the two cannot be 
related? The answers to these questions have implications for empirical exercises that control 
for market shares of churches and for analyses that study the felicity with which a church 
uses the twin instruments of doctrinal and behavioural strictnesses. 
 
Orwell’s Problem (Part II) The questions raised here complement our earlier discussion on 
Ekelund  et  al‟s  assumptions  (cf.  Section  4.7.2,  supra)  in  a  crucial  way.  There  we  drew 
attention to an Orwellian Problem, namely, people not acting efficiently given information 
and evidence about corruption in church. Here we have encountered another such problem 
but one, which relates to the Church not acting on the information about mongrel believers in 
its flock. In any Orwell‟s Problem we can segregate the actors into two camps. In one camp 
are  those  who  do  not  respond  efficiently  to  available  information  and  bear  losses  as  a 
consequence and in the other are those who reap the benefit from the inaction in the first 
camp. In the religious domain there are two complementary Orwell‟s Problems and both 
parties, church and believers, play both the roles. This complementarity arises due the the fact 
in the religious domain both parties play the role of principal as well as agent (cf. discussion 
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on principal-agent problems in Section 7.0, supra). This discussion should alert us against 




So far EoR has relied on three major types of indexes that capture degree of separation of 
state and church (uni-dimensional vs. multi-dimensional indexes), demographic heterogeneity 
(fractionalization  vs.  polarization  indexes),  and  competition  in  market  for  religion 
(Herfindahl vs. others), discussed below in the same order.  
 
8.3.1 Institutional secularization 
 
Separation of state and church has been the focus of a number of contributions since late 
1980s. On the one hand we have Barro and McCleary (2005: 188 states) who present a 
dichotomous index, which is easy to use. On the other Fox (2006) provides by far the most 
refined index for separation of religion and state. He ranks 152 states (population > 1 million) 
on a 0-100  scale  covering  general  restrictions,  legislation, discrimination, and regulation. 
Grim  and  Finke  (2006)  provide  separate  indexes  for  government  regulation,  government 
favoritism, and social regulation of religion for 196 political territories (all countries and 
some other political entities except U.S.A.).
74 Of the three Fox‟s index is most informative. 
The shortcoming of a dichotomous index is easy to see. For instance, it cannot differentiate 
between Scandinavian and Middle Eastern countries. But multi-dimensional indexes are not 
free from blemishes either. Fox (2006) notes the usual aggregation problem in constructing 
such indexes. Here, we will discuss one striking feature of Fox‟s coding, which will lead us 
to Grim-Finke. According to Fox U.S.A. is the only state with complete separation between 
state and religion, score = 0 (ibid: 559). This seems to be inaccurate on at least six counts: a) 
religious organizations as well as their donors enjoy income tax exemptions (Reece 1979), b) 
states have laws governing organizational structure of churches (P. Dane quoted in Mao and 
Zech  2002),  c)  it  is  not  clear  if  blue  laws  have  been  repealed  across  USA  (Gruber  and 
Hungerman  2006:  Table  1),  d)  institutionalized  cooperation  between  state  and  religious 
                                                 
74 Others attempts at index building include Gill (1999: Latin America, 0-21), Chaves and Cann (1992a: 18 
Western Christian countries, 0-6), Box-Steffensmeier (1992: 17 Western Christian countries, 1-10), North and 
Gwin (2004: 59 states, 0-9). See Iannaccone (1992b) for problematic nature of such indexes.   103 
organization in areas of common interest via the “office for faith-based intiatives” (Dixit 
2005,  also  see  McCleary  and  Barro  2006b),  e)  appeal  on  religious  grounds  in  election 
campaigns (Glaeser et al  2005), and f) lobbying by religious interest groups for appointment 
of judicial officials. 
 
Even though one is not sure about the extent to which Bellah‟s (1967) civil religion has 
invaded Washington there is no doubt that even after accounting for a) - f) U.S.A. remains 
one  of  the  most  secular  states  in  the  world.  Still  it  is  worth  noting  that  even  extremely 
elaborate schemes might fail to capture the otherwise obvious manifestations of state-religion 
interaction.  But  why  does  Grim-Finke  index  not  cover  U.S.A.?  Simply  because  it  is 
constructed from information contained in U.S. Department of State‟s International Religious 
Freedom Report (Grim and Finke 2006: 9). Fox (2006: 555) also uses this report but in his 
case it is one among a larger set of sources relied upon. Grim-Finke index based on the report 
of a sub-ordinate of U.S. government is problematic for two reasons: a) U.S.A. itself does not 
have full separation of religion and state and b) U.S.A. is an interested party in conflicts in 
every region of the world. This shortcoming, however, should not overshadow a very crucial 
contribution of Grim and Finke, namely, distinction between state and social regulation as 
well as between state regulation and state favouritism. 
 
An important issue is overlooked in all the index building enterprises. Ranking is one thing 
but it does not tell us whether a particular score is feasible or desirable, which is what should 
interest us as economists. McConnell and Posner (1989) suggest that full separation is both 
impracticable as well as undesirable because market for religion has “close and unbreakable 
connections  to  many  other  markets  in  which  government  intervention  is  commonplace”, 
which means that some intermediate level of separation probably closer to full separation is 




Demographic heterogeneity is widely considered to be an important determinant of religious 
behaviour.  Two  different  kinds  of  measures  have  been  employed  in  this  regard. 
Fractionalization index,  , where si is the share of ith religious group in population 
and N is the number of religions, measures the probability that two individuals picked at   104 
random  belong  to  different  communities  and  is  basically  one  minus  Herfindahl  index 
(Alesina  et  al  2003).  Polarization  index,  ,  provides  measure  of  the 
extent to which large groups dominate the society (Reynal-Querol 2002). Fractionalization 
increases with increase in number of communities whereas polarization decreases as number 
of communities increase and is maximized when there are two communities of identical size. 
Both high levels of fractionalization and low levels of polarization characterize a relatively 
heterogeneous  society.  Fractionalization  is  not  sensitive  to  small  changes  in  shares  of 
different groups as it is dominated by the share of largest group. Intuitively speaking both 
indexes  should  increase  with  normative  distance  between  groups.  But  the  distance  is 
generally treated to be fixed across different pairs. Following Fearon (2003), who combines 
inter-community distance and fractionalization in a non-religious context, it is desirable to 
examine the interaction between religion and other identity markers, which might mitigate or 
aggravate the normative distance between two religious communities. Fearon accounts for 
linguistic distance based on language classification. The idea behind the new measure is that 
“number of common classifications in the language tree can be used as a mesure of cultural 
proximity”. Cultural fractionalization index is given by  , where 
 is a resemblance factor that is equal to one when groups i and j speak the same 
language, l is the number of shared classifications for the groups, m is the maximum number 
of classifications for any language in the data set, and  . To account for religious 
distance the classification of religions suggested in Kumar (2008a) can be used. Accounting 
for interaction between identity markers is important because it has been argued that nature of 
a stand alone identity marker is quite different from one embedded in a web of competing and 




Herfindahl index or pluralism index, which is one minus the former, are the most commonly 
used measures of competition in market for religion. We have already discussed the scathing 
criticism of use of this index (Chaves and Gorski 2001, Voas et al 2002, Montgomery 2003) 
and also an alternative that skirts the controversy, the rank ordering of markets for religion, 
proposed by Montgomery (2003) (see Section 4.2.1, supra). 
   105 
9.0 Models of Afterlife 
 
One  thing  that  differentiates  religion  from  rest  is  its  supernatural  dimension  (Stark  and 
Bainbridge 1980: 124). In EoR religious phenomena are treated either as purely this-worldy 
(Sullivan 1985, Grossbard-Neuman 1986, Neuman 1986, Iannaccone 1988, 1990, 1992a, and 
1994, Montgomery 1996b, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001) or including otherworldly aspects as 
well (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975, Redman 1980, Durkin and Greeley 1991, Smith 1999, Reed 
and Bekar 2003, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Cavalcanti 2007). Regarding the first approach 
note two things. One cannot assert that afterlife matters a lot to a lot of people (Iannaccone 
1998: 1469) and also exclude it from explanation of religious behaviour, an inconsistency 
noted by Iannaccone (1990, 1998) himself. Also empirical studies based on the first approach 
often control for belief in afterlife (see, for instance, Iannaccone 1994: Table 3). For a partial 
compromise between the two approaches see Ferrero (2008a), who first builds an incomplete 
information model assuming this-worldliness and then argues that the empirical evidence 
cannot reject the primacy of this worldly concerns in the problem under consideration. With 
some  exceptions  (Hull  and  Bold  1994  and  1989  and  Kumar  2008a)  religions  without  a 
conception of afterlife are widely ignored, which is interesting since modelling a religion 
with afterlife as if only worldly part mattered and a religion without afterlife are entirely 
different things even if the end result is same. If studies based on the former approach find 
empirical  support  can  we  infer  that  religion  is  indeed  devoid  of  afterlife  dimension  (cf. 
Section 4.7.1, supra)? In this section we will discuss modelling religion with and without 
afterlife component. 
 
9.1 Religious capital model (Modelling religion sans afterlife) 
 
The dominant model here is Iannaccone‟s (1990) religious capital model, based on Becker‟s 
theory of human capital. Religious capital consists of “familiarity with a religion‟s doctrines, 
rituals,  traditions,  and  members”  (ibid:  299),  without  any  intrinsically  religious  content, 
which could differentiate it from other forms of human capital.
75 For a recent religious capital 
                                                 
75 The idea of religious capital is not really novel. Traditional religious discourse also had a notion of such a 
capital. In that discourse religious capital did not consist of address books and scriptures frozen in memory. No 
one got salvation for memorizing scriptures or being in contact with believers. What counted was deeds. Do to 
others what you would have them do to you. Within religious discourse the tension between knowing and acting 
was always resolved in  favour of right deeds. Traditional approach  therefore  informs that religious capital   106 
based empirical study see Smith and Sawkins (2003), who also account for other factors like 
demographic  heterogeneity  (also  see  Footnote  34,  supra).  In  human  capital  models 
individual‟s  instantaneous  utility  function  is  denoted  by  the  following  expression  (ibid: 
1579): 
                  (4) 
Uq > 0, Uqq < 0, UR > 0, URR < 0, UC > 0, UCC  < 0, UqR  > 0, dq/dR > 0    (5) 
 
where  U(t)  is  utility  at  time  t,  q(t)  is  consumption  of  organized  religion,  C(t)  denotes 
consumption  of  all  other  commodities,  and  R(t)  is  the  stock  of  religious  capital,  which 
depends on past consumption of organized religion and is “accumulated initially as a result of 
parental investment decisions”. UqR > 0 and dq/dR > 0 capture the complementarity between 
consumption  of  organized  religion  and  religious  capital.  “[R]eligious  human  capital  and 
participation  are  complements  since  the  accumulation  of  religious  capital  provides  an 
incentive for further religious participation” (ibid: 1579). Accumulation of religious capital 
also  enhances  religious  productivity.  In  this  model  participation  in  religious  activities  is 
treated as yet another way to build human capital and attempt is made to “explain religious 
patterns and trends solely through variations in individual opportunity, that is without appeal 
to  preference  variation”  (Kuran  1994:  772)  or  changes  in  beliefs  (Caplan  2001:  13, 
Montgomery 1996a: 444). Montgomery points out that it is not clear what exactly is captured 
by religoius capital. Is it a “proxy for utilities, probabilities, or both”? Do people stick to 
parental religion because they derive more utility or because they believe in it? In fact, it is 
plausible that participation influences both beliefs as well as utilities, a fact widely ignored in 
religious capital literature. 
 
The  key  predictions  of  religious  capital  model  include  inertia  of  religious  affiliations, 
religious endogamy, decreasing chances of conversions with ageing after a certain age, U-
shaped  participation-age  profile,  etc,  which  can  also  be  obtained  using  other  modelling 
approaches. For instance, inertial religious affiliations can also be explained by using insights 
drawn from a number of other approaches, not all of which are methodologically exclusive or 
independent:  procrastination  (Akerlof  1991:  10-11),  uncertainty  (Montgomery  1992:  120, 
Kumar 2008b), status quo bias (Chaves and Montgomery 1996: 129), cognitive dissonance 
                                                                                                                                                        
should be treated as a stock of points collected through good deeds, ethical behaviour. People did not approach 
saints to intercede on their behalf because they had lot of knowledge rather they were supposed to be rich in 
purportedly transferable religious capital acquired through good deeds. This holds true for individual, e.g., 
saints, as well as organizations, e.g., the Roman Catholic Church.   107 
(Montgomery  1996b:  445-446),  adaptive  preferences  (Sherkat  and  Wilson  2001:  1403), 
rational irrationality (Caplan 2001: 13), and home team bias (Wittman 2008). We can add 
another  explanation  to  this  list,  christened  brownie-point  capital,  which  treats  religious 
capital as stock of points collected by a believer over time that depends on how closely one 
conforms  to  the  scriptural  exhortations  (see  Footnote  75,  supra).  Assuming  involuntary 
acquisition of brownie-points aka religious capital in pre-adult phase and then invoking loss 
aversion one can see that with some additional structure (inverted-U earning-age profile) this 
model would provide almost all predictions one gets from a religious capital model. 
 
9.2 Modelling religion with afterlife 
 
9.2.1 Heaven with limited seats  
 
Given Calvinism‟s centrality in Weber‟s hypothesis it is indeed surprising that this type of 
heaven has hardly received any attention. Calvin preached that for inscrutable reasons god 
randomly chose a sub-set of mankind, Calvin included (!), for salvation and that the select 
can sense their privileged status from success in their calling. There is nothing one can do to 
change this initial choice. So afterlife can be modelled assuming fixed number of places in 
heaven,  which  are  strictly  less  than  the  population,  alloted  randomly.  This  mechanically 
creates a scope for scarcity rents. See Dixit and Grossman (1984) for the only instance of use 
of  this  approach.  Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1986)  point  out  that  their  assumption  is 
incompatible  with  existing  religions,  which  promise  heaven  to  all  true  believers.  Ferrero 
(2002: 344) observes that while the places in heaven are infinite, terrestrial agents can control 
access and create a scarcity. But even this does not create a scarcity rent though it leaves 
room for informational rent. An interesting feature of Dixit and Grossman‟s model is that 
religion can be beneficial under certain circumstances, e.g., a monastic religion can help if 
there is surplus labour, a cathedral building religion can help by diverting resources in a war 
prone society, etc. 
 
So far there is no full-fledged model of heaven with limited seats.  Glaeser and Glendon 
(1998)  model  the  impact  of  belief  in  predestination  on  secular  outcomes  (for  more  see 
Section 5.1.2, supra). A successful model has to take into account the uncertainty inherent in   108 
Calvinist doctrine. Firstly, if honesty, etc are required to reassure one then one is actually 
gambling.  What  if  one is  not  among  the  select?  Then  all the  investment  in  gentlemanly 
behaviour  net  of  earthly  returns  goes  down  the  drain.  Secondly,  as  population  increases 
uncertainty increases because people are not sure whether the quota of elects is proportional 
to population or is a fixed number irrespective of population. In fact, one is not even sure if 
the quota is evenly spread across generations. What if each generation‟s share in quota is 
inversely proportional to its distance from the first generation? What about those who are 
born before receiving the prophet‟s message? 
 
9.2.2 Heaven sans capacity constraint  
 
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) model for household allocation of time between religious and 
secular sectors is the trendsetter in this category. We will take the liberty of quoting at length 
from  their  pioneering  paper  to  illustrate  the  nature  of,  what  is  known  as,  the  religious 
household production model: 
[M]ost religions promise their members some form of an afterlife. Furthermore, the expected afterlife 
benefits are often viewed by individuals as being at least partially related to their lifetime allocation of 
time  to  religious  activities.  This  suggests  that  household  participation  in  church-related  activities 
should be analyzed in the context of a multiperiod household-allocation-of-time model which allows 
for “afterlife consumption,” with this variable being at least partially a function of the household's 
investment of members‟ time in religious activities during their lifetimes…Our household‟s view of the 
afterlife is not one of an all-or-nothing proposition (heaven or hell), it is rather that there exists a 
continuum of possible outcomes. The stream of expected afterlife benefits will last indefinitely into the 
future. However, if the household has any positive subjective rate of time preference, we can convert 
this infinite durational flow into a finite expected discounted present value of afterlife benefits (as of 
period n + 1)…. Thus, we can represent an infinite horizon model by an n + 1 period model. (Azzi and 
Ehrenberg 1975: 28, 33-34, 52; also see Redman 1980: 331, Hull and Bold 1994: 450, Ekelund et al 
1996: 61, Smith 1999: 452-453, Hrung 2004: 374, Chang 2005: 5, Cavalcanti et al 2007: 109-110, 
Benabou and Tirole 2006: 732, and Tao and Yeh 2007: 773)
76 
 
Households have preference ordering denoted by the following quasi-concave utility function 
(Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975: 32-34): 
                   (6) 
                                                 
76 Cavalcanti et al‟s (2007: 109-110, 115-116) model requires in addition that difference between pay-offs from 
heaven and hell is finite, which is not necessarily in line with religious teachings.   109 
 
where Ct is the final consumption in period t that depends on input of market goods and time 
of both spouses and q is the present discounted value of return from afterlife that depends on 
the  time  allocated  by  both  the  spouses  for  religious  activities  in  all  periods  during  their 
lifetimes. Households maximize utility subject to lifetime income and time constraint. Time 
is divided among labour, household production, and church. The distinctive features of this 
approach (not all of which appear in the above quote) include the following: a) belief in god 
and afterlife are coterminus (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975: 34, Durkin and Greeley 1991: 187, 
Tao and Yeh 2007: 773), b) afterlife is a normal good (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975: 36), c) 
religious  participation  can  be  explained  by  invoking  salvation  motive,  d)  returns  from 
salvation are obtainable only after this life, and e) returns from afterlife are finite. Each one of 
these features is problematic in one or the other way. Ulbrich and Wallace (1983: 45-47, 49) 
draw attention to the multiple interpretations of empirical support for Azzi and Ehrenberg. 
For  instance,  a  significantly  positive  relationship  between  attendance  and  both  spouses 
belonging  to  the  same  religion  can  validate  either  the  current  consumption  hypothesis 
(“enhancing  the  consumption  benefits  (joint  consumption)  or  reducing  the  costs  (marital 
discord)”) or the afterlife hypothesis (“the lower wage spouse specializing in the production 
of afterlife capital”). 
 
By confounding belief in god and afterlife the model is rendered useless whenever the two 
are not interlinked, as in case of religions without afterlife. Treating afterlife to be a normal 
good is problematic since Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) find church-membership (ibid: 40) and 
church-attendance  (ibid:  48)  to  be  income  inferior  (also  see  Long  and  Settle  1977:  412, 
Ulbrich  and  Wallace  1983:  49-50,  and  Ekelund  et  al  2006:  57).  Further  “[i]f  salvation 
depends  on subjective belief but  belief is  not  an act  of volition,  rational  choice  analysis 
cannot  explain  religious  participation  through  a  “salvation  motive””  (Montgomery  1992: 
118). But these models do not specify how beliefs change. The assumption that returns from 
investment  in  afterlife  is  obtainable  only  after  this  life  (Azzi  and  Ehrenberg  1975:  35, 
Redman 1980: 331, and Hrung 2004: 734) is questionable because in some religions salvation 
begins  in  this  life  itself  (Sullivan  1985:  310).  Also  investment  in  salvation  yields  direct 
secular pay-offs, e.g., in case of traders on Hajj pilgrimage (Ensminger 1997). A related 
assumption is separability of utility function in terrestrial and afterlife pay-offs (Azzi and 
Ehrenberg 1975: 52, Durkin and Greeley 1991, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Cavalcanti et al 
2007).   110 
 
Last but not the least the treatment of returns from afterlife is also questionable. The rationale 
behind Azzi and Ehrenberg‟s (1975: 28) formulation of returns from afterlife is bi-partite. We 
will comment on the Hull and Bold (1994) version, by far the most lucid exposition of this 
position.  Firstly,  scriptures  suggest  that  religious  promises  about  afterlife  differ  from 
experienced reality only by a few orders of magnitude, so that returns in every period of 
afterlife are finite. Secondly, given discounting the overall returns from afterlife are finite. 
The latter does not sound convincing for two reasons. One, heaven is supposed to be where 
people are assured the best possible quality of life sans scarcity. Two, religions associate 
impatience with human existence, something uncharacteristic of afterlife, which should be 
conquered  in  this  life  to  gain  access  to  comfortable  afterlife.  It  is,  therefore,  arguable  if 
impatience could be associated with afterlife, which in turn suggests that discounting might 
not apply to afterlife.
77 So even with finite returns every period of afterlife the stream of 
returns is not finite. How does one compare an infinite stream of returns with a finite stream 
of returns from involving in religious activities in this life? Durkin and Greeley (1991) do not 
assume discounting or multiple periods in afterlife. Instead they assume that individual utility 
depends on among other things “quality of afterlife”, which provides finite returns. But they 
do not specify how they scale down the returns from afterlife. Further since one either enters 
heaven or does not to sustain their assumption one has to make two additional assumptions, 
which they have not made. One, other world has different colonies allotted as per religious 
merit. Two, people can form expectations about afterlife destination. 
 
Eve’s Problem In the above models people are made to compare returns from afterlife and 
secular activities. How to compare infinite and finite? Others have also noticed this problem. 
For instance, John Wesley argued that through contrived interpretation of scriptures believers 
first downsize the magnitude of expected punishment in hereafter and then justify otherwise 
sanctioned secular activities (Samuelsson 1961: 33). But he does not explain how exactly the 
people manage to accomplish the downsizing. Kane (1966: 430) invokes “dynamic myopia” 
to account for deviant behaviour despite infinite pay-offs from conformance but does not 
provide a formal model. Akerlof‟s (1991) model for procrastination could serve as a starting 
                                                 
77 Since we have no information and religious scriptures are the only known sources about afterlife, which also 
influence behaviour of believers, we cannot but rely on scriptures as a starting point, a point also made in Brams 
(2007 [1983], 2002 [1980]). Even though it is expressed in tangible terms a closer look suggests that the idea of 
afterlife in major religions transcends the space-time framework. There is a hierarchy of afterlives, not all of 
which are stable states.   111 
point. But it is not clear how to downsize infinity in steps, which is how Akerlof‟s agents 
have to begin the transition. 
 
Brams  (2003 [1980]: 17-25) notes that Eve, and later on Adam, faced a choice between 
infinite and finite returns. He posits a God, a serpent, Adam, and Eve, who play a series of 
two person non-cooperative games of complete information against each other. The infinite-
to-finite transition takes place in two stages. First in the game between the serpent and Eve, 
the serpent first dismissed god‟s threat and then promised Eve “the surpassing reward of 
divinity if she tasted the fruit”, which helped Eve to make the transition.
78 Then in the game 
between Eve and Adam the latter‟s “desire to remain unrestrained and his love for Eve” 
helped him make the transition. It is not difficult to see that this is no solution at all. Further it 
would be fruitful to see Adam‟s problem simply as whether to imitate or not. So we are left 
with only one problem, namely, Eve’s Problem that involves an infinite-to-finite transition. 
Brams  (2007  [1983]:  33-35)  also  observes  that  if  one  or  more  pay-offs  is  infinite  in 
magnitude the problem of choice is not well-defined. He argues that one could “evaluate a 
player‟s expected utility in the limit as the reward/penalty approached infinity” (ibid: 38) but 
does  not  illustrate  this  with  a  concrete  example.  Durkin  and  Greeley  (1991:  154), 
Montgomery (1992: 119), and Smith (1999: 452) acknowledge that afterlife pay-offs could 
indeed be infinite rendering the entire issue of choice meaningless (also see Olson 1971: 160-
162) and proceed with marginal calculus without explaining how they skip the infinite chasm. 
 
There are two different issues at hand. Given that we observe people behaving as if they face 
a finite dimensional problem can we model their choices? Modelling a finite dimensional 
problem and an infinite dimensional problem as if it were finite are two different things. How 
do people manage to behave the way they do despite claiming to believe that they face an 
infinite dimensional problem? To use marginal calculus to understand religious behaviour 
requires that we answer the following: How does inflexible (infinite rewards/punishment) 
rhetoric translate into marginal calculus framework (also see Footnote 39, supra)? What is 
the cause and consequence of dissonance between belief and practice? Why do religions live 
with this dissonance? One can, however, look at the whole issue in a different manner with 
the decoupling of salvation and afterlife motives suggested in Section 3.2 (supra) serving as 
                                                 
78 We still come across similar situations in non-“modern” forest-based communities in the Third World, which 
are subjected to competing pressures of modernity (forest is a resource) and tradition (forest, or at least parts of 
it, is an untouchable god). So a meaningful resolution of Eve‟s problem is going to help us in understanding a 
widespread contemporary problem.   112 
the  starting  point.  Davies  (1978:  90-91)  conceptualizes  salvation  as  follows,  where 
plausibility can refer both to beliefs and preferences: 
state of sufficiency of durable plausibility existing for an individual or group, under given ideological 
and social structural conditions, such that no alternative is sought (also see Geertz 2000 [1968]: 89-90, 
Hardin 1997: 260, Albert 1997: 228, 229, 231). 
 
The idea is that human beings seek to live in an understandable universe. Absent such a 
possibility they need to believe they live in such a world. What can economists do about this? 
Actually  this  is  not  as  remote  from  economics  as  it  appears  at  first.  A  case  in  point  is 
Benabou and Tirole‟s (2006) model of the “need to believe in a “just world”” discussed 
above  (see  Section  5.1.2,  supra).  Benabou  and  Tirole‟s  model  involves  individuals  who 
maximize  their  utility  given  information  about  the  rest  of  the  society.  By  adopting  their 
model  we  can  bypass  both  Eve‟s  Problem  as  well  as  the  need  to  find  some  market  for 
salvation. This, however, does not solve our problem because individualistic religions are few 
and far between. All religions have intermediaries in one or the other garb. So there is no 
escape from the exchange situation, i.e., market, which is what we are going to discuss next. 
Finally note one problem with regard to decoupling of salvation as access to afterlife and 
salvation as plausibility generation mechanism. If a religion supports afterlife it becomes part 
of the overall cosmos posited by that religion. Religion renders the whole cosmos, including 
itself, plausible. So decoupling the two is not feasible. However, our the attempt to decouple 
them has helped us in appreciating the possibility of religion without afterlife. 
 
10.0 The Market for Religion 
 
In this section we will discuss the nature of the market for religion. We have noted above that 
without salvation and/or afterlife this market is indistinguishable from otherwise comparable 
secular markets. To understand this market we need to understand the beliefs and preferences 
of constituent agents. The objective of this section is to build a coherent picture of the market 
for  religion  with  the  help  of  fragmentary  discussions  in  the  existing  literature.  We  will 
proceed in three steps. First we will discuss the treatment of beliefs and preferences in EoR 
and then draw attention towards the much ignored primacy of beliefs. Finally we will explore 
the nature of the market for religion. Our discussion it should be noted differs radically from 
Iannaccone  (1991,  1998)  and  Ekelund  et  al  (2006),  whose  discussion  on  the  market  for   113 
religion is primarily concerned with the supply and demand side discussions of the kind we 
have seen above (Section 4.0 and 5.0). We will focus on the core of the market for religion, 
which provides the foundation for the visibly manifest markets that have concerned EoR so 
far. 
 




The dominant approach treats peferences as exogeneous (Iannaccone 1997c, Ekelund et al 
2006).  Exceptions  include  Kuran  (1997).  But  he  does  not  provide  a  formal  treatment  of 
choices in market for religion subject to preference falsification. In any case all sides assume 
“well-behaved”  preferences  except  Kane  (1964,  1966),  Brams  (2007  [1983]  and  2003 
[1980]),  Reed  and  Bekar  (2003),  and  Bernholz  (2006)  who  deal  with  lexicographical 
preferences.  Assuming  lexicographical  preferences  for  core  concerns  of  religion  is  not 
unreasonable given the status of divine within a religion. Hull and Bold (1994: 450) confound 
beliefs with preferences, when they suggest that the latter could “be interpreted as a measure 
of  plausibility  of  church  claim  about  the  afterlife”.  As  mentioned  above  there  is  no 
contribution  dealing  with  meta-preferences.  However,  in  Coşgel  and  Minkler  (2004b) 
religious  individuals  have  “identity-conferring  commitments”  that  govern  “choices  of 
preferences  and  actions”.  Identities  can  be  complementary  (believer  and  parent)  or 
susbstitutes  (believer  and  scientist).  So  changes  in  different  secular  dimensions  of  life 
differently impact “religious commitments and behaviour”. Two things remain unclear in 
their discussion: a) why do people form commitments in the first place and b) where from 
these commitments arise. Contrary to their assertion one can argue that commitments can 




The  treatment  of  beliefs  is  equally  unsatisfactory.  We  will  examine  three  issues: 
characterization of beliefs, uncertainty management, and change in beliefs. Beliefs are mostly   114 
treated as exogenous to analysis. For example, Ekelund et al  (2006: 5) argue, “[i]t is clearly 
not irrational to assume, as we do, that human beliefs (however they are formed) are given”. 
In principle there is nothing wrong in holding part of the variables fixed but one still would 
like to figure out the function of “given” beliefs in contributions to EoR, an unenviable task 
not taken up here. We will instead concentrate on studies that try to deal with beliefs in a 
non-trivial fashion. Here one finds many different approaches. At times belief in god and 
afterlife are used interchangeably, which as pointed out above effectively excludes religions 
without afterlife (see Section 9.2.2, supra). For instance, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 52) and 
Cavalcanti  et  al  (2007:  107)  treat  religious  belief  as  individual  probability  of  reaching 
heaven. Durkin  and Greeley  (1991:  181) confound practice and belief,  which are  clearly 
distinct dimensions of religiosity (see Stark and Glock 1968: 14-15). 
 
Then there is the issue of uncertainty that looms large over any non-verifiable belief system. 
Assuming religious dealings to be risky Iannaccone (1995a, also 1998: 1491) suggests that 
people  mitigate  the  risk  by  diversification  or  collective  production.  The  latter  involves 
seeking safety in numbers whereas in the former individuals might simultaneously subscribe 
to radically opposed beliefs to avoid a major loss from association with a belief that might 
later  on  turn  out  to  be  wrong  or  harmful.  Bruce  (1993:  202)  has  argued  that  “religious 
promiscuity” is not necessarily “a form of rational diversification” because of the “absence of 
certainity about the ultimate return” from engaging with multiple religions and also because 
“religions generally demand (and get) the complete faith of their adherents”. Even though the 
latter argument is  suspect  the former makes  sense  makes  sense for an additional reason, 
namely, limits to cognitive dissonance that human beings can handle. 
 
The point about diversification brings us to Raskovich (1996) who defines polytheists, a rare 
attempt in EoR, as people who believe that different gods exist with different probabilities 
(ibid: 460) or who believe that offerings to different gods would be fruitful with different 
probabilities  (ibid:  453).  This  is  implausible  on  three  counts.  One,  people  do  not  go  to 
worship believing that there is, say, only half a chance that the god enshrined is actually a 
god. Two, people do not think that they can fool god who is omniscient. If one god says no 
then other gods have no reason to oblige. (But see Harmgart et al 2006 on role of miracles in 
Medieval Christianity.) Three, polytheists do not worship different gods simply because of 
risk aversion. Rather different gods in a polytheistic pantheon are approached for different 
purposes  or  a  few  gods  co-preside  over  certain  aspects  of  life  jointly.  If  diversification   115 
hypothesis is correct then one should find that polytheists worship more than one god for the 
same  purpose  even  though  it  is  known  that  worshipping  at  least  one  is  necessary  and 
worshipping at most one of them is sufficient for success. The problem is compounded if we 
take cognizance of monism, the belief that all gods are equal and true manifestations of the 
same god. Now the probabilistic definition of Raskovich becomes completely redundant. In 
Kumar (2008a) belief in god is a dichotomous variable. In a society that knows  N gods 
followers of an n-theistic religion believe that the n gods who form their religion‟s pantheon 
exist  with  probability  one  and  rest  of  the  gods  do  not  exist.  Following  Raskovich‟s 
formulation has other implications as well. According to his formulation religions with large 
pantheons have enormous redundancy. One wonders how such belief systems with enormous 
redundancies  could  survive  over  long  periods  spanning  centuries  if  not  more.  This  also 
applies to religions that provide multiple saints who can be approached for intercession.
79 
 
Quite distinct from the above contributions is Caplan (2001) who models beliefs per se. He 
argues that religious beliefs belong to the class of low information, high certitude beliefs, 
which  can  be  modelled  as  rational  irrationality.  People  are  endowed  with  taste  for 
irrationality. He assumes an objective irrationality-material wealth exchange rate observed by 
individuals without bias. This is a very strong assumption since costs of holding on to 
irrational beliefs cannot be known with reasonable certainty in many of the situations of 
interest in EoR and also the difference between rational/irrational is not always clear. Caplan 
implicitly assumes existence of three kinds of beliefs: useful, innocuous, and harmful. In fact, 
all beliefs are innocuous unless tested, i.e., unless one incurs a cost for continued adherence. 
Most religious beliefs, howsoever, irrational can be held with high certitude because they do 
not affect ones material well-being, e.g, strongly believing in the reality of Mosaic mircales 
or flying prophets does not affect ones salary  unless one is into aircraft designing. But the 
limitation of Caplan becomes clear when we consider the case of those who  sacrifice their 
lives for otherwise innocuous religious myths, e.g., the place of Ali in  (Islamic) prophetic 
hierarchy, etc. Note that our last example suffers from identification problem s. Those who 
fought initially for Ali‟s honour were also fighting for their share in the nascent Arab empire.  
But what about those who fight for Ali‟s honour in 20
th Century urban South Asia? Horowitz 
(2000 [1985]) would argue that even these latter conflicts are instrumental. 
 
                                                 
79  See  Ferrero  (2002)  who  argues  that  the  institution  of  sainthood  in  Catholicism  helps  checking  agency 
problems.   116 
Having discussed a number of different models of religious beliefs we will now try to find 
out if some of them can help explain changes in religious beliefs. Interestingly we know a lot 
why people do not change beliefs most of the times
80 but little if anything  about why they 
change beliefs sometimes.  Human players in Brams (2007 [1983]) change beliefs but the 
mechanism of belief transformation is not made explicit and, it seems, assume d to be 
unproblematic. In Durkin and Greeley (1991, also 1992) individual chooses the level of faith 
(read belief). But as pointed  out above they confound belief with practice. It is easy to see 
that Caplan (2001) can explain changes in belief subject to changes in price of holding on to 
extant beliefs. In other words it can explain some forced conversion (changes in beliefs)
81 but 
it cannot explain the large number of cases  in which people have indeed died but did not 
change otherwise innocuous or  even harmful beliefs.  For instance, it cannot explain why 
people moved from pantheism to monotheism (or even atheism)
82 or why people began to 
subscribe to a desacralized notion of state because in all these cases there was no pressure to 
abandon the existing “irrational” beliefs. If anything the pressure was in favour of status quo. 
In Raskovich (1996) individuals change beliefs under threat of sanctions, which is strange 
because  sanctions  can  only  change  actions,  which  need  not  correspond  to  beliefs.  It  is, 
however, not impossible for these actions to influence beliefs a la cognitive dissonance. But 
he does not invoke this stratagem. Readers might want to refer to Section 4.6 (supra) where 
we discussed the issue of religious conversion. We will end this sub-section with an extended 
discussion on Pascal‟s wager. 
 
                                                 
80 Following existing literature various possible explanations could be suggested: status quo bias/endowment 
effect  (Chaves  and  Montgomery  1996  and  Frey  1997),  sunk  cost  effect  (Frey  1997),  religious  capital 
accumulation (Iannaccone 1990), uncertainty about other alternatives (Montgomery 1992, Kumar 2008b), home 
team bias (Wittman 2008), and beneficial side effects (Hardin 1997). Hardin (1997: 264) argues that even if rain 
dance systematically fails to produce intended results bringing the belief about its efficacy into question it might 
nevertheless persist because it builds social capital of the community giving it a higher chance of survival. Still 
one  wonders  how  an  otherwise  non-productive  practice  can  escape  scrutiny  in  so  many  societies  widely 
dispersed across space and time. In fact, given the great investment it called for (see, for instance, Loewe 1994 
and also Oakley 2006) one can as well ask why a series of failures would not eat up more social, and more than 
that physical capital, and possibly contribute to the demise of the community. 
81 The Jain scholars of South Asia used to add  may be it is right (syaat yeh theek ho) at the end of their 
arguments (Dinkar 1954 [2002]). When faced with such a person one might not feel the need to change his 
belief that god is a blue colored Himalayan sheep dog clad in Armani who loves Cuban cigars. But if the person 
asking for change is a sword wielding crusader or jihadi suicide bomber then one does not have the luxury to 
entertain fancy beliefs. 
82 See Raskovich (1996) who tries to explain the emergence of monotheism as the dominant religion in a 
polytheistic society. There are two different kinds of problems with his attempt. In addition to the problems  
already discussed in this section his analysis also suffers from the neglect non -monotheistic alternatives to 
polytheism. Rationalizing the polytheism-to-monotheism transition after the fact and explaining why among the 
many possible alternatives monotheism emerged are entirely different things.   117 
Pascal’s Wager: A number of contributions on changes in belief are inspired by Pascal‟s 
Wager. Pascal “asks if selfish rational arguments are available which suggest that one should 
order one‟s life as if God existed” (Landsberg 1971).
83 While this is decidedly theologically 
(can genuine belief in god rest merely on fear or self-interest) and epistemologically (can one 
simply believe whatever one likes)
84 suspect the rational choice part of it is of direct interest 
to us. Using a simple model Landsberg (1971) shows that the wager cannot serve as an 
impersonal normative guide for a rational agent even for a binary choice problem,  namely, 
choice between theism and atheism. One can d raw support for either belief or disbelief 
depending on “his other beliefs and the strength with which these beliefs are held” (emphasis 
added) and in any case Pascal‟s wager cannot resolve the tie between multiple gods. We will 
present here Landsberg‟s model for an educated gambler for the case involving just two 
options and highlight the link between Pascal‟s Wager and Eve‟s Problem. 
 
Example 3: (Pascal’s Wager and Eve’s Problem) An individual believes that god exists with 
probability p. In case god does not exist and he does (not) participate in religious activities he 
receives a pay-off equal to 0 (1). However, if god exists and he participates in religious 
activities he receives a pay-off of R > 1. If god exists non-participation attracts punishment P 
so that pay-off is R-P. A rational individual participates if p > 1/(1 + P). Pascal assumed that 
  P  so that any positive subjective belief will favour the decision to be religious (ibid: 
101-102).
85 In effect he presumed that the individual faced Eve‟s Problem. 
 
It cannot however be denied that our actions (governed in part by past choices) affect our 
beliefs. So going through the motions could indeed induce belief. Montgomery (1992: 118-
119) examines the wager within a cognitive dissonance framework. 
 
Example  4:  (Pascal’s  Wager  in  cognitive  dissonance  framework)  Suppose  an  individual 
believes that god exists with probability p. If he participates in religious activities and god 
exists he receives a reward (R) otherwise return is zero in case of non-participation or non-
existence  of  god.  Assume  participation  cost  to  be  C.  A  rational  individual  chooses  to 
                                                 
83 One can find similar instrumental justifications for believing in other traditions. See Tulsidas‟s (1576) Shri 
Ramacharitmanasa (Sundarakanda: 57) for medieval Northern India. 
84  Jon Elster, cited in  Montgomery (1996a: 446), observes  that  an individual cannot both (1) believe a 
proposition and (2) recognize that this belief stems from a decision to believe. 
85  As long as reward from belief is infinite and probability is strictly positive the exact  level of belief  is 
immaterial. However, if as generally assumed the returns are finite then “the rational choice problem is well 
defined only if p is known” (Montgomery 1992: 119).   118 
participate  iff  pR  –  C  >  0.  At  p*  he  is  just  indifferent  between  participating  and  not 
participating.  In  this  case  if  he  continues  to  participate  then  he  suffers  from  cognitive 
dissonance due to conflicting cognitions: (a) there is very little chance that god exists and (b) 
I  am  participating  in  religious  activities.  Dissonance  reduction  requires  that  either  he 
continues to participate (and belief accentuates to pH > p*) or discontinues participation (and 
belief  de-accentuates  pL  <  p*).  The  rational  choice  problem  is  not  well-defined  due  to 
endogeneity of beliefs. If pHR – C > 0 > pLR – C “either choice [belief or disbelief in god] 
would appear to be correct after it has been made (but before God‟s existence has been 
revealed)” (ibid: 119; emphasis in original).
86 Montgomery (1992: 119-120) also provides a 
simple model of Pascal‟s Wager taking into account the Knightian distinction between risk 
and uncertainity. The conclusion remains unchanged: Pascal‟s Wager cannot serve as a guide 
to the perplexed. 
 
While in our discussion above we noted that Pascal‟s Wager cannot help one in a multi-god 
setting Brams (2007 [1983]) points out yet another weakness of the Wager. He observes that 
given that Pascal presumed “a bet whose outcome will never be known” (or “we will know in 
our lifetimes only indeterminacy”) it is indeed surprising that he did not consider a third state 
of nature, namely, existence of god is indeterminate. Brams models the Wager as a one-
person game (Figure 3) against three states of nature – god‟s existence is verifiable, god‟s 
non-existence  is  verifiable,  god‟s  existence  is  indeterminate,  in  which  humans  have  two 
strategies – search and do not search. He shows that human agents do not have a dominant 
strategy unless one is prepared to make assumptions, not all of which are plausible (ibid: 33-
35). 
Figure 3 about here 
 
While  Pascal‟s  framework  is  decision  theoretic  Brams  (2007  [1983])  examines  a  related 
question within a two person non-cooperative game theoretic setting. Assuming that god is 
“an active entity who is capable of making choices” he asks if it is rational for god to reveal 
himself  and  for  individuals  to  believe  in  god.  He  also  examines  the  implications  of 
omniscience, omnipotence, and immortality of god for the outcomes of games between god 
and  individuals.  He  deduces  player‟s  pay-offs,  strategies,  and  preferences  from  the  Old 
                                                 
86  While  cognitive  dissonance  drives  changes  in  beliefs  through  changes  in  action  (Montgomery  1992) 
commitment can also be influential in this regard (Goldin and Metz 1991, Coşgel and Minkler a and b). Actually 
commitments are not an alternative to action driven changes in beliefs and/or preferences. Commitments impose 
certain restrictions on choice of actions, which in turn feedback to reduce cognitive dissonance.   119 
Testament.  While  the  analysis  does  not  generate  unambiguous  answers  it  abounds  in 
paradoxes of all kinds. One can raise a number of objections to his analysis starting from 
characterization of players. For instance, it is not clear whether the human player is a believer 
or agnostic (ibid: 19-22); if believer then parts of analysis are superfluous and if agnostic one 
is not told how he comes to know god‟s preferences. Since it is not difficult to bypass these 
problems  by adding some additional structure  to  assumptions  we can  move on to  a few 
important insights one can pick up from Brams. First of all faith and rationality are shown to 
be indistinguishable in a number of religious settings. He argues that oftentimes there is no 
difference  between  the  rational  calculus  behind  “logical  decision”  and  “emotional 
commitment” and therefore the same action can be justified either way.
87 He suggests that in 
such situations it is better to stick to faith  and reduce ones cognitive load. Brams (2003 
[1980]) shows this in case of the biblical stories of Abraham and Jepthah (also see Brams 
(2007  [1983]:  36-37).  Secondly,  Brams  (2007  [1983])  shows  that  a  large  number  of 
theological games between god and humans are marked by undecidability, i.e., “an ordinary 
being cannot decide whether the other player is superior from the outcome that is induced”, 
and in a large number of search problems, assuming humans search for god, there is no 
dominant  strategy.  In  effect  Brams  offers  mundane  foundations  for  inscrutability  of  the 
divine realm. 
 
One last point about the treatment of beliefs before we stress their primacy in the following 
section. A majority of the contributions fail to account for the fact that religious belief is 
associated with uncertainty, not just risk. Hardly anyone observes the Knightian distinction 
between  uncertainty  and  risk  (see  Bewley  1986  for  a  discussion).  Exceptions  include 
Montgomery (1992) and Khalil (1997). While most (e.g., Iannaccone 1995a, Ekelund et al 
2006:  58)  talk  in  terms  of  risk  aversion  following  Khalil  (1997:  153-155,  also  see 
Montgomery 1992, Ekelund et al 2006: 50) uncertainty aversion seems to be more relevant 
consideration with respect to the key products of religion. Khalil has, in fact, argued that the 
stratagem of reducing Knightian uncertainty to risk does not work in the case of religion. A 
further possibility that the core of religion is not only unknown but probably unknowable is 
equally  widely  ignored  (exceptions  include  Brams  2007  [1983],  Montgomery  1996b). 
Unknowability, if true, does not rule out the application of rational choice approach to the 
                                                 
87 Others have noted similar ambiguities with regard to human behaviour.  Brennan and Hamlin (1995), for 
instance, argue that if honesty is the best policy under certain institutional settings then people will choose to be 
honest. In such a case “direct calculative egoism” and “dispositional honesty” are indistinguishable.   120 
market  for  religion.  It  only  suggests  that  possibly  we  are  dealing  with  trade  in  symbols 
without empirical correlates (see Section 4.7.1 and 10.3.3). 
 
10.2 Primacy of beliefs 
 
We have seen above that the dominant approach in EoR literature involves invocation of 
unchanging “well-behaved” preferences and beliefs within a framework of rational choice 
under risk as the starting point. The inappropriateness of this approach has already  been 
discussed. We now proceed in two steps to emphasize the primacy of beliefs. First we will 
disentangle beliefs and preferences and then argue in favour of giving primacy to beliefs and 
also discuss the structure this primacy imposes.  
 
10.2.1 Disentangling beliefs and preferences 
 
We have seen above that at times contributions confound beliefs and preferences. We will 
begin with disentangling beliefs and preferences in a non-religious setting followed by an 
example from the religious domain. 
 
Example 5: Consider Aesop‟s The Fox and the Grapes in which a fox is desperately after 
grapes. Preferences and beliefs of the Aesopian fox can be represented as follows: sweet
neutralsour and prob(grapessweet food) = 1. After repeated failure to secure grapes the 
fox concluded “I am sure they are sour”. Even though it is possible to come to the same point 
through preference falsification or preference adaption in this Aesopian fable beliefs (“I am 
sure”),  rather  than  preferences  (“I  do  not  like”,  i.e.,  non-sweetsweet),  are adjusted.  So 
ultimately prob(grapessweet food) = 0. 
 
Example 6: Now consider an example related to religion. If an atheist is asked to indicate his 
preference ordering for heaven (abundance of goods), hell (abundance of bads), and earth 
(scarcity of goods and presence of bads) the answer would be heavenearthhell. But then 
ask  him  to  state  his  subjective  belief  about  existence  of  afterlife  the  answer  would  be 
prob(afterlife)  =  0.  His  preference  ordering  would  be  endorsed  by   believers  with  the 
difference that the latter believe in afterlife. A true Catholic would order religions R1 (same,   121 
pleasant afterlife for all, without any effort), R2 (same, pleasant afterlife for all, with minimal 
effort), and R3 (complex afterlife sans free lunches) as follows R1R2R3. But his belief is 
prob(RR3)  =  0,  i.e.,  the  true  state  of  afterlife  cannot  but  correspond  to  religion  R3‟s 
description. 
 
10.2.2 Primacy of beliefs 
 
We  have  shown  above  the  distinction  between  beliefs  and  preferences.  It  remains  to  be 
argued that beliefs should be accorded primacy. We will illustrate the point with the help of a 
hypothetical situation but before that recall that we have already discussed this issue, albeit 
very briefly, in Section 5.1.1 (supra). 
 
Example  7:  Consider  a  monotheistic  missionary  who  believes  that  salvation  requires 
following a prophet of a formless god (Qm) and pagans who believe that salvation requires 
offering unripe lemons to a guava tree (Qp). Initially Qm Qp, prob(Qp = true| pagan) = 
a′ >> 0, and prob(Qm = true| pagan) = a<< a′. The missionary has to convert the pagan so 
that ultimately Qm   Qp, a′   1, and a   a′. We will argue that the 
missionary should first induce change in beliefs, a(→1)   a′(→0). One can as well 
argue that he should begin with converting preferences (Qm Qp). Once beliefs are 
altered  as  suggested  above  then  prob(Qp  =  true|  convert)*U(pagan  heaven)  →  0  while 
prob(Qm  =  true|  convert)*U(monotheisitic  heaven)  >  0.  Thus,  in  this  case  changing 
preferences once beliefs have changed is innocuous from the perspective of erstwhile pagan. 
But  if  preferences  alone  are  altered  with  beliefs  left  unscathed  then  prob(Qm  =  true| 
convert)*U(monotheisitic heaven) → 0 and prob(Qp = true| convert)*U(pagan heaven) > 0, 
at least  as long as U(pagan heaven)  > 0 under the reformed preferences. So there is no 
incentive in the latter case to change beliefs after preferences have been changed.
88 
 
                                                 
88 Example 8: Consider a comparable case from politics. Informed preferences over communism and democracy 
would  be  as  follows:  communist  promise democratic  promise democracy  as  practiced communism  as 
practiced. For perpetuation of communist rule it is sufficient that a majority believes that successful overthrow is 
impossible,  which  may/may  not  be  buttressed  by  the  belief  that  communism  is  the  only  true  system  of 
governance. This might require belief falsification. Of course through propaganda the regime can also alter the 
preference or at least enforce preference falsification. But preference falsification a la Kuran (1991) was neither 
necessary nor sufficient for stability of communist regimes. This should be evident from the fact that even those 
who preferred communism switched sides when they realized that the regime was about to collapse. Before that 
time even those who preferred non-communist regime did not express their preference because they believed 
that the regime is unlikely to bow to public pressure and would, in fact, respond with repression.   122 
Since change in preferences does not necessarily lead to change in beliefs the missionary is 
better advised to focus on changing beliefs. Empirical evidence to the contrary is due to the 
fact that beliefs are difficult to verify whereas preferences revealed through behaviour make 
it easy to gauge the success in efforts put in to change preferences. For instance, in Henri 
IV‟s case  the moderate Catholics had to  accept  change in  preferences because efforts to 
ensure belief transformation were proving to be too expensive. Muslims in South Asia show 
preference  for  Muslim  places  of  worship  but  their  pre-Islamic  belief  in  god-like  saints 
remains intact and continues to be driving force of South Asian Islam. 
 
10.2.3 Hierarchy of beliefs and preferences 
 
Having  argued  in  favour  of  primacy  of  beliefs  we  can  say  that  preferences  cannot  be 
arbitrary. Rather the latter have to be compatible with the former. For instance, Hausman and 
McPherson (1994) argue that in general preferences depend on beliefs rather than other way 
round.
89 For example, a believer in Mohammed‟s prophethoood cannot prefer pork to other 
permissible foods or idol worship to worship of formless god. Now we can provide a clearer 
picture of religious beliefs and preferences. Individuals have belief about existence of god (0
th 
order beliefs) and afterlife (1
st order beliefs) and preferences over quality of life and afterlife 
(1
st Order preferences). Further they have beliefs about which religion is more likely to lead 
to the preferred outcome here and hereafter (2
nd Order beliefs). One could argue that instead 
of 2
nd Order beliefs individuals could have 2
nd Order preferences over available alternatives, 
say, Islam, Protestantism, etc. It is not difficult to see that this is not meaningful. Consider, 
for  instance,  a  bicycle  and  spacecraft.  One  might  prefer  to  travel  to  moon  on  a  bicycle 
without ever believing that bicycle can be used to reach moon. A similar argument applies 
wherever one likes to replace beliefs with preferences. So we can say that there is a hierarchy 
with higher order beliefs and preferences being constrained by lower order ones. But the 
hierarchical structure of preferences proposed here is not coterminous with meta-preferences 
posited elsewhere in literature (see Sen 1977; also Wallis 1991: 189-191 for a review of 
relevant literature). 
 
                                                 
89 Montgomery (1996a) stresses the need to differentiate between beliefs and preferences but does not suggest 
further structure. The primacy of beliefs in religion comes out very clearly in Wolfe‟s (1993) examination of 
Henri IV‟s (re-re-)conversion to Catholicism.   123 
10.3 The market for religion 
 
We concluded Section 9.2.2 (supra) with the observation that market for religion cannot be 
dispensed  away  with.  We  will  proceed  in  three  steps  in  this  sub-section.  First  we  will 
examine  the  purported  sources  of  demand  for  religion.  Then  we  will  argue  that 
salvation/afterlife the key product in the market for religion is difficult to value followed by 
the argument that it defies usual characterization of goods in market. Finally we describe the 
market for religion as a peculiarly inscrutable market. 
 
10.3.1 Demand for religion 
 
It  has  been argued that  religion  continues  to  thrive  in  the world  because it  helps  one to 
navigate in an uncertain world. The uncertainty intrinsic to religion is widely ignored though 
(see Section 4.1, supra). Religion‟s claim that it can reduce this uncertainty is itself subject to 
uncertainty because it generates both its claims and proofs. By providing a global uncertainty 
reduction mechanism religious doctrine forecloses the possibility to step out and ask if the 
mechanism works. There are instances when authors have suggested that religions can indeed 
reduce uncertainty without explaining how that happens in absence of influx of additional 
credible  information  into  the  system  (Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  1986:  52).
90  One fails to 
understand  how  Durkin  and  Greeley‟s  (1992:  122)  paranormal  signals  and  Iannaccone‟s 
(1995a)  testimonies  are  going  to  reduce  the  uncertainty  intrinsic  to  religion  unless  the 
targeted individual  is  prepared to  believe in  their efficacy  a priori,  which is  nothing but 
believing  in  the  religion  itself.  But  in  the  first  place  these  signals  and  testimonies  were 
provided to help the target decide whether believing is worth it! 
 
The confusion regarding religion‟s efficacy in mitigating uncertainty is compounded by the 
fact  that  it  is  not  clear  if  the  claims  of  religion  are  normative  or  descriptive.  Generally 
normative and descriptive claims of religion are mutually reinforcing (Geertz 1968 [2000]: 
89-90; also see Hardin 1997: 260, Albert 1997: 228-231). Religious claims have no chance of 
passing as normative statements. Applicability for normative purposes requires that the states 
                                                 
90 Revealed/prophetic religions solve this problem once for all by invoking an omniscient being, external and 
prior to creation, who conveys the truth to a chosen one and his people. The latter in turn transmit the message, 
“uncorrupted”, across space and time.   124 
of nature identified by religion should be a) mutually exclusive and b) exhaustive and c) 
should represent “nature’s exogenous uncertainty” that cannot be affected by individual‟s 
choice of action. Whether the states actually exist or are conjured up is irrelevant for the 
purpose  of  normative  use  (Machina  2002).  The  first  requirement  is  not  easy  to  fulfill 
particularly  for  monotheistic  religions
91  and fulfilling the second is a tall order for all 
religions. Still inline with the ingenious solution  (tri-partite dogma)  devised by religions, 
described in Section 4.7.1 (supra), assume that the believer takes the scripture at face value 
so that the list supplied by the scripture is  believed to be exhaustive. Even then the last 
requirement  cannot  be  fulfilled  because  simply  by  converting  to  atheism  or  some  other 
religion the states of nature can change drastically. Further one can also argue that religious 
claims cannot serve as stand alone descriptive statements without the scaffold of beliefs. We 
have already suggested that religious claims cannot be subjected to rational scrutiny in a 
straightforward manner. 
 
So religion cannot objectively serve as a guide to the perplexed in an uncertain world. In 
other  words  the  demand  for  religion  cannot  be  explained  by  suggesting  that  it  helps 
individuals to deal with uncertainty.
92 
 
10.3.2 Salvation as a good 
 
It has been argued that salvation is beyond the pale of rational choice because “it is not an 
alternative to any other end” (Diesing quoted in Bruce 1993: 204) and therefore it cannot be 
valued as yet another market good. But why not value salvation the way we value Mona 
Lisa?  The  analogy  though  tempting  is  not  appropriate.  Salvation  cannot  be  auctioned  to 
determine its value for two reasons. One, there are theological constraints, which rule out 
such an attempt even if it made sense. Two, the attainment of salvation by one person does 
not rule out the same for others. In fact, “consumption” of salvation by one person does not 
even reduce the quality of salvation enjoyed by others. So salvation is a non-depleteable 
                                                 
91  Monotheism  presumes  a  god  that  is  unique  and  external  to  the  universe,  including  its  space  and  time 
dimensions. So an alternative to Christianity whether another religion or no-religion cannot merely be a state of 
the world. Instead it will be yet another set of states of the world. 
92 Balagangadhara (2005 [1994]: Chp. 5) has discussed the contribution of other sources of demand for religion, 
e.g., “fear of unknown”, “chaos”, “hostile nature”, nature‟s “mystery”, etc, towards the origin of religion. He 
rejects the claim that one or more of these could explain the origin of religion. But such claims continue to 
figure in EoR (see Ekelund et al 2006 for a recent example).   125 
good. In fact, one can also say that given uncertainty joint “consumption” might as well lead 
to improvement in quality experienced a la Iannaccone (1992, 1995a). Consider, for instance, 
salvation as a plausibility generation mechanism. The more people subscribe to it the more 
credible is its promise to render the world plausible. But we also know that individuals can be 
denied salvation. So, salvation is neither a public good nor a private good. Possibly it is a 
kind of club good. But it is not clear if this analogy is helpful because unlike a club good, 
which exists independent of the club that tries to obtain it, the very possibility of salvation 
begins to emerge after the formation of club-salvation. 
 
Another  common  tendency  in  EoR  equates  religious  goods  with  credence  goods  (see 
Iannaccone  1995a:  286,  Iannaccone  and  Berman  2006:  115),  which  in  our  opinion  is 
inappropriate. We are not saying that religious products are necessarily non-credence. In fact, 
most the religious products can be classified as search and experience (Nelson 1970) and 
credence  (Darby  and  Karni  1973)  goods.  Only  salvation,  which  has  defied  satisfactory 
treatment, does not fall under either of these categories. That salvation goods are neither 
search nor experience goods is plain. So it suffices to make clear why we think that they are 
also  not  credence  goods. Darby and Karni (1973:  68-69) define a credence  good as  one 
whose qualities “cannot be evaluated in normal use” and are “expensive to judge even after 
purchase”. Exchange of these goods involves “a consumer who is unfamiliar with the exact 
qualities of a particular purchase” and “a seller of a product with qualities measurable only at 
considerable  expense”.  Credence  goods  require  quality  certification  otherwise  the  market 
cannot  function  (Akerlof  1970,  Darby  and  Karni  1973,  Ekelund  et  al  2006:  52).  It  is 
straightforward  to  see  that  our  seller  himself  is  clueless  about  his  wares  and  the  quality 
cannot be verified at any cost by either party or third party experts. In fact, third party experts 
and quality certifications do not even exist in the religious domain. A Pope does not send 
doubting Toms to a Caliph or a Marx to cross-check the veracity of the Church‟s claims. So 
short of death there is no way to ascertain the truth about afterlife. 
 
But  does  salvation  in  the  sense  of  plausibility  generation  fall  into  one  of  the  three 
abovementioned categories? No, because supplier has no idea if his setup works to the end 
proclaimed and consumers cannot objectively ascertain the quality even after purchase. Here 
cost is not a consideration because to verify the quality of the product (uncertainty reduction 
mechanism) a consumer has to first believe that it works, i.e., the consumer has to accept that 
the product works before attempting to verify if at all it works. Ekelund et al (2006: 27-28)   126 
suggest that salvation/afterlife is a meta-credence good but stick to credence goods in their 
discussion. We propose the tag inscrutable good, which clearly indicates that we are dealing 
with a good that we have not been able to describe so far the way we describe other goods. 
An important property of marketable goods is our ability to judge their quality after detaching 
ourselves not only from such goods but also the act of using them; if this is not feasible then 
one cannot also think of a third party. That afterlife cannot be handled in this way is easy to 
see.  Further  it  is  not  clear  how  one  can  detach  oneself  from  salvation  as  a  plausibility 
generation mechanism as well as the plausibility flowing from it. Recall that we have already 
discussed the difficulty in decoupling sub-components of salvation in the concluding remarks 
to Section 9.2.2 (supra). So in our discussion below we will treat salvation as a monolithic 
good. 
 
10.3.3 Selling an inscrutable good in an inscrutable market 
 
If as argued above demand for salvation, the key product of religion, is difficult to relate to 
empirically verifiable sources and salvation as a good is ill-defined and even otherwise is 
difficult to value then one should expect the market for religion to collapse sooner than later. 
Still this market of equally clueless sellers and buyers thrives. Such markets are known as 
inscrutable markets, where “there is no clear ground on which the notion of “honesty” itself 
can be constructed” (Gambetta 1994). In passing note that inscrutability and intangibility are 
not co-extensive. Even with one supplier such a market is queer. With multiple suppliers 
consumers  suffer  from  a  particular  variant  of  Buridan‟s  Ass  problem,  namely,  choosing 
between products that are different “in some crucial aspect which is not apparent”. In such 
situations consumers can at best work with thumb rules, which are not necessarily rational. 
Frey (1997) also draws attention to the too little search carried out in the market for religion 
and the biased evaluation of whatever little information that is available. 
 
Gambetta suggests that in such a market it is the supplier who needs to give signals to induce 
transactions.
93  It has been suggested after Weber that rationality might better reflect the 
decision-making process of organization (here   church) than individuals (Demerath 1995: 
                                                 
93 We can arrive at this claim from a different starting point as well. If one is prepared to entertain the Knightian 
distinction between risk and uncertainty and accept that the core of religion is marked by uncertainty then one 
can say that it is unlikely that individuals will shop in the market for religion. To draw them out of the blissful 
state of Knightian status quo (see Bewley 1986, also Montgomery 1992) the suppliers have to exert themselves.   127 
107). This fits in well with the idea of inscrutable market where the supplier has to choose a 
rational strategy. Both suppliers and consumers (this presumes a demand for religion) have 
incentive to generate and accept symbols of mythic proportion to facilitate exchange and in 
time  these  symbols  substitute  for  the  products  they  were  supposed  to  certify  in  the  first 
place.
94 But there is one crucial difference  between the market for religion and Gambetta‟s 
inscrutable market. In Gambetta‟s market for (mafia) protection the sellers have some clue 
about their capacity to deliver, claims are ex-post verifiable by at least some players in the 
market,  including the successful  mafia and others who survive killings. Once in  a while 
someone careless or sufficiently risk-taking generates information, which is in fact a public 
good and no wonder underprovided. But in markets for religion even this latter possibility is 
ruled  out.  Finally  note  a  very  crucial  point.  From  the  above  it  should  be  evident  that 
Gambetta‟s inscrutable markets deal with credence goods whereas the core of market for 
religion  is  a  market  dealing  with  an  inscrutable  good.  In  short,  market  for  religion  is  a 




We  will  now  quickly  recapitulate  what  we  discussed  in  course  of  this  review.  A  longer 
summary  is  available  at  the  beginning  of  this  essay  (see  Section  2.0,  supra).  We  first 
suggested multiple taxonomies for EoR and then organized the literature survey according to 
the causal mechanism, namely Marxist or Weberian, underlying the explanations contained in 
papers. Inability to pin down religion for analytical purpose and difficulty in dealing with 
afterlife/salvation were identified as the major shortcomings of the literature. In light of this 
we  then  discussed  the  problems  with  aggregate  and  individual  level  analyses  and  the 
limitations of indexes used in EoR. In the last but one section we discussed at length the 
problems associated with modelling afterlife/salvation, the distinctive element of religion. 
The  last  section  began  with  a  discussion  on  unsatisfactory  treatment  of  beliefs  and 
preferences  in  EoR.  We  then  argued  in  favour  of  primacy  of  beliefs.  Finally  like  the 
Upanishadic sages we identified the outlines of the market for religion by drawing attention 
to what it is not. What remains at the end of this exercise in negation suggests that the market 
for religion is a peculiarly inscrutable market. We end with the hope that this peculiarity will 
                                                 
94 One needs perhaps to look at explanations of how reality, or indeed an illusion of it is created. Richman 
(2000, ed) and Geertz (1981), and to a lesser extent Oakley (2006), examine this issue in the context of religious 
mythology. Horowitz (2000 [1985]) provides a related discussion with regard to ethnic identity. Within EoR 
Smith (1999) suggests that religious scriptures work on the imagination capital of individuals.   128 
attract more attention in future and enrich economic theory per se. To make sense of this 
hope  compare  the  modus  operandi  of  a  religious  organization  (invent/discover  afterlife, 
inform individuals about the same, and sell insurance packages or tickets for afterlife) with 
the following observation by Gomez and Moore (2006: 209): 
[R]ather than considering religious organizations as firm-like, it could be more opportune to consider 
firms as becoming religious-like organizations…Firms currently seem to create beliefs associated with 
their products, rather than objectivable products. They seek to influence their consumers‟ identities and 
palettes of preferences rather than the products themselves.
95 
   
                                                 
95 This is not an isolated observation. Fogel (1999: 1), for instance, uses the term spiritual “not in its religious 
sense but as a reference to commodities that lack material form”.   129 
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Figure 3: Pascal’s Wager as a Search Decision/Game
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    States of nature 
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search 
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96 Adapted from Brams (2007 [1983]: 34). 
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Table 1: Evolution of Economics of Religion 




Adam  Smith  -  Self-interested  income  maximizing 
players  in  market  for  religion,  human  capital  based 
explanations,  church-sect  dichotomy,  political 





Karl  Marx  -  strictly  materialist  interpretation  of 
religion  (Lobkowicz  1964),  Weber  (1995  [1920])  - 
Protestant ethic hypothesis, secularization, church-sect 
dichotomy 




Lewis  (1972  [1955])  -  macroeconomic  impact  of 
religion, Boulding (1957) - general, Kane (1963, 1964, 
1966) - church as oligopolistic firm with endogenous 
doctrine and lexicographical preferences 




Azzi  and  Ehrenberg  (1975)  -  household  production 
model,  Carr  and  Landa  (1983)  -  club  goods  model, 
Dixit  and  Grossman  (1984)  and  Bhagwati  and 
Srinivasan  (1986)  -  organized  religion  and 
rent/revenue-seeking, Aumann and Maschler (1985) - 
interpretation of Jewish law 
North America, Israel 
1987-
1998 
Ekelund et al - public Choice models, Iannaccone et al 
- religious capital model, church-sect model, religious 
economy model, Posner (1987) - law and economics of 
First  Amendment,  Akerlof  (1991)  -  indoctrination, 
Montgomery (1992, 1996a) - cognitive dissonance 
Christendom, Israel 
1999-  Widely distributed (see Section 7.0)  Christendom, Middle 
East, International 
panels, others (Taiwan, 
India, Indonesia)  
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